

REFORMATION AND THE "CONFESSION-BUILDING"
IN EARLY MODERN POLAND:
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION
OF THE BASIC RESEARCH AREAS

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Abstract: *The article is an attempt to detect the key stages in the research of the Polish Reformation history and to investigate how these stages changed over time. The main groups of the works in the Polish, German, Russian and American historiography were analysed. Based on the primary conceptual approaches and using the chronological principle five main stages of the Polish Reformation historiography development were defined, within which various concepts for the analysis of the historical phenomenon were used. This paper analyses the main features of the Protestant Reformation historiographical tradition, of the positivist, the modernist and the postmodernist approaches to the Polish Reformation history. The author determined that the change of the main approaches to the issue depended on the ideological context and transformations of the dominant historiographical tradition, which influenced the generally accepted interpretations of the historical phenomenon. The second aim of the current research was to explore new horizons for the future studies on the Polish Reformation history. The author noted that one of the most important current research tasks is to find a suitable set of methodological instruments for the research, combining conventional historiographical approaches with the postmodern "Confessionalization" theory, which is still "under construction".*

Keywords: *Reformation, Confession, Poland, Historiography, Modern Times, Methodological instruments, Positivist approach, Modernist approach, Postmodernist approach*

Rezumat: *Reformarea și „construirea confesiunilor” în Polonia modernă timpurie: reprezentarea istoriografică a domeniilor esențiale ale cercetării.* Articolul încearcă să identifice etapele esențiale de cercetare a istoriei Reformei poloneze și să investigheze modul în care aceste etape s-au modificat în timp. Au fost analizate principalele grupe de lucrări științifice în cadrul istoriografiei poloneze, germane, ruse și americane. Plecând de la abordările conceptuale de bază și folosind principiul cronologic au fost definite cinci etape de dezvoltare a istoriografiei Reformei poloneze, în cadrul căreia au fost folosite diferite metode de cercetare a fenomenelor istorice. Sunt caracterizate principalele trăsături ale tradiției istoriografice protestante de reformare, ale

abordărilor pozitivistice, moderniste și postmoderniste în cercetarea istoriei Reformei poloneze. S-a constatat că schimbarea principalelor abordări a depins de contextul ideologic și de transformările tradiției istoriografice de bază, influențând, în consecință, interpretarea general acceptată a fenomenului istoric. Al doilea obiectiv al acestei cercetări a fost acela de a identifica noi direcții în cercetarea istoriei Reformei poloneze. S-a remarcat faptul că una din sarcinile de cercetare actuale constă în găsirea unui ansamblu de instrumente metodologice care să combine abordările istoriografice tradiționale cu teoria postmodernistă a „confesionalizării” aflată încă în stadiul de elaborare.

Résumé : La Réformation et « l'établissement de la confession » dans la Pologne prémoderne : la représentation historiographique des domaines de recherche fondamentaux. Cet article est une tentative de déterminer des principales étapes de l'étude de l'histoire de la Réforme polonaise et d'examiner comment ces étapes ont changé avec le temps. Les principaux groupes des travaux de recherche de l'historiographie polonaise, allemande, russe et américaine ont été analysés. En se basant sur les approches conceptuelles dominantes et en utilisant le principe chronologique de cinq principales étapes et en utilisant le principe chronologique, les cinq étapes du développement de l'historiographie de la réformation polonaise ont été définies et ont été utilisés les différents concepts l'analyse des phénomènes historiques. Les principales caractéristiques de la tradition historiographique de la Réforme protestante, des approches positivistes, modernistes et postmodernistes à l'étude de l'histoire de la Réforme polonaise ont été décrites. L'auteur a déterminé que changement des principales approches dépendait du contexte idéologique et des transformations de la principale tradition historiographique qui ont influencé les interprétations communément admises du phénomène historique. Le deuxième objectif de cette étude consistait à explorer de nouveaux axes de recherche de l'histoire de la Réforme polonaise. Il a été indiqué que l'une des tâches les plus importantes consiste à trouver un ensemble approprié d'instruments méthodologiques destinés à la recherche en combinant les approches historiographiques classiques avec la théorie de la confessionnalisation post-moderne est « encore en cours d'élaboration ».

INTRODUCTION

The European Reformation originated in wide-ranging transformations in almost all spheres of public life. Each European state was involved in the development of this new phenomenon, defining its place, role, and specificity of relations with other elements of the system. In the second half of the 16th century Poland was one of the largest Eastern European countries, which experienced its real “golden age”, characterized by outstanding political and cultural achievements, which were widely known far beyond the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The Protestant Reformation was a complex socio-political phenomenon, which was strongly combined with the ideological, social, political and economic determinants. Being an integral part of the 16-17th centuries Eastern European history, the Reformation in Poland formed a unique regional model of its proceeding, which was different from the Western European types. The analysis of the primary source material of this period allows us not only to reconstruct its course but also to determine the scale, nature, and limits of the influence of the Reformation changes in their spatial-temporal parameters.

It should be noted that practically every branch or specialized field of early modern studies that developed in Poland since the second half of the 19th century not only touched upon the Reformation and religious matters but very often due to the significance of the surviving historical documents and archives, totally focused on this subject. It is quite clear that the wide diversity of trends in early modern studies has naturally contributed and continues to provide a better understanding of the Polish Reformation. An important breakthrough in medieval studies in general, including Reformation history, was made by numerous publications of the narrative historical sources and documentation descended from the late 16th century, a project undertaken primarily by the Academy of Learning and the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. The Reformation 500th anniversary celebrations also provided a new impulse to research and reassessment in the very field of the study.

Different approaches of historians to the understanding of the essence of the reformation movement reflect the complexity, diversity, and contradictions of the Reformation epoch. The search for a new, broader interpretation of the Reformation as a historical phenomenon was reflected in the concept of "Confessionalization" formulated by the German historians W. Reinhard¹ and H. Schilling.² The researchers put forward the notion of the typological homogeneity of the reformation and counter-reformation movements, proposed to rename the period of the Reformation to the era of Confessionalization. Among other things that implied the phenomenon of the formation of new Christian confessions in the 16th – 17th century Europe, which existed in close connection with the socio-political processes of the early modern period and passed through

¹ W. Reinhard, *Glaube und Macht: Kirche und Politik im Zeitalter der Konfessionalisierung* [Faith and Power: Church and Policy in the Confessionalization Epoch], Freiburg im Breisgau, Herder, 2004.

² Heinz Schilling, *Early Modern European Civilization and its Political and Cultural Dynamism*, Hanover, University Press of New England, 2008.

three stages of its development: the stage of “internalization of faith” (in Germ. *Bekenntnisbildung*), the stage of “confession-building” (in Germ. *Konfessionsbiuldung*), and the stage of “social disciplining” (in Germ. *Sozialdisziplinierung*).

Despite a large number of publications devoted to this issue, there is a necessity to make some generalizations. The European Reformation was interpreted by researchers in different ways. In this article we will focus on the main approaches to the historiographical representation of the reformation movement in Poland in order to highlight the key stages in the development of the Polish Reformation historiography. The main goal is to identify the key approaches and to investigate how these approaches changed over time. The paper also aims at exploring new horizons for future studies in the Polish Reformation history.

Taking into consideration the significant historical influence and the far reaching consequences which the reformation movement has had, many generations of historians turned their attention to its main characteristics. The historical study of the specific features of the Polish Reformation (which started more than five hundred years ago) has already accumulated historiographical heritage consisting of the works of Polish, and to a lesser extent, German, Russian and American historians. Depending on the dominant conceptual approaches and using the chronological principle, it is useful to divide the total array of historical works into five main stages of research development, within which various methods for the analysis of the historical phenomenon were used.

PROTESTANT REFORMATION HISTORIOGRAPHY

The first stage – the middle of the 17th – first half of the 19th century was marked by the process of increasing accumulation of the factual material within the Polish and German historiography. The works of this period are noticeable by their religious and apologetic character, which was enshrined by the Protestant historiographical tradition. The historical analysis of the Reformation movement in Poland was initiated by the Polish Protestant historians of the 17th century A. Węgiński, W. Węgiński, S. Lubieniecki and H. Sandius. Originally created as historical works, the writings of the witnesses of the Reformation epoch perform dual functions, acting as a historical work and as a valuable narrative source at the same time.

The work of the Calvinist author A. Węgiński, entitled *The Historical and Chronological System of the Slavic Churches*, which was first published in 1652 under the pseudonym of A. Regenvolski, deserves our particular attention. During the second reprint which took place in 1679 and was published under the real

authorship, the work was retitled as *The Book of the Slavic Reformation*.³ The specificity of the structural composition of this work was aimed to prove the Slavic origins of the European reformation movement. The work consists of four books, each of which comprises sixteen chapters. Despite the large geographical scale and variability of the problems revealed by the author, the description of the events of the Polish Reformation sets the central place in the text. The religious activity of the Protestant communities, the development of the Protestant education and book-printing are referred to the main achievements of the reformation movement in Poland while political aspects of the phenomenon are mentioned only in passing.

Other influential work related to the Protestant historiographical tradition is *The History of the Reformation in Poland* published by the Arian author S. Lubieniecki in 1685.⁴ The text is arranged in chronological order and focuses on the analysis of the theological views of the confessional groups and communities, identifying common and distinctive features of the different trends of the Polish Reformation, while the historical aspects are presented only as the background of the theological issue. The presentation of the material carried out from the theological standpoint of Arianism omits essential historical data about the Polish Calvinistic and Lutheran communities' development. Highlighting the history of the Polish anti-Trinitarians the author proceeds to disclose the confessional mosaic of the Polish Reformation. In addition to the accumulation of factual material, the main research accomplishments of this work can be summarized as the analysis of the theological foundations of the Polish Reformation and an attempt to determine the leading causes of their evolution.

The dynamics of the development of the Reformation movement in Krakow during 1552-1657 was traced in the work of the Calvinist historian W. Węgiński *Chronicle of the Evangelical Gathering in Krakow*.⁵ Until its first publication in 1817, the work existed only in the manuscript form. Highlighting the course of the inter-confessional confrontation between the Polish Catholics and Protestants, the author emphasizes the aggressiveness of the counter-reform activities initiated by the Catholic Church. The historian also glorifies the Protestant victims of the religious

³ Andreae Wengerscii, *Libri quattor Slavoniae Reformatae* [The Book of the Slavic Reformation], Varsoviae, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1973.

⁴ S. Lubieniecki, *Historia Reformacji Polskiej* [The History of the Reformation in Poland], Warszawa, Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1938.

⁵ W. Węgiński, *Kronika zboru ewangelickiego krakowskiego* [Chronicle of the Evangelical Gathering in Krakow], Kraków, Parafia Kościoła Ewangelicko-Augsburskiego, 2007.

persecution. In general, despite some factual inaccuracy, the work of W. Węgiński, based on the use of a wide range of documentary sources, undoubtedly has an unquestionably high informative value.

An attempt to trace the history of the Arian communities in Poland was presented in the treatise written by the Arian author H. Sandius *Library of the Anti-trinitarians* first published in 1684.⁶ It contains valuable biographical information focused on the lives of the leaders of the Polish Arianism, a list of Arian publishing houses located on the Polish territory and the bibliography of the Arian 17th century books published in Poland. The manner in which the text is organized fully accords with the encyclopaedic style, with a minimal amount of author's comments. The documentary material accumulated by H. Sandius increases significantly the diverse array of the historical sources on the Polish Reformation history.

The final victory of the Counter-reformation in the 17th century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth resulted in the geographical displacement of the Polish Reformation study outside the boundaries of Poland, mainly to the German lands. The historical essay written by the German author S. Lauterbach entitled *Ariano-socinianism in Poland* (1725)⁷ was based on the collected testimonies of the Polish anti-trinitarians. Deprived of the proper historical sources, the author did not even attempt to make any generalizations of the information provided. Another work that can serve as an excellent historiographical example in that regard is F. Bock's *History of Anti-Trinitarians*⁸ first published in 1774 which was also based on the encyclopaedic principle. The work consists of 350 separate articles covering biographies of the most active followers of Arianism in Poland. The main source of information used by the author was the *Library of Anti-Trinitarians* written by H. Sandius. Certain fragments and text passages of *History of Anti-Trinitarians* are either based on or directly borrowed from other works.

A notable place among the works of German historians of the 18th century belongs to Christian Friese's *Church History of the Polish Kingdom*.⁹ The most important asset of this research was an attempt to outline the Polish reformation movement in all its diversity of denominational manifestations. Despite his

⁶ Christophori Sandii, *Bibliotheca antitrinitariorum* [Library of Anti-trinitarians], Warszawa, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1967.

⁷ Samuel Friedrich Lauterbach, *Ariano-socinismus olim in Polonia* [Ariano-Socinianism in Poland], Franckfurt, Leipzig, George Marcus Knochen, 1725.

⁸ Friderici Samuelis Bock, *Historia Antitrinitariorum* [The History of Anti-Trinitarians], Regiomonti, G. L. Hartungius, 1779.

⁹ Christian Gottlieb Friese, *Kirchengeschichte des Königreichs Polen* [The Church History of the Polish Kingdom], Wrocław, Wilhelm Gottlieb Korn, 1786.

obvious pro-Lutheran position, Christian Friese did not reduce the content of the Reformation to the activities of the particular religious group. Another notable feature was the study of a wide array of archival sources in search for the factual details. To a certain extent this work played the role of the special milestone in the Polish Reformation historiography, which contributed to the formation of the holistic view on the historical nature of the phenomenon.

In general, the Protestant historiography presented the Polish Reformation in the framework of its confessional dimension. Such one-sided interpretation predetermined a low degree of the research objectivity. On the one hand, it is important to note, that the Protestant historians were not simply trying to create a detailed record of what had happened but to provide historical background as an additional argument for their religious polemics with the representatives of other confessions. Instead of the declared straightforward chronology of events most of the mentioned works were arranged in a much more complicated way, promoting or defending various theological concepts and principles. On the other hand, although rather selective in choosing data, Protestant historians provided the succeeding researchers with vital factual material which was almost exclusively explained in terms of theology within the consciously formulated apologetic doctrines.

POSITIVIST VIEW OF THE POLISH REFORMATION HISTORY

The next stage – second half of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th century was characterized by the dominance of the positivist approach to the study of the Polish Reformation, presented in the works of the Polish, German and Russian authors which tend to a clear empirical orientation, focusing on factual, critical analysis of the primary source information. At the same time, it should be noted that although the observance of the positivist methodology was declared as a given thing, it did not exclude attempts to implement logical generalizations, structuring of the factual material not only on the chronological but also on the problem principle.

As a result, new publications on various aspects of the Polish Reformation were conducted. In particular, a series of works of the Polish historian J. Łukaszewicz devoted to the study of the regional features of the Polish Reformation argued the need for a comprehensive research of all the confessional trends.¹⁰ The author's attention was primarily aimed at highlighting the problems of the

¹⁰ J. Łukaszewicz, *O kościołach braci czeskich w dawnej Wielkiej Polsce* [About the churches of the Czech brothers in the former Great Poland], Poznań, Drukarnia Karola Pompejusza, 1835.

internal development of the Protestant communities, the evolution of their organizational structure and geographic expansion. The political background of the Polish reformation movement remained practically unanalysed. One of the main achievement of Łukaszewicz works was the publication of several manuscripts which contained rich source material from the Archives of the Raczyński Library in Poznań.

The work of the Polish historian W. Zakrzewski *The Rise and Development of the Reformation in Poland* (1870)¹¹ has significantly contributed to the Reformation history research. Covering the genesis of the Polish reformation movement, the author expanded substantially the range of the used historical sources analysing textual and contextual data of the numerous official Polish Sejm Diaries and the Diplomatic Acts of the Apostolic Nunciature in Poland, which were often neglected by other historians. W. Zakrzewski enhanced significantly the level of the scientific research of the Polish Reformation history, focusing on the participation of the Protestants in the political life of Poland in the 16th – 17th centuries. The author himself determined the main purpose of his work as the attempt to represent the historical reconstruction of the main stages of the Polish Reformation history which would make it possible to create the complete picture of the historical phenomenon in a long-term future.

In the second half of the 19th century, the history of the Polish Reformation was analysed in the works of representatives of the Krakow historical school J. Szujski and M. Bobzyński. Referring to the topic of the European Reformation, the adherents of the so-called “pessimistic” concept of the Polish history interpreted the Polish reformation movement as one of the manifestations of the “szlachta” anarchy. The subject matter of the Polish Reformation was totally reduced to the political issue.

From another perspective the history of the Polish Reformation was presented in the work of J. Szujski *Renaissance and Reformation in Poland* (1880).¹² The first edition included the printed versions of the author's lectures which provided a comprehensive picture of the expansion of the humanistic ideas in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the middle 15th– second half of the 17th century. Analysing the existing historiographical base, the historian emphasized the genetic link and ideological continuity between the periods of the

¹¹ Winsenty Zakrzewski, *Powstanie i wzrost Reformacji w Polsce: 1520–1572*, [The Rise and Development of the Reformation in Poland: 1520–1572], Lipsk, Fr. Wagner, 1870.

¹² Józef Szujski, *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* [Renaissance and Reformation in Poland], Warszawa, Drukarnia Wieku, 1880.

Polish Renaissance and Reformation, noted the significant contribution of the Reformation to the development of the Polish culture. Despite a certain fragmentation, J. Szujski's work initiated the revision of the strictly negative assessment of the value of the Polish Reformation within the Krakow historical school.

Among the comprehensive studies we should point out a two-volume work of the Polish researcher J. Bukowski *History of the Reformation in Poland*¹³ which was first published in 1883. Contrary to what the title stated, the history of the reformation movement was traced back to 1559. From the geographical perspective, the analysis of the events described rarely goes beyond the borders of the Little Poland region. Written from the standpoint of a Catholic priest, the work contains a significant number of subjective evaluative judgments, which, in general, do not reduce the informative value of the used rich source material. The author's desire to emphasize the connection between political and religious struggle in Poland of the 16th – 17th centuries is absolutely obvious.

One of the first attempts to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the Polish Reformation history was also made by the Polish historian, Count W. Krasiński. Being in exile in London, the researcher published a two-volume work.¹⁴ Despite the problem approach declared in the title the work provides a simple account of the main events of the Polish Reformation. Deprived of the opportunity to use archival primary sources, Krasiński has compiled and systematized the main achievements of his predecessors.

Among the studies of this period, a special place was occupied by Russian historians, who focused on the cause-and-effect relationship between the reformation movement and Polish national history. The work of the Russian professor N. Liubovich entitled *History of the Reformation in Poland: Calvinists and anti-Trinitarians* (1883)¹⁵ aroused as a result of the profound research of the subject matter, based on the Polish and foreign archives. The author analysed the history of the Polish Calvinist confessional split, considering it to be the main reason for the decline of the Reformation in Poland. An attempt to assess the Polish Reformation history in the Pan-European context characterizes the work

¹³ Julian Bukowski, *Dzieje Reformacji w Polsce* [History of the Reformation in Poland], Kraków, Drukarnia Wł. L. Anczyca i Spółki, 1883.

¹⁴ Waleryan Krasiński, *Zarys dziejów powstania i upadku Reformacji w Polsce* [The Outline of History of the Rise and Decline of the Reformation in Poland], Warszawa, Nakładem Zwiastuna Ewangelicznego, 1903.

¹⁵ Н. Любович, *История Реформации в Польше: кальвинисты и антитринитариусы* [History of the Reformation in Poland: Calvinists and Anti-trinitarians], Варшава, Типография Земкеевича и Ноаковского, 1883.

of the Russian historian N. Kareev *Essay on the History of the Reformation Movement and the Catholic Reaction in Poland* (1886).¹⁶ Emphasizing the methodological effectiveness of the comparative research, the historian compared the development of the Reformation in Eastern and Western European countries and asserted the similarity in features between the Polish and French reformation movements. Observing the subject on a broad historical background, the scientist was one of the first to note the national urge in the political struggle of the Polish Protestants against the influence of the Catholic Church.

In general, the study of the Polish Reformation from the standpoint of positivist approach remained a separate line of historical research. Despite the fact that all the mentioned authors regarded themselves as the keepers of the positivist ideals, they differed considerably in their philosophical outlooks and had no generally accepted concept of the Polish Reformation history. The impact of the Reformation on the history of Poland has long been a major concern of the positivist researches. The main issues that continued to be debated were the following: whether Reformation can be considered as one of the causes of the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; did the Eastern European reformation movements have something in common with the Western European ones; was the Polish Reformation imposed from above or was it popular; did the Polish Reformation differ according to regions and localities; were the Reformation changes the result of deliberate plans or did they come about through bungling confusion? The trend of positivist scholarship stressed the extent of popular conservatism in the Polish Reformation. The process was not seen as irresistible from the reign of Sigismund II onwards, but it was presented of a series of disparate and at the same time reversible events, influenced as much, if not more, by political rather than theological factors as well as marked by various significant political turning-points. At the same time a major result was the establishment of the critical source analysis and publishing of a wide range of historical documents, presentation of the Reformation as a self-sufficient stage of the European and Polish national history.

MODERNIST AND POSTMODERNIST APPROACHES TO THE POLISH REFORMATION HISTORY RESEARCH

The third stage covers the first half of the 20th century and is characterized

¹⁶ Н. Кареев, *Очерк истории реформационного движения и католической реакции в Польше* [Essay on the History of the Reformation Movement and the Catholic Reaction in Poland], М., Типография А. И. Мамонтова и К, 1886.

by the deepening of the thematic specialization of studies in the history of the Polish Reformation as a multidimensional historical phenomenon. The works of this period represent first and foremost the achievements of the Polish historiography, as well as certain accomplishments of German and American historians. Profound changes in the Polish historical science research priorities, observed by the Third Congress of the Polish Historians in Krakow held in 1900, led to the transition from positivism to the ideas of neo-romanticism and modernism, which became the starting point for targeting of the new historiographical areas, in particular the history of Polish culture. The mentioned above features can be overviewed with the help of several concrete examples.

Enhancement of the research interest in the cultural heritage of the Reformation generated a series of new works dedicated to the study of the Polish Protestant literature.¹⁷ Describing the main achievements of the Protestant polemical tradition, Polish researcher T. Grabowski focused on the historical context of its formation, providing his work with essential historical data. Much emphasis was placed on the coverage of the evolution of the doctrinal principles of the Polish Protestantism. The cultural heritage of the Polish Reformation movement attracted the attention of the Polish researcher A. Brückner¹⁸ who devoted his works to the analysis of the Reformation literature as well as the biographical information about the most iconic figures of the Reformation in Poland.¹⁹

The dynamics of the geographical expansion of the Polish reformation movement was traced in the work *The Protestant Communities and Authorities in the Ancient Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth* (1904)²⁰ by the Polish historian H. Merczyng, who summarized the main achievements of his predecessors and presented all the research findings in the most accurate and accessible form. Using an approach based on the statistical analysis, the author attempted to highlight

¹⁷ Tadeusz Grabowski, *Literatura ariańska w Polsce* [The Arian Literature in Poland], Kraków, Akademia Umiejętności, 1908; Tadeusz Grabowski, *Literatura luterska w Polsce wieku XVI* [The Lutheran Literature in Poland of the 16th Century], Poznań, Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, 1920.

¹⁸ A. Brückner, *Różnowiercy polscy. Szkice obyczajowe i literackie* [Polish Protestants. Sketches on traditions and literature], Warszawa, Nakładem Księgarni Naukowej, 1905.

¹⁹ Idem, *Dzieje literatury polskiej w zarysie* [The Outline History of the Polish Literature], Warszawa, Biblioteka Polska, 1924.

²⁰ H. Merczyng, *Zbory i senatorowie protestancy w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej* [The Protestant Communities and Authorities in the Ancient Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth], Warszawa, 1904.

the quantitative characteristics of the Polish Reformation movement, recognizing the deficiency of the results obtained due to the lack of the full range of sources. Most of the documentary publications in the series of *Monumenta Reformationis Polonicae et Lithuanicae* editions were made on the initiative and financial support of the historian. A brief but informative analysis of the Polish Reformation was presented in the essay of the Polish scholar K. Chodynicki *Reformation in Poland* (1921),²¹ in which making no attempt at a complete research, the author focused on the most significant aspects of the history of the Polish reformation movement, such as the political struggle of the Protestant nobility against the Catholic Church and the idea of initiating Polish National Council.

Analytical approaches of the Polish historiography vividly contrasted with the methods of some German historians of this time. Thus, the work of the German researcher G. Krause *Reformation and Counter-Reformation in the Former Kingdom of Poland*,²² published in 1901, presented simple historical account of events and facts arranged in chronological order shaping the history from theological viewpoints. Theological approach to the historical events was also inherent in a series of monographs of the German historian T. Wotschke *History of the Reformation in Poland* (1911).²³ Interpreting a wide array of source material, the author practically avoided generalizations, supporting the tradition of covering the history of the selected Protestant communities. An excessive focus on the development of the Reformation in Greater Poland Region often interfered with the comprehensive analysis of the Polish Reformation in general. To a certain extent this misleading tendency emerged due to the Greater Poland origin of the documents used, many of which were discovered by the author himself.

The influence of the reformation movement on the peculiarities of the social and economic development of the 16th century Polish state was analysed in the work of the American historian P. Fox *Reformation in Poland: Some social and economic aspects* (1924).²⁴ Explaining the decisive importance of the social and economic factors in the evolution of the Polish Reformation, the researcher

²¹ K. Chodynicki, *Reformacja w Polsce* [The Reformation in Poland], Warszawa, Polska Składnica Pomocy Szkolnych, 1921.

²² G. Krause, *Die Reformation und Gegenreformation im ehemaligen Königreiche Polen*, [Reformation and Counter-Reformation in the Former Kingdom of Poland], Posen, Merzbach Buchdruck, 1901.

²³ T. Wotschke, *Geschichte der Reformation in Polen* [History of the Reformation in Poland], Leipzig, 1911.

²⁴ P. Fox, *Reformation in Poland: Some Social and Economic Aspects*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1924.

highlighted main features of the conflict between the Polish nobility and the Catholic Church. Despite the fact that there was a rather limited collection of published sources at the author's disposal, the work of P. Fox in many respects can be regarded as a starting point for the further in-depth study of the problem.

A methodological break with the tradition of unilaterally political coverage of Polish history stimulated the recourse to complex research problems. The study of the Reformation period offered extensive research perspectives which obtained additional emphasis due to the commemoration of the 400th anniversary of the beginning of the Reformation movement in Europe.

Since 1919, the study of the Polish Reformation history was institutionalized around the specially founded Society for the Polish Reformation History Research. In accordance with the Charter the newly established society was aimed at a comprehensive study of the Polish Reformation, publication of historical documents and popularization of scientific knowledge. The official journal of the Society entitled "Reformation in Poland" was launched in 1921. The work on the annually printed edition brought together the efforts of many scholars of the Polish Protestantism, in particular, such remarkable historians as H. Barycz, O. Bartel, O. Halecki, T. Grabowski and S. Kot.²⁵

A large number of works of this period were dedicated to the study of the Polish Arians whose unique socio-political doctrine attracted the attention of social history researchers. At the same time the study of the Polish Brethren movement reflected the search for the specific features of the Polish Reformation on the example of the denomination that originated on the local ground. As a result, the history of the Polish Arianism remained a basic research topic of the Polish historiography several decades throughout.

As an example, we could mention a series of articles *Ex regestro arianismi*:

²⁵ H. Barycz, *Szkice z dziejów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego* [Sketches on the History of Jagiellonian University], Kraków, Druk W. L. Anczyca i Spółki, 1933; O. Bartel, *Z Dziejów Reformacji w Polsce: walka dogmatyczna w latach 1559–1562* [From the History of Reformation in Poland: Dogmatic Struggle in 1559–1562], Warszawa, Drukarnia P. Wyszynski, 1928; O. Halecki, *Zgoda Sandomierska 1570 r.: jej geneza i znaczenie w dziejach Reformacji polskiej za Zygmunta Augusta* [Union of Sandomierz: its Origin and Significance for the Polish Reformation History during the Reign of Sigismund Augustus], Warszawa, Gebethner i Wolff, 1915; Tadeusz Grabowski, *Literatura luterska w Polsce wieku XVI* [The Lutheran Literature in Poland of the 16th Century], Poznań, Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, 1920; S. Kot, *Ideologia polityczna i społeczna braci polskich zwanych arjanami* [The Political and Social Ideology of the Polish Brethren, called Arians], Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Instytutu Popierania Nauki, 1932.

Essays on the History of the Decline of Protestantism in Little Poland (1948)²⁶ published by the Polish historian M. Wajsblum and dedicated to the analysis of the history of the Polish Arians in the second half of the 17th century. The monograph of the Polish historian Stanisław Kot *The Political and Social Ideology of the Polish Brethren, called Arians*²⁷ published in 1932 was devoted to the study of the socio-political views of the radical branch of the Polish Protestantism. The author's attention was focused on the ideas of pacifism, religious tolerance and social equality reflected in the Polish Arians theology as well as ideological aspects of their social and political activities. Most of the historian's conclusions were based on the analysis of the Arian polemic literature, which provided a rich source of historical data.

Thus, the study of the Polish Reformation became the major academic concern of the social historians. Throughout the period under discussion the main sources systematically published by the previous researchers became accessible and more widely available. New documents were thoroughly explored and following the great social upheavals of the first half of the 20th century as well as the fact of restoration of Poland's sovereignty in 1918 social historians began to take an interest in the subject. This had a beneficial influence on the study and produced considerable research and publishing activity. The foundation of the Polish Reformation Research Society also undoubtedly strengthened the multilateral cooperation amongst the Polish scholars in this field. In addition, the obvious focus on social history connected with the modernist historiographical perspective encouraged significant reassessment of the historical past with the goal of replacing the previously generally accepted concepts.

The fourth stage – the 1950s – the second half of the 1960s was marked by the domination of the Marxist approach to the study of the Polish Reformation history. The First Congress of the Polish Science held in 1951 adopted a resolution on the necessity of the implementation of the basic principles of Marxist methodology as a key element of scientific research.²⁸ The organizational and methodological changes introduced in the form of ideological dictatorship had a direct impact on the development of scientific studies in the history of the Polish refor-

²⁶ M. Wajsblum, *Ex regestro arianismi: szkice z dziejów upadku protestantyzmu w Małopolsce* [Ex regestro arianismi: essays on the History of the Decline of Protestantism in Little Poland], Kraków, Towarzystwo Badań Dziejów Reformacji w Polsce, 1937.

²⁷ S. Kot, *op. cit.*

²⁸ Л. Зашкільняк, *Польська історіографія після Другої світової війни: проблеми національної історії* [The Polish Historiography after World War II: National History Issues], Київ, НМК, 1992, p. 36.

mation movement. Among general features of this period it is worthwhile to mention the great influence of the ideological component as well as the low level of the scientific research. Let's make a brief overview of the mentioned peculiarities.

Held in 1954 Polish Academy of Science Conference dedicated to the problems of the Polish Reformation history triggered a scientific discussion on the topic of the Polish Brethren socio-political views. As a result, the scientific reports emphasized the anti-feudal nature of the Polish Arian ideology highlighting the Reformation history in the context of the so-called “class struggle”.²⁹ The theological views of the anti-Trinitarians were labelled as “inconsistently atheistic”. At the same time, the more moderate trends of the Polish Protestantism were not given a proper analysis.

The research priorities identified during the Conference became generally accepted principles of the Polish Reformation studies. The Commission of the Renaissance and Reformation, headed by historian K. Lepszy, was founded in 1955. One of the official publications of the Polish National Academy of Sciences, yearly periodical entitled “Revival and Reformation in Poland”, was first published in 1956. The adoption of the new research methodology was accompanied by the denial of the previous historical thought and by the ban of any non-Marxist historiography manifestations. Thus, in 1956 the printing of the yearly periodical “Reformation in Poland”, founded in 1921, was stopped, and on June 4, 1963, the Society on the Reformation History in Poland was liquidated by announcing its self-dissolution.³⁰

The basic and practically iconic work which advocated the effectiveness of the Marxist approach in the Polish Reformation studies was *Reformation and the Peasant Problem in Poland of the 16th Century. The Influence of the Class Struggle in the Polish Village on the Formation of the Religious Ideology of the Gentry during the Reformation* (1953)³¹ written by J. Tazbir in the dogmatically Marxist style. The European Reformation received a definition of the broad socio-political movement, which was based on the mechanisms of “class struggle”. Certain radical provisions of the socio-political ideology of the Polish Arians were interpreted by the author as the theoretical basis for the beginning of the anti-feudal revolution. An analysis of the anti-feudal aspects of the Polish Reformation

²⁹ J. Tazbir, *Reformacja a problem chłopski w Polsce XVI wieku. Oddziaływanie walki klasowej na wsi polskiej na kształtowanie się ideologii religijnej szlachty w okresie Reformacji* [Reformation and the Peasant Problem in Poland of the 16th Century. The Influence of the Class Struggle in the Polish Village on the Formation of the Religious Ideology of the Gentry During the Reformation], Wrocław, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1953, p. 7.

³⁰ Л. Зашкільняк, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

³¹ J. Tazbir, *op. cit.*

found its continuation in the monograph of W. Urban.³²

It should be noted that in the late 1950s some Polish historians initiated a gradual rethinking of the restrictive ideological schemes. The striking discrepancy of Marxist concepts with historical realities prompted a careful revision of author's positions. In particular, such works included the monographs of Z. Ogonowski *On Tolerance in Poland of the 17th Century* (1958)³³ and E. Śliziński *On the Literary Activities of the Czech Brethren in Poland during the 16th – 17th Centuries* (1959).³⁴ The liberalization of historical studies formed a sufficient basis for a qualitatively new level of their development.

The fifth stage, characterized by the domination of methodological pluralism in the study of the history of the Polish Reformation, lasts from the second half of the 1960s to the present. The fundamental changes in the Polish historical science coincided with the new stage in the development of the global historical thought, which found its manifestation in the "intellectual turn", shifting the emphasis from the social and political history to the benefit of the cultural one. Parallel transformations in the development of the Polish historiography emerged due to a combination of a wide range of internal and external factors which caused significant liberalization of scientific creativity within Poland.

The study of the problems of the Polish reformation movement has become even more international in nature. New alternative approaches to the study of the phenomenon of the European Reformation were used in the works of G. R. Elton *Reformation Europe: 1517-1559* (1963)³⁵ and A. Dickens *Reformation and Society in Sixteenth-Century Europe* (1963).³⁶ Enrichment with the new theoretical advances of the world science has ensured the progressive development of the Polish historical thought.

More attention was paid to the topics that were previously forbidden. A monograph written by the Polish historian J. Tazbir *A State Without Stakes: Polish*

³² W. Urban, *Chłopi wobec Reformacji w Małopolsce w drugiej połowie XVI w.* [Peasants' Perception of the Reformation in Little Poland During the Second Half of the 16th Century], Kraków, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1959.

³³ Z. Ogonowski, *Z zagadnień tolerancji w Polsce XVII wieku* [On Tolerance in Poland of the 17th Century], Warszawa, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1958.

³⁴ J. Śliziński, *Z działalności literackiej braci czeskich w Polsce XVI–XVII w.* [On the Literary Activities of the Czech Brethren in Poland During the 16th – 17th Centuries], Wrocław, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1959.

³⁵ G. R. Elton, *Reformation Europe: 1517–1559*, London, Collins, 1963.

³⁶ A. G. Dickens, *Reformation and Society in Sixteenth-Century Europe*, London, Thames and Hudson, 1966.

Religious Toleration in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (1967)³⁷ became one of the first works on the history of the Polish Reformation, written in the light of the new methodological approaches. The researcher selected the phenomenon of religious tolerance in early modern Poland as the object for coverage and analysed the participation of the Polish nobility in the reformation movement, highlighted the process of the adoption of the Warsaw Confederation Act and the implementation of the principles of the agreement in practice, recorded typical examples of its violation. The work was also focused on the issue of the Reformation impact on the Polish mentality formation.

Actualized due to methodological innovations, the problem of religious tolerance has received multifaceted coverage in the writings of Polish historians. An attempt of a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of religious tolerance in Poland during the Reformation era was carried out in another monograph by J. Tazbir *The History of Polish Tolerance* (1973).³⁸ The process of the emergence, adoption, and implementation of the Warsaw Confederation Act was analysed in the work *Pearl of Free Conscience: Polemics around the Warsaw Confederation in 1573-1658* (1974)³⁹ written by M. Korolko. The features of the practical implementation of the basic principles of religious tolerance in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were revealed in the writings of M. Kosman *Protestants and Counter-reformation: from the History of Tolerance in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the 16th – 18th Centuries* (1978)⁴⁰ and R. Kościelny *The Problem of the Tolerance of Counter-reformers in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the Turn of the 16th and 17th Centuries* (1997).⁴¹ Historians identified the phenomenon of religious tolerance as the main specific feature of the Polish reformation movement, organically inherent to the Polish mentality.

³⁷ J. Tazbir, *A. State without Stakes: Polish Religious Toleration in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, Warsaw, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1973.

³⁸ Idem, *Dzieje polskiej tolerancji* [The History of Polish Tolerance], Warszawa, Interpress, 1973.

³⁹ M. Korolko, *Klejnot swobodnego sumienia: polemika wokół konfederacji warszawskiej w latach 1573–1658* [Pearl of Free Conscience: Polemics Around the Warsaw Confederation in 1573-1658], Warszawa, Instytut Wydawniczy PAX, 1974.

⁴⁰ M. Kosman, *Protestanci i kontrreformacja: z dziejów tolerancji w Rzeczypospolitej XVI–XVIII wieku* [Protestants and Counter-reformation: from the History of Tolerance in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the 16th – 18th Centuries], Wrocław, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1978.

⁴¹ R. Kościelny, *Problem tolerancji kontrreformatorów w Rzeczypospolitej na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku* [The Problem of the Tolerance of Counterreformers in the

The stated focus on cultural values caused the appeal to the analysis of the cultural heritage of the Polish Reformation. In particular, in 1970 a collection of articles entitled *The Contribution of Protestantism to Polish Culture: on the problems of Protestantism in Poland* was published under the general editorship of T. Wojak.⁴² A. Kawecka-Gryczowa focused on collecting systematic data on the subject of history of the particular Protestant publishing houses in Poland in order to analyse Protestant publishing practices from a variety of widely different perspectives⁴³. The study of certain aspects of the development of Polish Protestant education was represented by the works of S. Tworek *Educational and Cultural Activities of Little Poland Calvinism* (1970)⁴⁴ as well as M. Pawlak's *The History of the Elblong School in 1535-1772* (1972)⁴⁵ and R. Lewanski's *The Role of the Reformation in the Development of Polish Culture* (1990).⁴⁶

Scholar interest towards political history remained topical one but different areas received different scale of attention. The pattern of political struggle was still on the focus of the Polish historians interest. The common political struggle of the Protestant and Orthodox nobility against the harassment of the Catholic Church was traced in the writings of Polish scholars Y. Dziegielewski *On Tolerance for the Vanquished: the Religious Policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the Reign of Władysław IV* (1986)⁴⁷; J. Wołoszyn *Religious Problems in the Parliamentary Practice of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1648-1698* (2003),⁴⁸ T. Kempa

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the Turn of the 16th and 17th Centuries], Szczecin, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 1997.

⁴² Tadeusz Wojak, *Wkład protestantyzmu do kultury polskiej* [The Contribution of Protestantism to Polish culture: on the problems of Protestantism in Poland], Warszawa, Zwiastun, 1970.

⁴³ Alodia Kawecka-Gryczowa, *Ariańskie oficyny wydawnicze Rodeckiego i Sternackiego: dzieje i bibliografia* [The Arian Publishing Houses of Rodecki and Sternacki: history and bibliography], Wrocław, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1974.

⁴⁴ S. Tworek, *Działalność oświatowo kulturalna kalwinizmu małopolskiego: (połowa XVI – połowa XVIII w.)* [Educational and Cultural Activities of Little Poland Calvinism (mid-16th – mid-18th Centuries)], Lublin, Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, 1970.

⁴⁵ M. Pawlak, *Dzieje Gimnazjum Elbląskiego w latach 1535–1772* [The History of the Elblong School in 1535-1772], Olsztyn, Pojezierze, 1972.

⁴⁶ R. C. Lewanski, *The Role of the Reformation in the Development of Polish Culture*, London, 1990.

⁴⁷ J. Dziegielewski, *O tolerancję dla zdominowanych: polityka wyznaniowa Rzeczypospolitej w latach panowania Władysława IV* [On Tolerance for the Vanquished: the Religious Policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the Reign of Władysław IV], Warszawa, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1986.

⁴⁸ J. W. Wołoszyn, *Problematyka wyznaniowa w praktyce parlamentarnej Rzeczypospolitej*

Against Counter-reformation: the Struggle of Protestant and Orthodox Christians for the Freedom of Religion in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the 16th and the first half of the 17th Century (2007).⁴⁹ Summarizing increasingly controversial Polish Reformation historiographical heritage, Polish historian J. Wijaczka focused on the role of the Polish King Sigismund II in declining of the Polish reformation movement by rejecting the opportunity to form the Polish national Church which could have reinforced the royal authority.⁵⁰

The causes of the decline of the Reformation movement in Poland were analysed in another work by J. Tazbir, *The Nobles and Theologians: Research on the History of the Polish Counter-reformation* (1987).⁵¹ This study reveals the social and political factors that caused the decline of the Reformation in Poland and explains the nature of the manifestations of Catholic xenophobia. The researcher also focused on the description of the forms and methods of counter-reformation propaganda, provided examples of religious intolerance used as a method to eliminate political rivals. The origins of the triumph of Polish Catholicism, according to the historian, were closely linked to the change in the mood of the political elite of the state. One of the achievements of the Polish historiography became the collection of historical essays by J. Tazbir *Reformation in Poland* (1993).⁵² Built on the problem basis, the work does not claim to be comprehensive representation of the subject, but proposes to consider the author's analysis of the most neglected problems of the history of Polish Reformation history, such as the Slavic sources of the Polish Reformation, its social base, the role of the Germans in the Polish Reformation movement, the Polish Brethren service to Radziwill princely family.

Those issues which were previously neglected by the Marxist historiographical tradition fully appeared in the centre of the contemporary Polish Reformation studies. Thus, religious conversion as one of the most significant

w latach 1648–1696 [Religious Problems in the Parliamentary Practice of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1648-1698], Warszawa, Semper, 2003.

⁴⁹ T. Kempa, *Wobec kontrreformacji: protestanci i prawosławni w obronie swobód wyznaniowych w Rzeczypospolitej w końcu XVI i w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku* [Against Counter-reformation: the Struggle of Protestant and Orthodox Christians for the Freedom of Religion in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the 16th and the first half of the 17th Century], Toruń, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2007.

⁵⁰ Jacek Wijaczka, *The Reformation in Sixteenth Century Poland: a Success Story or a Failure?*, in "Reformation and Renaissance Review", 2015, Vol. 17, no 1, p. 9-26.

⁵¹ J. Tazbir, *Szlachta i teologowie: studia z dziejów polskiej kontrreformacji* [The Nobles and Theologians: Research on the History of the Polish Counter-reformation], Warszawa, Wiedza Powszechna, 1987.

⁵² Idem, *Reformacja w Polsce* [Reformation in Poland], Warszawa, Książka i Wiedza, 1993.

aspects of the early modern social history was examined in the work of the Polish historian W. Kowalski *From the "Land of Diverse Sects" to National Religion: Converts to Catholicism and Reformed Franciscans in Early Modern Poland (2001)*⁵³. Comparative analysis of the organization of Czech-Brethren and Calvinistic communities in Poland in the middle of the 16th– the second half of the 17th century was accomplished by H. Gmiterek.⁵⁴ D. Rott devoted his work to the cultural heritage of the Czech Brethren Church in Poland.⁵⁵ Comprehensive study of the Czech Brethren role in the Polish reformation movement was carried out in the works of J. Dworzaczkowa.⁵⁶ A. Klemp researched the peculiarities of the development of the Reformation on the territory of Royal Prussia.⁵⁷ M. Luszczynska examined the concept of the so-called "Sacred Community" formation as an instrument to establish confessional identity of the radical currents of the Polish reformation movement⁵⁸. The history of Polish Arianism became the subject matter of new monographic studies. The works of this period are characterized by the shift of research emphasis from the socio-political to philosophical and cultural aspects, increased attention to the coverage of the history of Arian emigration in the second half of the 17th century, an attempt to trace the contribution of the intellectual elite of the Polish Brethren to the development of the new philosophical trends in the Western European countries.

The works of the Western European and American historians took an important place in the development of the Polish Reformation research. In particular, the generalized picture of the course of the Reformation movement in

⁵³ W. Kowalski, *From the "Land of Diverse Sects" to National Religion: Converts to Catholicism and Reformed Franciscans in Early Modern Poland*, in "Church History", 2001, No 70 (3), p. 482-526.

⁵⁴ H. Gmiterek, *Bracia czescy a kalwini w Rzeczypospolitej: połowa XVI – połowa XVII wieku: stadium porównawcze* [Czech Brethren and Calvinists in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: the Second Half of the 16th – Middle 17th Century: Comparative Studies], Lublin, UMCS, 1987.

⁵⁵ D. Rott, *Bracia czescy w dawnej Polsce: działalność literacka, teksty, recepcja* [Czech Brethren in the Old Poland: Literary Activity, Texts, Reception] Katowice, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2002.

⁵⁶ J. Dworzaczkowa, *Bracia czescy w Wielkopolsce w XVI i XVII wieku* [Czech Brethren in the Greater Poland in the 16th and 17th Centuries], Warszawa, Semper, 1997.

⁵⁷ A. Klemp, *Protestanci w dobrach prywatnych w Prusach Królewskich od drugiej połowy XVII do drugiej połowy XVIII wieku* [Protestants in the Royal Prussia Private Manors from the Second half of the 16th to the Second Half of the 18th Centuries], Gdańsk, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1994.

⁵⁸ Magdalena Luszczynska, *The Polish Brethren Versus the Hutterites: a Sacred Community?*, in "Journal of Early Modern Christianity", 2017, Vol. 4, No 1, p. 21-46.

Central and Eastern Europe was presented in the work *Sketches on the History of the Reformation in Central and Eastern Europe* (1967)⁵⁹ written by an English historian of Polish origin P. Skwarczyński. The features of the expansion, perception, and development of the Reformation ideas in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were covered in the work *Sown on the Rocks: the Reformation in Poland and Lithuania* (2000)⁶⁰ by the German historian H. Schmidt. Polish Protestant translations of the biblical texts became the focus of the study of the American historian D. A. Frick *Polish Sacred Philology in the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation: Chapters in the History of Controversies (1551-1632)* (1989).⁶¹ The specific features of inter-confessional relations in Polish society of the early modern period were outlined by another American researcher M. Teter in her volume *Jews and Heretics in Catholic Poland: A Beleaguered Church in the Post-Reformation Era* (2006).⁶² The British researcher S. P. Ramet in her work *The Catholic Church in Polish History* (2017)⁶³ draws attention to Reformation history events as important turning points and vital existential challenges in the life of the Polish nation, stating that the Counter-Reformation put the Catholic Church on a firmer foundation in Poland. However, it should be noted that the mentioned works accumulated the results of the previous scientific achievements of the Polish historians and developed mostly from the historiography, rather than from the primary source material basis. For Western European and American historians of the Reformation, trained principally on the trail-blazing studies in social history, the Polish Reformation poses somewhat of a problem. The sociological methodology, which has become a standard part of their tool kit for examining the issue, is not of much use in Poland where there was no such thing as popular Reformation in the German or Swiss sense. Without detailed case studies the long overdue re-interpretation of the history of Reformation in Poland cannot be undertaken.

The close genetic linkage of the Polish Reformation with the development of the Reformation movement in Lithuania and the Eastern Slavic lands of the

⁵⁹ P. Skwarczyński, *Szkice z dziejów reformacji w Europie środkowo-wschodniej* [Sketches on the History of the Reformation in Central and Eastern Europe], Londyn, Odnova, 1967.

⁶⁰ C. Schmidt, *Auf Felsen gesät: die Reformation in Polen und Livland* [Sown on the Rocks: the Reformation in Poland and Lithuania], Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2000.

⁶¹ D. A. Frick, *Polish Sacred Philology in the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation: Chapters in the History of the Controversies (1551-1632)*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989.

⁶² M. Teter, *Jews and Heretics in Catholic Poland: a Beleaguered Church in the Post-Reformation Era*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006.

⁶³ Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Catholic Church in Polish History*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was confirmed by the studies of Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian authors, in particular, A. Anushkin⁶⁴, R. Degiel⁶⁵, M. Dmitriev⁶⁶, B. Floria⁶⁷, M. Kosman⁶⁸, M. Leidke⁶⁹, S. Podokshyn⁷⁰, G. Williams.⁷¹ In this regard, the analysis of specific perception of the Protestant movement on the Ukrainian lands of Rzeczpospolita was presented by M. Shkribliak and O. Balukh.⁷² Researchers outlined the interconfessional contacts between Lutherans and the higher Orthodox Hierarchs of the East, emphasizing the reaction of the Orthodox Church to the institutional formation of the early Protestant currents. Exploring the issue, historians also stated that the Roman Catholic Church played a decisive role in shaping the Renaissance paradigm of the Polish national culture development.

⁶⁴ А. Анушкин, *На заре книгопечатания в Литве* [At the Dawn of Book-printing in Lithuania], Вильнюс, Минтис, 1970.

⁶⁵ R. Degiel, *Protestanci i prawosławni: patronat wyznaniowy Radziwiłłów birzańskich nad Cerkwią prawosławną w księstwie słuckim w XVII w.* [The Protestants and Orthodox: Religious Patronage of Birzhan Radziwills Over the Church in Sluck Principality in the 17th Century], Warszawa, Neriton, 2000.

⁶⁶ М. В. Дмитриев, *Православие и Реформация: реформационные движения в восточно-славянских землях Речи Посполитой во второй половине XVI в.* [Orthodoxy and the Reformation: Reformation Movements in the Eastern Slavic Lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Second Half of the 16th century], Москва, МГУ, 1990.

⁶⁷ Б. Н. Флоря, *Реформация и контрреформация в странах Центральной Европы (XVI – середина XVII в.)* [Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Central European Countries (16th – Middle of the 17th century)], in *История Европы с древнейших времен до наших дней*, Москва, 1988, Т. 3, p. 299–306.

⁶⁸ M. Kosman, *Reformacja i kontrreformacja w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim w świetle propagandy wyznaniowej* [Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the Perspective of Religious Propaganda], Wrocław, Wydawnictwo PAN, 1973.

⁶⁹ M. Liedke, *Od prawosławia do katolicyzmu: ruscy możni i szlachta Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego wobec wyznań reformacyjnych* [From Orthodoxy to Catholicism: Noble Ruscy and Szlachta of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania Towards Reformation Denominations], Białystok, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, 2004.

⁷⁰ С. Подокшин, *Реформация и общественная мысль Белоруссии и Литвы: (вторая половина XVI – начало XVII в.)* [Reformation and Social Thought of Belarus and Lithuania: (second half of the 16th – the beginning of the 17th century)], Минск, Наука и техника, 1970.

⁷¹ G. H. Williams, *Protestants in the Ukrainian Lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth*, Cambridge, Ukrainian Studies Fund, 1988.

⁷² Mykola Shkribliak, Oleksii Balukh, *European Reformation and Distinguishing Features of the Institutional Design of the Early Protestant Currents in the Ukrainian Lands*, in “Codrul Cosminului”, XXIII, 2017, No 1, p. 121-138.

We have to underline that no comprehensive research devoted to the process of Confession-building in Poland has been published so far. Despite a large number of publications, no comprehensive attempt was made to introduce the methodological concepts of "Confessionalization" developed by Wolfgang Reinhardt and Heinz Schilling to the field of the early modern Polish studies. Although "Confessionalization" is still a historiographical concept in dispute, it is manifested as one of the leading modern interpretive historiographical categories which can considerably contribute to our present vision of the Reformation history. As a result, the "Confessionalization" theory itself applied to Polish historical realities can be significantly enriched with the new instruments and factual material which could help to provide better understanding of the controversial aspects and "blind spots" of the "Confessionalization" paradigm in general. Another important question concerns the impact that religious divisions in Poland might have had on Polish republicanism, what model of the relationship between the Church and the state did Polish republican thinkers envisaged. Without proper reconstruction of the Polish Reformation history it is impossible both to understand the religious experience and interconnected multi-layered process of fundamental social and political transformations which can be examined in various ways.

In general, recent studies⁷³ of the Polish Reformation have portrayed it as a multidimensional intellectual, social and political movement. Still there are aspects which merit further research and which have not been subjected to thorough analysis. This can help us to renew our present understanding of the Polish Reformation and relevant historical issues. It should be also mentioned that it is necessary not to conduct this research on Poland-Lithuania in isolation but to discuss this phenomenon from a broader European perspective so that national differences could be established.

CONCLUSIONS

The first aim of the study was to present the key stages in the development of the Polish Reformation historiography and to investigate how these stages changed over time. In general we can note that, based on the dominant conceptual approaches and using the chronological principle, it is useful to divide the total array of historical works into five main stages, within which various methods for

⁷³ Magdalena Luszczynska, *op. cit.*; Mykola Shkribliak, Oleksii Balukh, *op. cit.*; Sabrina P. Ramet, *op. cit.*; Jacek Wijaczka, *op. cit.*

the analysis of the historical phenomenon were used: the first stage – the middle of the 17th – first half of the 19th century which was marked by the Protestant historiographical tradition; the next stage – second half of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th century which was characterized by the dominance of the positivist approach to the research of the Polish Reformation; the third stage which covered the first half of the 20th century and was marked by the deepening of the thematic specialization in the research of the Reformation in Poland as a multidimensional historical phenomenon; the fourth period – the 1950s – the second half of the 1960s which was labelled with the dominance of the Marxist approach within Polish historiography and the fifth stage, characterized by the domination of methodological pluralism in Polish Reformation history research, which lasts from the second half of the 20th century to the present.

The second aim of the current research was to explore new horizons for the future studies on the Polish Reformation history. A brief historiographical analysis shows stable interest of many generations of researchers in the study of the Polish Reformation. At the same time, it should be noted that there are a number of issues that need further detailed analysis. Firstly, most of the existing generalizations on the history of the Polish Reformation, created by both Polish and foreign historians, date from the second half of the 20th century, and for this reason, do not take into account recent research results and a large array of source material. On the other hand, in the contemporary historiography, there are no attempts at comprehensive studies of the Reformation in Poland that would have made it possible to compile a complete picture of the phenomenon at the modern scientific level. Secondly, the basic qualitative parameters of the development of the Polish Reformation remain undeveloped. Insufficiently elucidated are its basic aspects which in most cases are mentioned in passing, or receive traditionally low coverage. Polish Reformation movement still awaits modern scholarly attention and research models that might develop out of the contemporary fascination with intellectual history, history of mentalities, gender history, history of concepts, memory studies, micro history and cultural anthropology. One of the most important current tasks is to find a suitable set of methodological instruments for the Polish Reformation research, namely within “Confessionalization” theory which is of great significance for the study of the European Reformation in general. This needs methodological reassessments which will require a new edition of primary sources including documents never yet published.

SOME ASPECTS OF ORGANISATION OF THE MILITARY-POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF IDEOLOGICAL WORK IN THE ARMED FORCES OF NAZI GERMANY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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Abstract. *The article analyses the process of organization of total military and political education in Hitler's Germany and a mechanism that ensures constant control over the political and moral condition of German servicemen and soldiers of the allied armies. Author discuss the consequences of the ideological influence of German propaganda on different target audiences and possible reasons for the non-perception of Nazi ideological values by representatives of other socioeconomic constructs. These original testimonies of German prisoners of war make it possible to assess the changes in the political and moral state of the servicemen of the Nazi army and of the allied armies in different periods of the war. The author highlights the motives and effects of the changes in the content of ideological activity among the personnel of the Hitlerite troops in 1943. The research is based on the materials of the funds hosted by the State Archives of Ukrainian Public Organizations.*

Keywords: Military leadership, politics, ideology, armed forces, Hitler, Germany, Second World War, national-socialistic education, psychological influence.

Rezumat: *Unele aspecte ale organizării coordonării militar-politice a activității ideologice în forțele armate ale Germaniei naziste în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Articolul analizează procesul de organizare a educației militare și politice totale în Germania lui Hitler și a mecanismului care asigură un control constant asupra condiției politice și morale a militarilor germani și a soldaților armatelor aliate. Autoarea pune în discuție efectele influenței ideologice a propagandei germane asupra diferitelor categorii de public-țintă și posibilele motive pentru nereceptarea valorilor ideologice naziste de către reprezentanții altor construcții socio-economice. Aceste mărturii autentice ale prizonierilor de război germani fac posibilă evaluarea mutațiilor în starea politică și morală a militarilor germani și ai armatelor aliate în diferite perioade ale războiului. Autoarea scoate în evidență motivele și efectele schimbărilor intervenite în conținutul activității ideologice în rândul personalului trupelor hitleriste în anul 1943. Cercetarea se întemeiază pe materialele fondurilor găzduite de Arhiva de Stat a Organizațiilor Publice Ucrainene.*

Résumé: *Quelques aspects de l'organisation de la coordination militaro-politique du travail idéologique dans les forces armées de l'Allemagne nazie pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale.* L'article analyse le processus d'organisation de l'éducation militaire et politique totale dans l'Allemagne hitlérienne et du mécanisme qui assure un contrôle permanent sur le statut politique et morale des soldats allemands et des soldats des armées alliées. L'auteur discute des conséquences de l'influence idéologique de la propagande allemande sur différents publics cibles et des raisons possibles de la non-perception des valeurs idéologiques nazies par les représentants d'autres constructions socio-économiques. Ces témoignages authentiques de prisonniers de guerre allemands permettent d'apprécier l'évolution de l'état politique et moral des soldats de l'armée nazie et des armées alliées au cours des différentes périodes de la guerre. L'auteur met en lumière les motivations et les effets des modifications apportées au contenu de l'activité idéologique parmi le personnel des troupes hitlériennes en 1943. La recherche est basée sur les matériaux des fonds hébergés par les Archives de l'État des Organisations Publiques Ukrainiennes.

INTRODUCTION

Modern researchers pay special attention to the processes of changing historical and personal paradigms. All combatants perceived war differently. Their testimonies provide an opportunity to restore the picture of the change in attitude towards the war and the experience of its horror as an ordinary person and a trained military man. The ideologically hardened soldiers were motivated to take actions that were contrary to the military oath. To some extent, this contributed to the emergence of grounds for changing the generally accepted paradigm on the role of non-military ways in achieving military-political goals. Changes in the mood in the troops through the prism of the perception of war by individual soldiers. In turn, the spread of collaborative infiltrations among the personnel of hostile forces influenced the change of social model in the new architecture of the post-war world.

The war is always suffering and grieving, significant human losses, as well as loss of material and cultural values. The Second World War features prominently in the history of mankind, as the largest and bloodiest war. 62 states and 80% of the world's population were involved in this global armed conflict. The figure of the total human losses of the former USSR amounts to almost 27 million people.¹ At first glance, the theme of World War II today is studied

¹ Доклад заместителя руководителя Федерального архивного агентства В. П. Тарасова на международной конференции (г. Будапешт (Венгрия), 9-10 дека-

carefully and a large number of studies provide an opportunity to get information on any moment of the armed struggle of the past century. But over time, official history is focused on by a narrow circle of specialists. The public perception of the events of the Second World War is somewhat different. On the one hand, this state of affairs can be explained by the fact that inevitably this world is left to the participants and war victims who are the bearers of "historical memory". The events of the war, according to J. Fedor, S. Lewis and T. Zhurzhenko pass into the category of "communicative memory" and are increasingly valued from the standpoint of a modern person and the peculiarities of its communicative activity.² On the other hand, the previously secret archival materials are becoming available. Work with the original sources makes it possible to explore previously unknown facts about the events of the war. Moreover, taking into account the increasing informational component of modern military conflicts, researchers are increasingly interested in organizing the activities of ideological structures of the opposing sides and methods and ways of influencing the consciousness of a target audience during the Second World War.

This article deals with the organization of the activities of ideological structures in the German armed forces, aimed at maintaining the appropriate moral and psychological state of servicemen.

The authors of the article make full use of real evidence of combatants. Working in state archives with soviet documents - special reports to the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army was the basis for the study. The reports used the results of interrogation of prisoners of war. This information was the basis for the planning and conduct of political events in the Red Army and in the Wehrmacht. In addition, translations of captured documents were delivered to the Main Political Department of the Red Army. This information makes it possible to understand that, firstly, ideological measures were carefully studied in the opposing armies. Secondly, the basis for political work was real events on the fronts.

боя 2011 г. [Report of V. P. Tarasov, the Deputy Head of the Federal Archival Agency at the international conference (Budapest, Hungary, December 9-10, 2011)], in <http://archives.ru/reporting/report-tarasov-2011-budapest.shtml> (Accessed on 20.03.2018).

² Julie Fedor, Simon Lewis, Tatiana Zhurzhenko, *Introduction: War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus*, in Julie Fedor, Markku Kangaspuro, Jussi Lassila, Tatiana Zhurzhenko (eds), *War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 3, in https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-66523-8_1 (Accessed on 20.03.2018).

THEORETICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL GROUNDING

The 1942-1943 years' transition of the strategic initiative to the Red Army, contributed to the strengthening of political and ideological work among the Nazi troops. The Nazis, to some extent, were forced to learn from the experience of the ideological structures of the Red Army.

It can be assumed that the military-political leadership of Germany drew attention to the experience of the work of Red Army ideologists. They were forced to take countermeasures. Also, it was ascertained whether the propaganda measures of the ideological structures of Hitler's Germany were effective in working with their own personnel and that caused the reformatting of this system in 1944.

Propaganda measures aimed at the soldiers of the German armed forces, the personnel of the armed forces and their people, remain relevant for representatives of various scientific fields. Historians, psychologists, and communications specialists turn to the experience of Nazi propaganda and as a technology of information and psychological influence on consciousness and as a phenomenon of an all-embracing nature, which became the basis for the upbringing of a generation of Nazi ideology disciples in pre-war Germany. Modern researchers pay a lot of attention to discovering the phenomenon of ideological motivation of German soldiers. When considering the history of the Second World War, attention is drawn to the perseverance with which the Germans continued to carry out an armed struggle until 1945. And this is despite the fact that they all understood during this period that the war was practically lost.

Hitler's Germany was a totalitarian state with a clearly defined general state control of all-important aspects of the life of citizens, including their way of thinking. The study of this issue should begin with a review of the system of Nazi ideological influence in the pre-war period. According to Ukrainian historians T. Vronskaya and O. Lysenko, "in order to capture the mass consciousness of such a people as German, the Führer had to offer something truly impressive. And he managed to capture the Germans with a fantastic project and personalize their expectations as a Messiah, able to bring the nation out of captivity to the humiliation of the Versailles System, socio-economic disadvantages, disbelief in the future".³

³ Т. Вронська, О. Лисенко, *Феноменологія війн: природа і цивілізаційно-гуманітарний вимір* [Phenomenology of wars: nature and civilization-humanitarian dimension], in

Today there are two opposing views in the scientific environment regarding the effectiveness of the Third Reich's propaganda measures aimed at various target audiences. For example, the American historian Robert Herzstein stated that "Propaganda directed against hostile countries did not derive particular success. In his view Goebbels turned only to the Germans, moreover, in a command tone. (...) But when appealing to strangers, his treatment did not have any result".⁴ Somewhat disagreeing with him Russian researcher of the Second World War Al. Gogun draws attention to the following: "...during the whole war, the Germans captured 5.75 million Red Army soldiers. It is clear that the act of transition to the side of the enemy is far from always the consequence of reading the leaflet or the heard radio. Someone could go to the Germans because of the fact that the Red Army threatened him with a tribunal, someone - because of hating the native power without any propaganda, someone - because of the arbitrariness and selflessness of the commanders (...), and hoped otherwise that in German captivity there was a chance to save life higher than fighting at the front (...) But it is obvious that if the masters of the Nazi propaganda were completely profane, then in such quantities Soviet soldiers would not have left the ranks of their own army".⁵ However, for the authors of this article, there is a fundamental study of the change in the social behaviour of the Nazi troops' personnel and related processes is crucial.

Long before the Soviet invasion in Germany, a powerful system of ideological treatment of German soldiers and population was created. The nationalist feelings associated with defeat in the First World War and the harsh conditions of the Treaty of Versailles were constantly stirred up. The growth of military production after the seizure of power by the Nazis contributed to a temporary reduction in unemployment and was fully used to strengthen the authority of Hitler. During this period, the Nazis actively promoted the ideas of racism in order to plant the hate of other peoples in the minds of the masses.⁶

Сторінки воєнної історії України. Збірник наукових статей, Випук 19, с. 13.

⁴ Р. Э. Герцштейн, *Война, которую выиграл Гитлер* [Robert Edwin Herzstein, *The War that Hitler won*], Смоленск, Русич, 1996, с. 16.

⁵ Александр Гогун (ed.), *Черный PR Адольфа Гитлера. СССР в зеркале нацистской пропаганды* [Black PR Adolf Hitler. The USSR in the mirror of Nazi propaganda], Изд. 2-е, испр. и доп. Киев, «К.І.С.», 2016, с. 14-15.

⁶ М. И. Бурцев (ed.), *Политическая работа среди войск и населения противника в годы Великой Отечественной войны (1941-1945)* [Political work among the troops and the population of the enemy during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)], Москва, Воениздат, 1971, с. 10.

Anticommunism and attacks on the Soviet Union, as the focal point for the spread of communist views around the world, represented the cornerstone of the ideological treatment of soldiers and population. Thus, the military-political leadership of Hitler's Germany determined the task of propagating the idea of the German people that Bolshevism was their archenemy. In 1937, the Ministry of Propaganda of Hitler's Germany sent a document to all the upper imperial branches of government, which stated that the struggle against world Bolshevism was the general line of German politics. The task of propaganda is to prove to the German people that Bolshevism is its archenemy.⁷

Anti-Soviet propaganda became even more widespread in the subsequent years. In 1938, all editors of the German newspapers and radio were asked to use false information about the Soviet Union on a continuous basis.⁸ Using all means of mass communication, the German military tip embellished the idea of the continued superiority of the Aryan nation as much as possible. Outstanding Soviet aircraft designer A. S. Yakovlev, who visited Germany at the end of 1939, told that all his interlocutors - from designer to carrier - "felt the perceived incomparable superiority over all others. This was felt in everything and it was the result of fascist propaganda (...) The Hitlerites brought up in the German people the spirit of hatred and contempt for other nations and did not hesitate to emphasize it."⁹

Particular attention was paid to work on military patriotic education. The main areas were physical training, the ability to survive the pain and not to despair in critical situations, and ideas of national-socialist ideology in the consciousness of the younger generation. A secret seminar on political processing of the personnel of the German Army took place in 1937.¹⁰ Obergebietsführer Stellrecht, the representative of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, made a loud statement in this event that the military education of young people should begin at the age of ten. Above all, children had to be taught the ability to win pain. Along with military training, the need for political work with young people was emphasized in order to fit the ideas in the minds of young people forever. Even if the faith in people would have been broken and the "honour codes" inefficient, "training, the iron habit of silently

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ А. С. Яковлев, *Цель жизни*. (The purpose of life), Москва, Политиздат, 1968, с. 186, 188 in <http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/yakovlev-as/13.html> (Accessed on 20.03.2018)

¹⁰ М. И. Бурцев (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 10.

obey and silently perform service under the orders of another” could become the last pillar of combat readiness.¹¹

At this seminar, one of the leaders of the Nazi Party, Rudolf Hess, demanded from the personnel of the armed forces unconditional loyalty to the Fuhrer and the ideas of National Socialism. He said that such a soldier was supposed to be not only an example of service. He had to understand the “driving force” of fascism, see the “goal of the war” and “obsessively stick to it, striving for the final victory of Germany.”¹² It can be said that the task of creating an army of trained soldiers for automation was formed, which even at critical moments worked on algorithms. But self-sacrifice had to act as a readiness for a certain perfect behaviour for ideological reasons. Almost all the personnel of the Nazi Germany armed forces underwent a course of national-socialist training of soldiers. This course was designed for 16 lessons on the following subjects: “the German people”, “the German Empire”, “German Lebensraum” and “national-socialism”.¹³

These companies of propaganda also helped organize an entertainment program. In 1938, a network of corps (army) company of propaganda was created, the functions of which included the collection of front materials (broadcast, photo, newsreel). It was necessary to collect materials about the heroic acts of German soldiers in order to use these facts in the creation of a thematic information product. These corporate propaganda companies also helped organize an entertaining program for the soldiers and worked among the population of the front-line territory and enemy troops. The roots were subordinated to the intelligence units of the headquarters of the general troops, armies and navy.¹⁴

The main purpose of propaganda among the troops was to maintain readiness for self-sacrifice and determination in the war, to overcome anxiety and unrest in critical situations. In order to guide this propaganda activity, in April 1939, a military propaganda department of the Supreme Command of the German Army was created. This department developed plans for “propagandist support” of the large-scale military operations. Plans were approved personally by A. Hitler. At that time, there were departments of propaganda among the population of the regions of the USSR created, which were foreseen in future military operations for occupation.¹⁵

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11-12.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

Military-political leadership paid considerable attention to the constant informing of the personnel. The main sources for obtaining information were periodicals with defined release dates and overlays. The magazine "Wehrmacht" was calculated for each company, as well as ten newspapers, including "Völkischer Beobachter". In Leipzig, serial mass literature was published for a "soldier's arm" ("Tornisterschrift").¹⁶

In addition to setting up a systematic publication of printed matter, a considerable attention was paid to the military-political leadership of Hitler's Germany and to the distribution of publications among certain categories of information consumers. Thus, there was a propaganda officer appointed in each battalion who distributed the press among the personnel. In addition to familiarizing the soldiers with information from the print media, they constantly participated in collective discussions on the topics of socio-political situation planned by the leadership. Regular conversations about current political events were held in each company. In the future, this measure was improved and the information hours began to be conducted in accordance with the guidelines approved by the leadership. Since April 1940, commanders of the company systematically received methodical instructions. These were the instructive bulletins - "Messages to the troops."¹⁷

For the senior command staff (from commanders of the regiments and above) the classified "News from Supreme Command" were also issued which hosted information about the military and political situation. In addition to the aforementioned edition, the newsletter "Messages for the officer corps" and the series of brochures "What moves us. Questions of the world view, politics, history and culture" were published. Representatives of the military clergy were also involved in the organization of measures to improve the morale of German soldiers.¹⁸

Printed editions that covered the causes and objectives of the war in the West until June 1941 gradually accustomed the soldiers to the idea of a possible military clash with the USSR in the future. Information on the victorious military actions of the German army was perceived as expected events. They were reformatted in an objective event with an indication of the victory of the Nazi Army in restoring lost justice. By June 1941, the victorious move of the German armed forces in the countries of Europe only supported the myth of invincibility

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

and the sacred content of the material problems of the German population has not become obvious yet. Families of the soldiers were quite well equipped. There was, therefore, virtually no reason to doubt the victorious mission of the German armed forces to the electorate of Hitler's Germany.

In the spring of 1941, in one of the regular bulletins of the "Message to the Army", the following was said: "Wherever the German sword will be hit, it will serve as the ultimate guarantee of the security of our homeland."¹⁹

The bulletin obliged commanders to remind the soldiers the need to "keep an absolute secret of all plans" and "keep silent". In the early days of June, the following slogan "We Expect an Order" was widespread. And on June 21, 1941, Hitler's appeal to the East Front soldiers was announced in all the battalions in connection with an attack on the USSR. Before the attack on the USSR, the German command issued a "Memo on the peculiarities of the Russian method of warfare," in which it was noted that the Red Army would be destroyed by modern adversaries that are the Germans. This meaningful installation was fitted to each serviceman.²⁰ Of the war against the Soviet Union, Hitler said in 1941, "It is a fight with the great opponent of our Weltanschauung, a struggle for life and death in which each soldier must feel like a political fighter and act accordingly. The German officer and soldier is far too deeply rooted in the conceptions of an antiquated era. It is impossible ever to overcome Bolshevism with these principles of a chivalrous, purely military conduct of war."²¹ This complex of measures contributed to the formation of a high level of combat readiness. It is well-known that the first echelon divisions were marked by a high offensive spirit.

ISSUES AND SOURCES

Today, in the generally accepted scientific thought, there is a rather sufficient point of view according to the alignment of the Nazi armed forces and their advantages over the Red Army before the attack on the USSR. For years, Soviet propaganda mythology supported the idea of the defeat of Soviet troops in the first months of the war as unwillingness to withstand, and the lack of concentration of forces and troops at the border, and thus unwillingness to act in defence on their own territory.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Apud P. M. Baldwin, *Clausewitz in Nazi Germany*, in "Journal of Contemporary History", Vol. 16, 1981, No. 1, p. 12.

Ukrainian researchers use the facts to review this issue and to justify a completely different picture of the balance of power. Thus, in his work "Strategic and Front Operations of the Great Patriotic War on the territory of Ukraine" Ukrainian historian V. Hrytsiuk proves that there were not the advantages of the forces on the German side. The Red Army significantly dominated the Wehrmacht in personnel, weapons and military equipment. However, Hitler's armed forces succeeded in offensive operations on the territory of the USSR. The researcher concludes that the military-political leadership of the USSR was unable to conduct successful leadership in the first period of the war.²²

Most of the German soldiers had already a successful military experience of the military companies in Europe, and their actions were subordinated to the sole purpose that A. Hitler defined as follows: "...to stop the eternal aspiration of moving Germany to the south and west of Europe, and definitely point your finger toward the territories located in the east (...) we deliberately move on to the policy of conquering new lands in Europe."²³

Of course, the success in offensive actions and the rapid move deep into the territory of the USSR supported the idea of the unsurpassed presence of the German armed forces and their victorious mission. And this circumstance served as a powerful ground for the adequate perception of the German soldiers and the personnel of the Allied troops of the social-nationalist ideas of official propaganda.

The education of the military within the framework of a well-formulated system of ideological values was determined by the military-political leadership of Hitler's Germany before the Second World War. A. Hitler spoke about the ideological component in resolving the fate of the German people: "... achieving a complete unanimity between the leadership of the state and the officer corps, not only in the purely military area, but first of all in relation to ideology."²⁴

A special role in the military-political leadership of Germany was allocated to the officer corps. Representatives of the military elite were carriers of social-

²² Валерій Грицюк, *Стратегічні та фронтові операції Великої Вітчизняної війни на території України* [Strategic and Front Operations of the Great Patriotic War on the territory of Ukraine], Київ, Інститут історії України, 2010, 150 с.; Idem, *Стратегічні та фронтові операції Великої Вітчизняної війни на теренах України* [Strategic and Front Operations of the Great Patriotic War on the terrain of Ukraine], in В. А. Смолій (ed.), *Україна в Другій світовій війні: погляд з XXI століття. Історичні нариси* [Ukraine in the Second World War: A View from the XXI Century. Historical Essays]. У 2 кн. *Книга перша*, Київ, Наукова думка, 2010, сс. 208-302.

²³ Александр Гогун (ed.), *op. cit.*, с. 87.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

nationalist values. The commanders put forward requirements for both military leaders and political tutors. According to A. Hitler: "An officer who is unable to educate and direct his people in political terms has no place in this struggle, just as an officer who is not able to exercise tactical leadership. Precious forces would be left to miserable abandonment if the moral combat capability of the troops was based only on blind subordination without conscious determination within which the soldier understood «why?»"²⁵

Hitler put the control over the organization of the activities of the ideological direction exactly on the commanders. Moreover, the leader of fascist Germany paid a lot of attention to the personnel training system and to ensuring a high level of ideological training of soldiers. In his opinion, "An officer must be an advanced fighter on an ideological front. In the spirit of the national-socialist outlook, to educate from their soldiers convinced and invincible fighters for our great Germany. Commanders should take care if this political training has a corresponding level of military training, as well as at the front. Commanders must monitor the execution of my order."²⁶

Analysing the archival documents with the interrogations of captured Nazis in 1944, there are various points of view. For example, Alexander Frantz's spare field company's grenadier testified that: "Recently, we were well-equipped with food, tobacco products, received letters in time, musical instruments - lipstick accordions, accordions were highlighted in our company. After a good rest, the fighting spirit of the soldier was high. Among the treasury there are rumours that it seems that the spring will be offensive on the eastern front. German propaganda reports about it all the time. This propaganda suggests that the USSR seems to be striking from the last forces. And today, the main thing for Germany is to withstand this blow, and then go on the offensive. "When it came to the proper level of security and observance of the German armed forces regime in the traditions of the first years of the offensive on the USSR, the propaganda measures found to work for their target audience and readiness to act in accordance with propaganda calls were high.

On the other hand, in most cases, the situation prevailed, when, according to the Joseph Novak, Ober-Grenadier from the 1st Grenadier-division, 3rd platoon, 1st company, 669th regiment of 371st Division: "The mood of the soldiers of 669

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України [Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine. Hereinafter: ЦДАГО України], Фонд 1, Опись 23, Дело 973, с. 15.

Regiment is bad, they have not been given food for 4 days. Most of them would have been ready to be captured if they were sure that the Russians would not kill the prisoners". In such an impoverished situation, the agitation calls for direct action were no longer susceptible. Eric Tcoche, a Pole by nationality, a soldier of 5th company, 2th battalion, 287th infantry regiment of 96th infantry division stated: "Recently, German aircraft dropped over the arrangement of our part of the postcard to German soldiers. It was said in them that the main thing now is to stand, not to lose heart. The state of affairs is not so bad as it may seem and we will overcome all the difficulties. Soldiers read these postcards, and then threw them and cursed".²⁷

In our opinion, the effectiveness of the Nazi system of military-political education was based on the victorious actions of the armed forces of Hitler's Germany, as long as the strategic initiative was on the side of the German command. So, the format of military-political education of the personnel of Hitler's Germany had been unchanged practically until 1943. It was after the Battle of Stalingrad that the turning point in the war came to a halt, and the Red Army took over a strategic initiative. Defeat of the German troops and the need to switch to defensive operations influenced the morally-psychological state of the soldiers. Reinforced measures of Soviet propaganda and the systematic work of the ideological structures with the personnel of the armed forces of Germany and the Allied Army influenced the readiness of servicemen to stop armed struggle and surrender to captivity.

It was about this in March 1944 that Rudolf Altenkirchen, the prisoner-of-war captain of the 6th Company of the 28th Motor regeneration Regiment, said: "... tanks and artillery were relocated from our area to the north. And the Soviet troops advocated us with tanks. The situation was critical. Only two platoons and group commander Major Wilhelm were at the battlefield at the command post of the battalion in the village of Melusha. Reigning panic. Commander of the Battalion, Captain Gosling, together with the headquarters, collapsed. 18 other soldiers and me were in the battalion headquarters. We were hiding in the cellar. There were 10 seriously wounded fighters and a captain of the sanitary service there. Major Wilhelm threatened us with a revolver from above. He drove us out of the cellar and demanded that we repel the Russians' attacks. But this did not work out. There were Russian tanks. Major Wilhelm and the captain of the sanitary service shot dead. Other soldiers and me were taken prisoner."²⁸

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, c. 21.

Helplessness before the onset of Soviet technology, a sense of fear and hopelessness contributed to the emergence of panic mood. This is evidenced by Oberfeldwebel Adolphi from the 6th reconnaissance detachment of the 6th tank division, the initiator of the surrender of 4 German soldiers: "On March 3 under Yampil we were surrounded with Russian tanks. A mess began. At a critical moment, we did not even have fuel. We had to undermine our military equipment and get out of the surroundings on foot. Our officers flee first, not even warned about the direction in which to go."²⁹

According to Soviet researchers, the German army, despite its many military training, good equipment with weapons and equipment, also had weaknesses and vulnerabilities in constructing a motivational component in the struggle for the idea of national-socialism. So, the reflection of class contradictions in the country was a deep abyss, which distinguishes the soldier's mass from the generals and the officer corps. The command failed despite all efforts to overcome the inequality among immigrants from different parts of the country. In the troops, there was an outright hostility between parts of the SS, which were in a privileged state and other infantry formations. The mass of soldiers frankly disliked the veterans, scribes and members of the Nazi party.³⁰

Edmund Korenz, who was taken captive on March 3, 1944, spoke on an ongoing account of the squadron's reserve squad member Langemarck: "Even in elite parts with a special regime and supply, a hierarchy and decadent mood amongst the rank and file were felt. Serving the highest ranks and subordination were no longer synonymous."³¹

During this period, the military-political leadership of Germany had an opinion on the insufficient level of political training of troops. The efforts of the commanders for political education and maintaining a high moral and political level were already insufficient. It was in 1943, in accordance with the order of A. Hitler from November 22, 1943, for all functions that until now were determined by the general notion of "military-political education", the concept of "national-socialist education" was announced.³² In addition, the term "Officers for National Socialist Education" was introduced. In 1944, by orders of the Fuhrer, a textbook "For what We Struggle" was published. In the text part he was forced to state the fact of the weakening of the moral stability of Hitler's soldiers. Among

²⁹ *Ibid.*, c. 28.

³⁰ М. И. Бурцев (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 13.

³¹ ЦДАГО України, Фонд 1, Опись 23, Дело 973, с. 29.

³² *Ibid.*, Дело 974, с. 50.

the German soldiers there was a growing mood towards the end of the armed struggle. This fact was related to the category of mobilized soldiers who did not support national-socialist ideas, politically motivated, those who had previously served sentences for political reasons. So, Reinhard Neher, a soldier of the 3rd Company, 465th battalion of 154th reserve troops captured on March 10 in the Zbarazh area, during an interrogation, testified: "There are many soldiers in the division, which were previously considered politically non-charitable. I personally from the Sudeten region, I was a member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia from 1930 to 1937. I spent two years in a concentration camp, after which I was taken to the army. There are lots like me in the division."³³ Another German prisoner of war, Helmut Stubner, Corporal of Company of Lublin, captured on March 9, 1944 during the interrogation, said that: "The arrival of the replenishment in the overwhelming majority consists of soldiers with limited fitness. They were underdeveloped and were called up by the army in 1943 for total mobilization. The regiment has a large number of contradictions between the emigrants from Alsace, Lorraine and Austria on the one hand and the Germans on the other hand. This reduces the combat capability of the regiment. The French are, in most cases, forcibly mobilized and have no desire to fight for us. They rejoice at each of our defeats."³⁴

A. Hitler understood this situation and declared: "In the fifth year of the war, political and ideological leadership and education of troops should be strengthened. Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, in coordination with the Party Office, are to take all necessary measures for this and take care of a unified behaviour for all. In the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the headquarters for national-socialist education were set up. The head of the staff of the National Socialist Education Department carries out his activities directly from my (AG) name. Chief of Staff for the National Socialist Education of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces appointed head of the military-political administration".³⁵

Thus, Hitler determined the level of political and moral education that the troops needed. This was a stimulant for the activation of the actions of the troops. And for this he used fundamental political and ideological ideas along with auxiliary means. We see an attempt to create a structure of a similar system of political managements in the Red Army. Special agencies of the German armed

³³ *Ibid.*, Дело 973, с. 28.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Дело 974, с. 48.

forces conducted a thorough study of the methods of activity of the political units of the Red Army, aimed at the enemy army. Doubts about the need to continue the war increasingly covered Hitler's soldiers, although the level of combat readiness in general was quite high. In 1944, the leader of Nazi Germany progressively emphasizes the ideological component in his discourses. He has advanced the idea of the need for decisive action.

In his opinion, during this period, the size and equipment of the troops play their decisive role in defeating the enemy. Hitler's warriors were supposed to be fanatics of the ideological struggle. National Socialist education was defined as a tool for this. A. Hitler recognized that, contrary to his expectations, this war was prolonged and turned into a war of ideologies, where the winner could become more ideologically motivated personnel. "In this war of worldviews, which is conducted with all the inherent martial arts of cruelty, the destiny of our people is put on the map. Wars of such a scale are not solved by numerical or other advantages (...) It is precisely in this war, that world forces are a decisive weapon, an idea for which there is a struggle. The mobilization of these moral values in order to achieve victory envisaged an increase in the activity of the soldier until he turns him into a fanatic for the struggle for national socialism through political education. The longer this war lasted, the more exacerbated the ideological fronts on both sides."³⁶

A. Hitler again drew attention to the role of an officer as responsible for carrying out this type of ideological work. At the same time, the officer should have been a commander who automatically, without any doubt, performs all the tasks, and on the other hand the officer motivates subordinates to succeed: "He leads his unit into battle, so correct education of his people is a predictable condition of success (...) There should be no contradictions between his willingness to fight as a soldier and his political conviction. In this fierce confrontation an officer is not enough to be only loyal to national-socialism. It is indisputable that the officer of the National Socialist Army expressly and strongly opposes any criticism. It is during the crisis that faith and confidence in victory must be spread by an officer to his people and made them strong. The officer must use every opportunity to influence his people."³⁷

That is, returning in 1943-1944 to his symbolic ideas about the ideological monolith of every German soldier at the beginning of the war, A. Hitler duplicated his opinion that it is the commander who is directly responsible for the level of

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

moral stability of each soldier. But the strict reality forces him to pay attention to additional measures to maintain the high morale of their soldiers. In fact, the situation in 1944 was completely different, as evidenced by the interrogations of the prisoners. On March 9, in the south-eastern direction from Starokonstantiniv, a group of soldiers of 8 people of 196th spare battalion appeared to be captured. The organizer of the capture of Matias Walt said: "When the Russian offensive began, our battalion was surrounded by tanks. The battalion consisted of unprepared but well-armed people. The first officers fled. Before that, they offered us to choose what we can do depending on circumstances."³⁸ Franz Götzer, chief executive officer of the same unit, stated: "Due to the constant retreat, the mood of the soldiers is very bad. Most of them believe that the war will end with the defeat of Germany. The reason is lack of sufficient strength to resist. Many warriors say that the culprit of war is Hitler. He unleashed the war, without calculating his capabilities. Soldiers say that in 1941 the officers were experienced people who enjoyed trust among the personnel. And now the officers become young gymnasts who do not have military experience. And these officers are often the first to flee the battlefield."³⁹

Nevertheless, lieutenant Fritz Dingeldein, commander of a 1th platoon, 5th company, 695th infantry regiment of 340th infantry division, who was captured in March 1944, said that he was ready to carry out military duties, but was forced to obey strictly: "On March 7, we were attacked by Russian tanks and infantry. During the attack all three companies of our battalion retreated without an order. I, as a young officer, tried to manifest myself and decided to stand to the end. But soon we were surrounded. Part of the soldiers of my platoon ran away, and I, with the division of the non-commissioned officer Mayer, was compelled to surrender. It was my first military baptism as the commander of the platoon. I graduated from the Infantry School in February 1944. On February 8, a group of young lieutenants of 14 people arrived to replenish 340 infantry divisions."⁴⁰

RESULTS

While studying the trophy documents of the Nazi command on this topic, it is noteworthy that A. Hitler, understanding the change of circumstances and taking into account the experience of the Red Army, had tried to save the situation

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Дело 973, с. 21.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

and creates a system and introduces officers of national-socialist education. In the guiding documents of the military-political leadership of Hitler's Germany in 1944, a new system of ideological structures and functional duties of an officer on national-socialist education was clearly defined:

"1. For the uniform exercise in the army of national-socialist education at the General Staff to establish a headquarters for national-socialist education. The Chief of Staff of national-socialist education is the Chief of Military and Political Administration.

2. Headquarters of military units should create (departments) national-socialist education at their headquarters. In all command instances, to divisions and similar units, inclusive, the full-time officers for national-socialist education are entered in the below-mentioned headquarters. The headquarters of the battalion included functions of national-socialist education. Classes are conducted by one of the officers of the staff on the part-time basis.

3. The leader of the national-socialist education in the army. The commander of the unit remains the leader of the national-socialist education in the army. He alone is responsible for the politic-ideological leadership and upbringing of the unit. To accomplish these tasks, commanders and commanders of the units are now subordinated to the national socialist education officers as instructors.

4. In accordance with the Führer's order the decisive factor in the successful increase of political activity is the choice of the officer for the headquarters. During this choice it should be remembered that this political and ideological upbringing has a decisive influence on the course of the war. Without a doubt, officers who meet the following requirements should be appointed to this post:

absolutely-convinced national socialist;

special personal qualities;

prominent behaviour at the front;

experience and practical skills in terms of politico-ideological leadership in educational work.⁴¹

The head of the headquarters of national-socialist education at the General Staff is at my disposal, directly subordinated and carries out my activities on my behalf.

The head of the staff of National Socialist Education works in close cooperation with the Chief of the General Staff and with the Chief of Personnel of the Army. He informs them about all the important issues of his activity. It

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Дело 974, с. 49.

operates both in the reserve army and in the military industry of the land forces.

The head of the staff of the national-socialist education of the land forces must provide moral and political education and increase the activity of the troops at the expense of a unified political and ideological leadership in the world of my order of 22.XII.43. For this he has the right to check the state of national-socialist education in parts and institutions of the active and reserve armies. He issues the orders necessary for these tasks from my name."⁴²

In the system of providing the German Armed Forces with national-socialist education, A. Hitler took into account all aspects of the possible activities of all headquarters for national-socialist education. The system developed for it is designed both for the active and for the reserve army. The main role was assigned to ideologically hardened officers who were able to motivate the personnel for appropriate actions.

The ideas of national-socialism in pre-war Germany have gained popularity, primarily against the backdrop of economic recovery. The constructed system of promoting the ideology of National Socialism was associated with economic success, increasing living standards and restoring Germany's past greatness, which it lost under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. A new paradigm was created on the unrivalledness of the German race, the need for its cleanliness and the creation of infrastructure within the framework of international influence.

Military-political education of the population of Germany provided a Hitler war machine motivated soldiers. All spheres of life of the country were subordinated to the expansionist purpose, skilfully camouflaged under the liberation motives and guiding the world order in accordance with the standards worked out by the ideologues of National Socialism. The military-political leadership of Hitler's Germany focused on the education of the future invincible army. Military successes during the first years of the war and political manoeuvring allowed maintaining the high moral and political status of Hitler's soldiers and the motivation for further warfare. The propaganda activities aimed at various target audiences were successful, since they relied on concrete successes in the conduct of aggressive wars. With the change of military-political situation in the leadership of Hitler's Germany there was a need to reformat the system of information and psychological influence on the consciousness of the soldiers.

The creation of a new structure in the German military armed forces, and the precise definition of the role and place of officers of national-socialist education in 1943-1944, became a sign of the need to strengthen ideological work

⁴² *Ibid.*

among Hitler's soldiers. Propaganda activity of the 1945 model was no longer effective, as the rhetoric of victory changed with calls and persuasions to withstand and resume offensive actions. There was a strict need to force Hitler's soldiers not to pay attention to reality, but to continue to act in accordance with official propaganda. The extremely unsatisfactory level of mobilization, the reduction of the number of well-trained and motivated soldiers, the powerful actions of the Soviet propaganda machine and the simple tiredness of the war led to the refusal to continue the armed struggle and seek salvation from death. The harsh reality forced people to change their ideological system and artificially created format for perceiving the role of Germany in world history. Thus, any kind of system of ideological measures aimed at changing the perceptions of the target audience about the world order will succeed if the planted or suggested conclusions are consistent with real events.

Taking into account the conclusions of Ukrainian historians regarding the equal opportunities of the German armed forces and the Red Army before the beginning of hostilities in the territory of the Soviet Union, the success of the Nazis can be explained by the experience gained in successful military companies in Europe and a high level of motivation. Since the success in offensive actions corresponded to the ideological foundations of national-socialism, the Nazi warriors had a high level of political and moral status.

CONCLUSIONS

The actions of the Nazis are condemned and recognized as a crime against humanity. The propaganda myths and the system of their propaganda served as a justification of national-socialist ideas as an ideological platform for racism, which included both Hitler's Germany and the USSR, provide an opportunity to analyse common features and understand the patterns of the formation of an appropriate information background.

In the conditions of modern socio-political conflicts and the domination of the information component in the construction of a new architectonics of world order, the role of ideological aspects is constantly increasing. Today, the media space and humanitarian societies cover all areas of life. A thorough study of the experience of using propaganda measures in the Second World War, their further development in low-intensity military conflicts from the second half of the last century, makes it possible to use the technologies of information influence in any sphere of social and political life. A new assessment of some aspects of the Second World War events is gradually changing the memory of mankind, in which the old

ideas, which were propagated for a long time, were blocked. The generations that survived the horrors of the war years were different from the modern generations of perceptions of vital values.

Turning to facts, we doing research not only the events but also the conditions in which they occurred. Studying the testimony of prisoners of war, which are set out in the reporting documents of the Red Army, the following should be taken into account. During the interrogations there was always an influence on the part of Soviet propagandists; the captives could, for the sake of them, say what they expected of them to smile at. Therefore, the data set forth in the interpretation of Soviet ideologists can be politically biased.

The formation of a modern personal paradigm depends on the extent to which its carrier is involved in military events. Relatives, friends, friends, victims of war, photos in family albums ... are the closest private indicators of measuring such phenomena as World War II. They can coincide, or enter into contradictions with social paradigms that are formed from the state, public level, and may also serve as a tool for reformatting consciousness.

MYKHAILO HRUSHEVSKY AND NICOLAE IORGA SCHOLARS' STRUGGLE OVER THE NATIONAL HISTORY

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Abstract: *The article is devoted to the reconstruction of the first Ukrainian-Romanian historiographical polemic represented by leaders of the national movement Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Nicolae Iorga. It has been proved that the discussion was triggered by the dynamic processes of nation-building in the Central-Eastern European region, which pushed historians to justify the „exclusive” rights of their peoples for one territory or another, and prompted interpretation of events common to their neighbours in the past, based solely on their own national interest. The conclusion has been made on the need for further comprehension of the phenomenon of historiographical discussions in Central and Eastern Europe and of their impact on the dynamics of interethnic relations in the region.*

Keywords: *Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Nicolae Iorga, historiographical polemics, nation building, Central-Eastern Europe.*

Rezumat: *Mykhailo Hrushevsky și Nicolae Iorga. Înfruntarea cercetătorilor pe tema istoriei naționale.* Articolul este dedicat reconstrucției primei polemici istoriografice ucraineano-române purtate de liderii mișcărilor naționale Mykhailo Hrushevsky și Nicolae Iorga. S-a demonstrat faptul că discuția a fost declanșată de procesele dinamice ale construcției națiunii în regiunea central-est-europeană, care i-au determinat pe istorici să motiveze drepturile „exclusive” ale popoarelor lor asupra unui teritoriu sau altul și să interpreteze evenimentele comune din trecut, luând în calcul doar propriul interes național. S-a ajuns la concluzia că este necesară o viitoare înțelegere a fenomenului discuțiilor istoriografice din Europa Centrală și de Est și a impactului acestora asupra dinamicii relațiilor interetnice din regiune.

Résumé: *Mykhailo Hrushevsky et Nicolae Iorga. La confrontation des chercheurs sur le thème de l'histoire nationale.* On dédia l'article ci-joint à la reconstruction de la première polémique ukrainienne-roumaine portée par les leaders des mouvements nationaux Mykhailo Hrushevsky et Nicolae Iorga. On y démontra que les processus dynamiques de la construction de la nation dans la région centrale-est-européenne, qui déterminèrent les historiens à motiver les droits „exclusifs” de leurs peuples sur un certain territoire ou un autre et à interpréter les événements communs du passé, prenant en calcul seulement leur propre

intérêt national, déclenchèrent la discussion. On arriva à la conclusion qu'une future compréhension du phénomène des discussions historiographiques en Europe Centrale et d'Est et de leur impact sur la dynamique des relations interethniques de la région est nécessaire.

INTRODUCTION

The second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of twentieth centuries is a special period in the cultural history of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, as at that time the generalized grand national narratives, performed according to methodological requirements of Rankean and positivist schools, widely spread across this part of the continent. This phenomenon has become a reaction to the increasing pace of national self-awareness in the region, encompassing wider social strata. The creators of these grand narratives were representatives of the latest generation of encyclopaedists-humanitarians actively engaged in national reconstruction processes, often trying on the role of leaders of social movements or practical politicians (for example, Pavel Milyukov from Russia or Michal Bobzhynsky from Poland). In the Ukrainian case, it was Mykhailo Hrushevsky, in Romanian – his slightly younger colleague, Nicolae Iorga.

The fate of Ukrainian and Romanian historians was more or less similar. Both gained a brilliant historical education under the guidance of prominent teachers: in M. Hrushevsky's case, it was Volodymyr Antonovych, and in N. Iorga's one it was Alexandru Xenopol. Moreover, even in the same year (1894) they became professors of university departments of world history: the Ukrainian scholar in the centre of national life in Lviv, and his Romanian counterpart in the metropolitan Bucharest. Responding courageously to the challenges of the epoch both actively plunged into public and political life and significantly influenced the evolution of national movements. Both were the founders of the first modern parties, which carried the same name: National-Democratic. Both were destined for the political Olympus: the Ukrainian scientist became the head of the Central Rada – the parliament of the revived Ukrainian state; for some time, the Romanian historian was the head of the parliament and even the prime minister of his country.

It is noteworthy that approximately at the same time – at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – both M. Hrushevsky and N. Iorga began to create national grand narratives. In accordance with the canons of that time, the construction of the „ideal” history of the people in such narratives provided the deepest possible, as far as only sources allowed, immersion of the past in seeking the roots of their own ethnic group. More importantly, historians attributed to their people the widest

range of resettlement. Such a reconstruction was made possible by medieval sources with their often-confusing ethnic nomenclature. Obviously, the willingness of the historians to attribute the largest possible area of settlement to their compatriots inevitably triggered disputes with historians of neighbouring nations that have implemented similar social objectives and claimed their territorial ambitions. The mentioned historiographical situation is now fully researched in the Ukrainian-Polish¹, Ukrainian-Russian² and Ukrainian-Belarusian³ cases. Instead, the Romanian aspect of the problem, as ultimately the broader issue of Ukrainian-Romanian historiographical visions, is virtually unclear today.⁴ Eduard Baidaus approached the study of this problem most thoroughly, reconstructing the image of Ukrainian-Romanian relations on the pages of the fundamental *History of Ukraine-Rus* by M. Hrushevsky. His interesting works⁵, which discuss the establishment of a professional dialogue between Iorga and Hrushevsky, proved the need for a special analysis of Ukrainian-Romanian

¹ Віталій Тельвак, *Між історією та політикою: польські та українські історики у боротьбі за східноєвропейську спадщину (кінець XIX – початок XX століття)* [Between history and politics: Polish and Ukrainian historians in the struggle for the Eastern European heritage (end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries)], in *Історичні образи «сусідів» на українсько-польсько-білоруському прикордонні: міфи – студії – пам'ять. Колективна монографія / Керів. автор. кол. та редактор В. В. Масненко* [Historical images of „neighbors” on the Ukrainian-Polish-Byelorussian border: myths – studios – memory. Collective monograph / Head of author committee and editor V. V. Masненко], Черкаси, 2017, с. 84-124.

² Леонід Зашкільняк, *Україна між Польщею й Росією: історіографія та суспільна свідомість* [Ukraine between Poland and Russia: historiography and public consciousness], in „Український історичний журнал”, Київ, 2005, no. 5, с. 93–113; Іван Куций, *Цивілізаційні ідентичності в українській історіографії кінця XVIII – початку XX ст.: між Слов'янщиною та Європою* [Civilizational identities in Ukrainian historiography of the late XVIII – early XX centuries: between Slavic and Europe], Тернопіль, 2016, 480 с.

³ Віталій Масненко, *У полоні національних міфів. Конструювання образів добрих/поганих сусідів (випадок України, Польщі, Білорусі)* [In the captivity of national myths. Designing images of good / bad neighbours (case of Ukraine, Poland, Belarus)], in *Історичні образи «сусідів»...*, с. 11-44.

⁴ Сергій Добжанський, *Ніколає Йорга та Буковина* [Nicolae Iorga and Bukovina], in „Питання історії України” [Questions on the history of Ukraine], Чернівці, 2014. Вип. 17, с. 138-141.

⁵ Eduard Baidaus, *Mihail Hrușevski și Istoria Ucrainei-Rusi* [Mykhailo Hrushevsky and History of Ukraine-Rus], in „Revista istorică” [Historical Review], t. XX, 2009, no. 3–4, p. 309–328; Idem, *Relațiile româno-ucrainene în Istoria Ucrainei-Rusi. Considerente istoriografice (I)* [Romanian-ukrainian relations in the History of Ukraine-Rus'. Historiographic considerations (I)], in „Revista istorică”, 2010, Vol. XXI, no. 1–2, p. 167–182.

intellectual relations during the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The purpose of the article is an attempt to reconstruct the first historiographical polemic between Romanian and Ukrainian intellectuals represented by the leaders of their humanities. A wide range of sources serve for the realization of this goal: historiographical works, review texts, documents of that time (epistolary and diaries), etc.

MYKHAILO HRUSHEVSKY AND THE NEED TO POPULARIZE THE UKRAINIAN HISTORY

Both historians made their first attempts to integrate the past of their peoples in their native languages, which did not belong to the general knowledge of the European scientific world. Therefore, the reception of these works, despite the utter novelty of ideas and concepts presented in them, was mostly limited to the internal readership circle. Pondering this problem, M. Hrushevsky was inclined to seek influence of hostile to Ukrainians forces: „In scientific circles, whether Russian or Polish the book [the first volume of *History of Ukraine-Rus*] is thoroughly concealed as the whole history of [...] in general”.⁶

However, analysing the reasons for the indifference of European colleagues, the Ukrainian scholar came to a logical conclusion about the need to present the historical hypotheses in the language of contemporary (for that time) science – German. In a diary, dated March 13, 1904, he noted: „During the last months, I contemplated a lot over the system of silencing us and on the urgent needs of popularization of our work. I made many mistakes, turning aside and relying on our work to pave its way. No, it may not break through because there are too many adversaries”.⁷

The aforementioned conviction that there is no alternative to the distribution of translated projects for professional audience to the achievements of historians of Central and Eastern Europe M. Hrushevsky expressed in 1904, in his first

⁶ Михайло Грушевський, *Автобіографія*, 1926 [Autobiography, 1926], in *Великий Українець: Матеріали з життя та діяльності М. С. Грушевського / Упоряд. та підгот. текстів та фотоматеріалів, комент. та приміт. А. П. Демиденка*. [Great Ukrainian: Materials from the life and work of M. S. Hrushevsky / Sorting and preparation of texts and photographs, comments, remarks by A. P. Demidenko], Київ, 1992, с. 230.

⁷ Михайло Грушевський, *Щоденник/підгот. до друку І. Гирича, О. Тодійчук* [Diary/Preparation to the publication by I. Girich, O. Todiychuk], in „Український історик” [Ukrainian historian], 2006–2007, ч. 4/1–2, с. 24. See about this: С. М. Панькова, *Творча майстерня вченого: до історії написання 3-го тому „Історії України-Руси” М. Грушевського* [The creative workshop of the scientist: to the history of writing of the 3rd volume of „History of Ukraine-Rus” M. Hrushevsky], in „Український історичний журнал”, Київ, 2016, no. 3, с. 32–38.

review of the work of N. Iorga, devoted to the trade relations of Romania (in the author's vocabulary „Voloshchiny”) with Lviv, in the XVII century. The reviewer praised his Romanian counterpart for a thoroughly written archaeologically work, which attracted the attention of Ukrainian scholars to the need for a closer study of the collections of the Lviv archive. At the same time, he pointed out that the Romanian language of the peer-reviewed text (as well as the obscure periodical, on the pages of which it appeared), naturally narrowed the circle of readers: „Due to the small area of knowledge of the Romanian language, for the majority researchers the publication [source] became a dead capital (for the record, it came out in the journal „Economia națională”, and there are no imprints on its sales)”.⁸

Being led by his growing belief in the need to popularize the Ukrainian history and the history of the past of Central and Eastern Europe in a practical aspect, M. Hrushevsky decided to translate the first volume of his *History of Ukraine-Rus* into German, by refining its content in accordance with the progress of scientific knowledge in the time elapsed from the first the publication of the book in 1898. The implementation of this plan has encountered unexpected obstacles. After all, if the professional aspect of M. Hrushevsky's question was solved rather quickly, thoroughly redefining the first volume taking into account the novelties of historiographical literature and the evolution of its own conceptual views on the questions of the initial period of Ukrainian history, then the real problem was the search for an interpreter.

It turned out that despite the fact that German was one of the languages studied in the educational institutions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, however, to find a translator for the historiographical text was a rather problematic issue. Either people who could handle such a responsible job were overworked, or, as the correspondents of the Ukrainian scholar say, did not want to take on a truly responsible task. For example, refusing M. Hrushevsky's proposal, his student Zenon Kuzelia (a future outstanding linguist) frankly stated: „Your *History* is the first venerable work on the history of Ukraine-Rus that appears in German; the translated history will become inextricable and probably a frequently used textbook

⁸ Михайло Грушевський, *Рецензія: Relațiile comerciale ale țărilor noastre cu Lembergul, registre și documente din Archivele Orașului Lemberg publicate de N. Iorga. Partea I, Букареш, 1900, см. 113. Studii istorice asupra Chiliei și Cetății-Albe, de Nicolae Iorga, Букареш, 1900, см. 419* [Review: The commercial relations of our countries with Lemberg, registers and documents from the Archive of the City of Lemberg, published by N. Iorga. Part I, Bucharest, 1900, 113 p.; Historical Studies of Chilia and Cetatea Alba, by Nicolae Iorga, Bucharest, 1900, 419 p.], in „Записки НТШ”, 1904, Vol. 61, c. 18.

for Western European scholars or those Slavic writers who were not more familiar with Ukrainian editions. Therefore, it must be translated completely by a very good, smooth and perfect German. The translation that does not correspond to the German standards will damage the *History's* popularity. For that reason, I would not dare taking on this translation. I am not good at it enough and the responsibility is great".⁹ After a long quest, Hrushevsky found Felicia Nossig. Although she had the experience of translating professional works of Ukrainian writers into German, she was little acquainted with the special features of the works of M. Hrushevsky. That is why the translated text was edited numerous times, in particular, by Ivan Franko, who was already overloaded by other projects.¹⁰ Despite all the efforts made, the quality of the translation turned out to be unsatisfactory.

These circumstances led to a significant delay of the book; it was published only in 1906 (two years after the Ukrainian version 1904) in Leipzig by „B. G. Teubner-Verlag”. However, the historiographical resonance caused by the book surpassed all, even the most daring expectations. It was predicted by Ukrainian intellectuals like Ivan Kopach who stated: „This is – without doubts – one of the most important events for Ukrainians. For the first time, our nation was represented to the Europe by the works of the most significant scholar and it was represented in such a way, that we cannot fear European condemnation”.¹¹ One of the translators, Ivan Franko on the pages of „Literary and Scientific Bulletin” wrote: „This edition is the first decisive step of our scientific works to the larger audience, the first attempt to introduce to the widest circles of Western European specialists the achievements of Ukrainian historiography. The first volume of *History of Ukrainian People* of prof. Hrushevsky impresses by its great scope, thoroughness of accomplishment and critical presentation of the material covered. All the remains of Rus original are present and they make the reading more pleasant for those who are not specialists in the field”.¹²

Indeed, *History of the Ukrainian People* was the most discussed scientific

⁹ Листи Зенона Кузеля до Михайла Грушевського / Упорядники: В. Наулко, В. Старков [Letters of Zenon Kuzelia to Mykhailo Hrushevsky / Compilers: V. Naulko, V. Starkov], Запоріжжя, 2005, с. 11.

¹⁰ Михайло Грушевський, *Щоденник*, с. 31.

¹¹ Іван Копач, *Рецензія: Hruševskyj Michael, Geschichte des ukrainischen (ruthenischen) Volkes. I Bd. Leipzig, Teubner 1906* [Review: Mykhailo Hrushevsky, History of the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) people], in „Діло”, 1906, ч. 34, no. 15 (28) лютого.

¹² І. Франко, *Рецензія: Hruševskyj M. Geschichte des ukrainischen (ruthenischen) Volkes. I Bd. Leipzig, Teubner 1906* [Review: Mykhailo Hrushevsky. History of the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) people], in „Літературно-науковий вісник”, 1906, Vol. XXXIII, с. 595.

book ever written by a Ukrainian scientist. Letters addressed to the author by Western European historians with the words of recognition, as well as numerous reviews evidence this.¹³ On the pages of Polish, Czech, and German periodicals, the author's decision to share his ideas with colleagues from other countries by means of commonly known language was unanimously approved.

The encyclopaedic education of the author and the courage of his historiographical reconstruction were also noted with enthusiasm. For example, the quote of Alexander Brikner's assessment: „The work of Mr. H[rushevsky] is a clear testimony to the scholarship and universality of the Rus [Ukrainian] author. He fully mastered the enormous literature of the subject – archaeological, historical, philological, especially Russian, before closed to Europe; he simply surprises us with knowledge of the most special, insignificant, even forgotten Russian and German works. With that fantastic knowledge combined with a speed of thought, the originality of judgments, the perfect method...”.¹⁴

At the same time, the most fundamental criticisms concerned exactly the interpretation of a certain complex of problems (territorial, terminological, event) differentiating the historical interests of Ukrainians with their neighbours. In interpreting author's statements reviewers were inclined to see the ideological motivation of the author's historiographical work as an attempt to attribute as large as possible range of resettlement to Ukrainians. As Otto Getch correctly noted, the concepts of M. Hrushevsky once again proved that „national historiography goes hand in hand with national awakening, which accelerate and affect one another productively”.¹⁵

The active appeal of colleagues to the *History of the Ukrainian People* persuaded M. Hrushevsky in the worthiness of the efforts and time spent on the project. Moreover, the critical remarks convinced the Lviv professor in the need to continue translating his works into German for further explanation of the logic of arguments in defence of the proposed model of the Eastern European historical process. The elevated mood of the scientist, caused by the scrupulous attention to his work, was reflected in a letter to his Russian counterpart Alexander Lappo-Danilevsky: „My

¹³ See about this Віталій Тельвак, *Німецькомовна «Історія українського народу» Михайла Грушевського в оцінках сучасників»* [German-language „History of the Ukrainian people” by Mykhailo Hrushevsky in his contemporaries' perspective views], in „Український історичний журнал”, Київ, 2007, no. 3, с. 175-189.

¹⁴ Aleksandr Brückner, *Dogmat normański* [Norman Dogmat], in „Kwartalnik Historyczny”, Lwów, 1906, Vol. XX, p. 665.

¹⁵ Otto Hötzsch, *Рецензія: Hruševskij M. Geschichte des ukrainischen (ruthenischen) Volkes. Leipzig, 1906* [Review: Mykhailo Hrushevsky. History of the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) people. I Vol. Leipzig, Teubner 1906], in „Historische Vierteljahrshrift”, Leipzig, 1907, Vol. X, p. 223.

first vol. of *History...* was released last year in German and now it is undergoing the fiery baptism. Alongside with more or less sharp criticism, dictated by the reluctance to my „innovations” or personal and political accounts, I was pleased to see that even the most severe critics did not point at any real flaws in my conclusions or methodology; on the other hand, this criticism, perhaps, should be valued even more than loud compliments. It motivates me for the new book review”.¹⁶ However, the chronic financial insecurity of Ukrainian science and scholars became a hindrance to many conceived, and even partially implemented, translation projects.

IORGA AND HRUSHEVSKY. THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTROVERSY

Among the reviewers of the *History of the Ukrainian People* was N. Iorga, whose review appeared on pages of Leipzig’s „Literarisches Zentralblatt für Deutschland”. Like other observers, the Romanian historian linked the emergence of work with the general activation of the Ukrainian national movement and the desire of its leaders to promote Ukrainian national postulates in the European intellectual and political environment: „In general, we are dealing with a product that serves as a national aspiration for Rusyns, who want to represent themselves as a people with 34 million population, their own culture and state formation”.¹⁷ The reviewer emphasized that the peer-reviewed book is only a small part of the multi-volume publication, on which M. Hrushevsky continued to work tirelessly. Therefore, according to N. Iorga, it was quite timely that the German translation of the first volume that presented the early history of Ukrainians was published. The reviewer summarizes the content of the *History of the Ukrainian People*, pointing out its strengths and weaknesses. He underlined the outstanding erudition of M. Hrushevsky, the profoundness of the work, the solidity of the used source and historiographical material. According to N. Iorga, the special scientific value marked the last section of the book, devoted to the beginnings of the Old Rus statehood and the reign of Volodymyr the Great. „Hrushevsky – emphasizes the reviewer – is an educated, critical, and inventive mind; he has a perfect knowledge

¹⁶ Віталій Тельвак, *Листи Михайла Грушевського до Олександра Лаппо-Данілевського* [Letters of Mykhailo Hrushevsky to Oleksandr Lappo-Danilevsky], in „Записки НТШ”, Львів, 2016, т. 270, с. 330.

¹⁷ Nicolae Iorga, *Рецензія: Hruševskij M. Geschichte des ukrainischen (ruthenischen) Volkes. I Bd. Leipzig, Teubner 1906* [Review: Mykhailo Hrushevsky. History of the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) people. I Vol. Leipzig, Teubner 1906], in „Literarisches Zentralblatt für Deutschland”, Leipzig, 1907, no. 17, p. 534.

of his material".¹⁸

At the same time, like his Czech and Polish colleagues, N. Iorga particularly focused on the moments that directly affected the interests of Romanian historiography. It should be noted that these were the first reflections of Romanian intellectuals regarding the modern version of the Ukrainian past. N. Iorga criticized the proposed size of the area of resettlement of Ukrainian ancestors in the prehistoric age and the exaggeration of the Ukrainian contribution to the ancient cultural and political heritage; he criticized Hrushevsky's Ancient theory as well as his „anti-românism” attitude, pointed at the idealization of the psychology and customs of his people. The reviewer was rather sceptical about the terminology of *History of the Ukrainian people*. He doubted the correctness of the toponym „Ukraine” instead of the usual „Rus”. In addition, the observer reproached a cumbersome structure of the book, the overload of its contents by numerous excursions that distracted the reader from the main plot line. However, this defect, as N. Iorga noted, is inherent in the Russian historiographical tradition.

Addressing the views of M. Hrushevsky, the special criticism concerned the Slavic colonization of the Carpathian region. Pointing to the unlikelihood of the territory attributed to „his Rusyns”, the Romanian scientist frankly mocks at such „gifts” in the form of the Danube lands and „Semigorod”. Besides, it was unclear why Ukrainian scientist carefully avoided the use of ethnonym „Romanian”, giving preference to the old „Vlachs”, and even concludes that his colleague „hates the name of the Romanians”. It should be noted that, at the same time, the observer did not feel a certain irony of the situation, of the „Little Russians”, and not – as M. Hrushevsky does – of „Ukrainians”. Finally, despite the rather harsh tone of the review, the critic pointed out: „A smart and voluminous, even enormous book will be useful for a lot of historians, but it will not satisfy everyone, although it indicates a high level of knowledge, and partly the author's insight”.¹⁹

The reproaches of N. Iorga were not left unanswered; the reason was the publication by the Romanian scientist at the same time of several parts of the *History of the Romanian people* in German. One of the closest students of M. Hrushevsky and a representative of the „Galician school”, Myron Korduba responded to the generalizing study of the founder of modern Romanian historiography. His review, published at the pages of „Notes of the SSS” which were edited by Hrushevsky, contained arguments, which, undoubtedly, correlated with ones of his teacher. Moreover, the letter of M. Korduba to Hrushevsky testified that the logic

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 533.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 534.

of construction and the critical tone of the review were largely provoked by N. Iorga's criticism of M. Hrushevsky: „Via Tomashivsky, I sent a review on Iorga's *Geschichte Rumänen*. Recently I read in the «Litterarisches Centralblatt» his criticism on the 1st volume of your *History*, which is similar to feuilleton criticism from our «Dilo» or «Ruslan». Since my review has been not printed yet, would you have time to send me some remarks? I think I should add something”.²⁰ The last phrase explains the structural similarity of the reviews of N. Iorga and M. Korduba, who challenged the Romanian scholar with the same criticism.

First, the observer introduced N. Iorga to Ukrainian audience, which had been already more or less acquainted with the name of an outstanding Romanian scholar. He acknowledges that his colleague is „undoubtedly the best methodologically trained from among Romanian historians”, who „laid the foundation of insights into the knowledge of the past of his people, the basis on which one can draw a solid image of the development of the Romanian powers in accordance with the requirements of present science”.²¹ The undisputed merit of N. Iorga was a consistent criticism in working with sources that removed from Romanian historiography many myths rooted over centuries (for example, the Roman origin of Romanians).

However, M. Korduba pointed at the author's insufficient source argumentation of many hypotheses he put forward. In addition, in the opinion of the columnist, N. Iorga underestimated the existing literature on the issue. More vividly it concerned Ukrainian historiography, achievements of which, as it was criticized repeatedly by the reviewer, were completely out of the attention of the Romanian author. The results of such neglect were significant mistakes of the peer-reviewed work, in which numerous aspects of the past of Ukrainian-Romanian relations were illusory or false. Among such mistakes, there was an interpretation of Cossacks' relationship with the Moldavian principality. Apart from this, M. Korduba argued with N. Iorga about the nature of the initial colonization of the Ukrainian-Romanian ethnic bor-

²⁰ *Взаємне листування Михайла Грушевського та Мирона Кордуби/Упорядник, автор вступних розділів і наукового коментаря Олег Купчинський* [Mutual correspondence of Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Myron Korduba / Compiler, author of introductory sections and scientific commentary Oleg Kupchinsky], Львів, 2016, с. 181.

²¹ Мирон Кордуба, *Рецензія: N. Iorga – Geschichte des rumänischen Volkes im Rahmen seiner Staatsbildungen*, Гома, 1905, т. I і II, XIV, 402-f-XV, 541 см. (Geschichte der europäischen Staaten, hrg. von A. H. L. Heeren, F. A. Uckert, W. v. Giesebrecht u. K. Lamprecht. 34 Werk) [Review: N. Iorga – History of the Romanian people as part of their state formations, Gotha, 1905, Vol. I and II, XIV, 402-f-XV, 541 ст.], in „Записки НТШ”, 1907, т. 76, с. 202.

der, indicating the methodological weakness of the attempts to support his hypotheses evidence from toponymic sources. The Ukrainian columnist pointed out to numerous mistakes in the transfer of Ukrainian ethnonyms and toponyms caused by the Romanianization of their pronunciation. M. Korduba did not appreciate the literary style of N. Iorga as well, in particular, he considered irrelevant the belles letters style of describing historical personalities. The Ukrainian scientist was not satisfied with the attempts of a peer-reviewed author to recreate the life of his people at the beginning of the twentieth century: „Here N. Iorga from objective historian turns into a politician who condemns everything that is not Romanian”.²²

In spite of the rather critical tone of the entire review, the Ukrainian historian ultimately pays tribute to the diligence and talent of his Romanian counterpart: „[...] We must admit that despite some flaws I consider this book to be the best work of this volume. The mistakes and shortcomings were the result of the author's contest to reject all the current acquisitions of science and to be original to the *tout prix*, partly again at the cost of ignoring Slavic scientific literature, which is impermissible for the Romanian historian”.²³

Since the publication of M. Korduba's critical review, the works of the Romanian scientist, especially those that at least somewhat concerned the Ukrainian past, were noticed by the employees of the „Notes of the SSS”. It is noteworthy that the students of M. Hrushevsky, who always stayed in close contact with the teacher, always reviewed them.²⁴ At the same time, the reviewers, like M. Korduba, admitted N. Iorga's professional skills, as they constantly pointed out to him the ignorance of Ukrainian historiography. To their mind, the last was the reason for misinterpretation of Ukrainian-Romanian relations during many centuries of neighbourhood.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 212.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 212-213.

²⁴ See, for example: С. Т. [Томашівський С.], *Рецензія: Alessandro Amira – Storia del soggiorno di Carlo XII in Turchia, scritta dal suo primo interprŕte... e pubblicata da N. Iorga, professore all' universita di Bucarest. Букарест 1905, см. 98* [Review: Alessandro Amira – History of the stay of Charles XII in Turkey, written by his first interpreter ... and published by N. Iorga, professor at the University of Bucharest. Bucharest, 1905, p. 98], in „Записки НТШ”, 1910, т. 93, с. 185-186; З. К. [З. Кузеля], *Рецензія: Scierile lui N. Iorga. (Junimea literarŕ, 1911, VIII, – ст. 146-154)* [Review: Writings of N. Iorga (Junimea literary, 1911, VIII, p. 146-154)], in „Записки НТШ”, 1912, т. 107, с. 178; Андрій Ключ, *Нова історія Османів. N. Iorga – Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches nach den Quellen dargestellt*, Gotha 1908 – 11, тт. I-IV: ст. VIII-486, VI+453, VIII+479 i 512 [A new story of the Ottomans. N. Iorga – History of the Ottoman Empire depicted after the sources, Gotha 1908 – 11, vol. I-IV: p. VIII-486, VI+453, VIII+479 i 512], in „Записки НТШ”, 1912, т. 110, с. 183-192.

Both N. Iorga and M. Hrushevsky themselves no longer reviewed the works of each other. Instead, at the beginning of twentieth century, the controversy moved to the pages of their general works, where the issues of reconstruction of the events of the Eastern European past in general and the Ukrainian-Romanian relations in particular, were raised. At the same time, M. Hrushevsky treated the works of a Romanian colleague with indisputable respect, especially appreciating his archaeological publications.²⁵ Traditionally, the Lviv professor disagreed with N. Iorga's opinions on the problems of common history solely through the prism of Romanian interest.

CONCLUSIONS

The historiographical controversy reconstructed above can be regarded as typical for the intellectual situation of that time: the dynamic processes of nation-building in the Central and Eastern European region pushed historians to justify the „exclusive” rights of their peoples for one or another territory and prompted interpretation of events common to their neighbours of the past, based solely on their own national interest. The results of this controversy were numerous discussions that emerged in the professional environment, often spread on the pages of massive periodicals, pushing for self-reflection the representatives of the broad circles of intellectuals. Unfortunately, this discussion was mostly „hermetic” in nature, since the parties a priori rejected the very possibility of the suitability of the arguments of the opponents. Therefore, the potential benefit of these discussions, which was the possibility of a kind of „immunization” of interethnic conflicts in the region through the correction of inter-neighbourly misunderstandings with intellectual tools, was actually wasted up. It was shown by the events of the First World War, when the empire's disintegration brought about its greater effectiveness in resolving territorial disputes. A good example here was the Ukrainian-Romanian confrontation in Bukovina. All this updates the comprehension of the phenomenon of historiographical discussions in Central and Eastern Europe and finds out their influence on the dynamics of interethnic relations in the region.

²⁵ М. С. Грушевський, *Історія України-Руси*: в 11 томах, 12 книгах [History of Ukraine-Rus: in 11 volumes, 12 books], т. I, Київ, 1991, с. 135; т. VI, Київ, 1995, с. 47, 63, 66, 67, 72, 602, 606; т. VII, Київ, 1995, с. 161; т. IX-1, Київ, 1996, с. 83, 90, 140, 477, 478, 485, 523, 524, 530; т. IX-2, Київ, 1997, с. 904, 905, 1546.

CONVICTS' LABOUR IN RUSSIAN PENITENTIARY PRACTICE OF THE 17th – 18th CENTURIES: FROM PUNISHMENT TO CORRECTION REMEDY

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Abstract: *The results of historical and legal research of the key characteristics of Russia's penitentiary policy in the sphere of convicted criminals' labour organization in the 17th – 18th centuries are presented in the article. As an information base were used original texts of Russian legal acts of the researched historical period. Also, were used science works of historians and legal scholars starting from the first half of the 19th century. The study determines the influence of the Church on the processes of law-making, execution of criminal penalties and convicts' labour organization in the early middle ages, as well as the impact of this stage on the formation of Russian penitentiary system in the studied historical period. The features of the influence of foreign legislation on the Russian penitentiary law-making and reception processes of the Byzantine legislation in the legal system, as well as the legislation of European countries, were determined. The article analyses the initial stage of the formation of a unified penitentiary system associated with the emergence of codified legal sources and a centralized system of public administration. Features of convict's attraction to labour as well as organizational aspects of penitentiary systems' functioning were investigated. The socio-economic conditions that determined the directions of development of Russia's criminal and penitentiary legislation of the studied historical period were analysed.*

Keywords: *convicts' labour, penitential, punishment, prison system, criminal legislation, Russian State*

Rezumat: *Munca deținuților în practica penitenciară rusă din secolele XVII – XVIII: de la pedeapsă la instrument de corecție.* Articolul prezintă rezultatele cercetării istorice și juridice a principalelor aspecte ale politicii penitenciare a Rusiei în secolele XVII-XVIII în domeniul organizării muncii criminalilor condamnați. Ca bază de informare au fost folosite textele originale ale actelor juridice rusești din respectiva perioadă istorică. De asemenea, au fost folosite lucrări științifice ale istoricilor și cercetătorilor juriști începând cu prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea. Studiul reflectă influența Bisericii asupra proceselor de elaborare a legislației, executării pedepsei penale și organizării muncii condamnaților

în Evul Mediu, precum și impactul acestei etape asupra formării sistemului penitenciar rus în perioada studiată. Autorii definesc particularitățile influenței legislației străine asupra proceselor juridice și ale receptării legislației bizantine în sistemul juridic rus, precum și ale impactului legislației țărilor europene. Articolul analizează etapa inițială a formării unui sistem penitenciar unificat asociat cu apariția unor surse legale codificate și a unui sistem centralizat de administrație publică. Sunt investigate specificul determinării condamnatului de a munci, precum și aspectele organizatorice ale funcționării sistemului penitenciar. Sunt analizate condițiile socio-economice care au jalonat direcțiile de dezvoltare a legislației penale și penitenciare a Rusiei în perioada istorică studiată.

Résumé : Le travail des condamnés dans l'exercice pénitentiaire en Russie du XVII-e au XVIII-e siècles : de la punition à l'instrument de correction. Les résultats des recherches historiques et juridiques sur les caractéristiques essentielles de la politique pénitentiaire de la Russie dans le domaine de l'organisation du travail des criminels condamnés des XVII-e au XVIII-e siècles sont présentés dans l'article ci-joint. Les textes originaux des actes juridiques russes de la période historique étudiée ont été utilisés comme base d'information. Des travaux scientifiques d'historiens et de juristes ont également été utilisés à partir de la première moitié du XIX-e siècle. L'étude détermine l'influence de l'Église sur le processus législatif, l'application des sanctions pénales et l'organisation du travail des condamnés pendant le Moyen Âge, ainsi que l'impact de cette étape sur la formation du système pénitentiaire russe dans le contexte historique étudié. Les caractéristiques de l'influence de la législation étrangère sur les processus d'élaboration de la législation pénitentiaire russe et de la réception de la législation byzantine dans le système juridique, ainsi que de la législation des pays européens, y ont été déterminées. L'article analyse l'étape initiale de la formation d'un système pénitentiaire unifié associé à l'émergence de sources juridiques codifiées et d'un système d'administration publique centralisé. Les caractéristiques de la détermination du condamné pour le travail, ainsi que les aspects organisationnels du fonctionnement du système pénitentiaire y ont été examinés. Les conditions socio-économiques qui ont déterminé les orientations du développement de la législation pénale et pénitentiaire de la Russie de la période historique étudiée y ont été analysées.

INTRODUCTION

Modern penitentiary science defines convicts' labour as a correcting remedy for criminals. This doctrine is reflected in the regulations of most developed countries. In European countries with highly developed economy, this doctrine is enhanced nowadays and vocational training is defined as a correcting remedy. In France and Austria, participation in vocational training programs is

defined as the work activity of prisoners for which they are entitled to get appropriate remuneration.¹

For a long time, the work of convicted criminals in the penitentiary practice of many countries performed exclusively compensatory functions and had the character of punishment, which was defined corresponding to the level of public danger of the committed crime. However, the processes of humanization of the penitentiary legislation and the relevant law enforcement practice have changed the emphasis in the use of labour as a correcting remedy related to the execution of basic punishments. The transition of convicts' labour from punishment to remedy took place in different countries during a long period. In Western Europe this process took over 400 years (15th-19th centuries) and had significant national differences.²

From this point of view penitentiary practice of the Russian state in the 17th-18th centuries deserves special attention. In this historical period, during a very short time (over 150 years) the formation of the Russian prison system took its place, and applicable legal norms and practices were in the progress of rapid development. The study of processes of the convicts' labour nature changing and its functions in the Russian penitentiary practice makes it possible to study the processes of humanization of the researched correctional system.

The relevance of the research of convicted criminals' labour organization in Russia in the 17th – 18th centuries, as well as the processes of formation of penitentiary policy in this area, is determined by the peculiarities of this historical period. The legal regulation of the execution of punishments related with the employment of convicted criminals had a system-forming nature and served as the basis of the criminal law and penitentiary policy of that period. At the same time, the studied historical period was associated with the intensive formation of Russia's legal system and the reform of its public administration system. The consolidation of state power by the Romanov dynasty and the beginning of state-building processes were accompanied by significant reforms. Formation of a new social structure of Russian society took place in that time. In these circumstances,

¹ Jo Hawley, Ilona Murphy, Manuel Souto-Otero, *Prison Education and Training in Europe: Current State-of-Play and Challenges*. A summary report authored for the European Commission by GHK Consulting. May, 2013, passim, in <http://klaskabak.net/doc/EC.pdf> (Accessed on 30.11.2018).

² Henry Theodore Jackson, *Prison Labor*, in "Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology", Vol. 18, 1927-1928, No. 2, pp. 219-225, <https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2059&context=jclc> (Accessed on 21.07.2018).

state penitentiary policy gained a great importance, which revealed in its significant impact on social, economic, military and political processes in Russian society. The reformatory activity of Peter the great also greatly affected the penitentiary functions of the state. On the one hand, these reforms were aimed at the modernization of all spheres of public life (including the legal status of prisoners), on the other hand, the modernized penitentiary policy was partially aimed at servicing economic, social and military reforms in Russia.

In the 18th century, the Russian Empire significantly expanded its territory. The country included vast territories, which provided a significant expansion of the national population, as well as complicated the class structure of society. These and other circumstances determined the significant development of domestic law, including legislation governing the execution of criminal penalties. As the self-government rights in the newly annexed territories expanded, the Russian penitentiary policy began to acquire an Imperial character. The legal system of the metropolis was enriched by law innovations applied in the Western territories (where some legal norms of a number of European countries were largely accepted). At the same time, legal systems of modern Eastern European countries in the researched period acquired a holistic character and passed an intensive stage of system formation.

Historical and legal study of the processes of formation and development of the Russian penitentiary policy in the sphere of labour organization of convicted criminals in the 17th – 18th centuries are essential from the point of view of the analysis of legal systems' formation processes of modern countries of Eastern Europe.

The relevance of the research of the Russian penitentiary policy in 17th – 18th centuries was determined in the work of Isabel de Madariaga, where she noted that "... so little had been written in English on the bare facts of Russian eighteen-century penal policy...". It was also noted that "...a full history of penal policy, in theory and in practice, in eighteenth-century Russia remains to be written".³ Study of Russian Prison System history, carried out by A.S. Mikhlin and R.D. King, outlines, that no systematic English-written analysis was made on the topic of implementation of sentences in Russia before the 19th century⁴.

³ Isabel de Madariaga, *Politics and Culture in Eighteenth-Century Russia: Collected Essays*, London, Routledge, 1998, p. 10.

⁴ A. S. Mikhlin, R. D. King, *The Russian Prison System: Past, Present and Future*, in R. Matthews, P. Francis (eds), *Prisons 2000*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24559-8_12

Methodology of our research in general grounds on the ideas of N. Lacey, D. Soskice and D. Hope. In their work they insist on such position "...four main explanatory paradigms of penal policy – focus on, in turn, crime, cultural dynamics, economic structures and interests, and institutional differences in the organization of different political economies as the key determinants of penal policy. We argue that these paradigms are best seen as complementary rather than competitive and present a case for integrating them analytically in a comparative political economy framework situated within the *longue durée* of technology regime change."⁵ We fully agree with gentlemen and due to this we focused our attention on a wide range of corresponding historical spheres that determined the features of Russian penal policy in the researched historical period.

The aim of the research is to identify the prerequisites for the formation of Russia's penitentiary policy in the sphere of convicted criminals' labour organization in the 17th – 18th centuries, as well as its impact on the processes of state construction and development of the legal system of the Russian Empire. Achieving the aim of the study is determined by the systematic use of a number of methods of scientific research. This paper is also aimed on the objective analysis of the prerequisites of the Russian penal policy forming. Hypothesis of such analysis assume that a widely spread opinion,⁶ that political repression played a tremendous role in the history of Russian penal policy, is a mistake. During the preparation of the article were used narratives, comparative legal, historical and genetic methods of science research, besides a number of general scientific research methods were used.

CLASSIC MIDDLE AGE ERA

Analysis of scientific literature in the sphere of history of state and law of Russia gives us opportunity to conclude that the use of forced labour of criminal

⁵ N. Lacey, D. Soskice, D. Hope, *Understanding the Determinants of Penal Policy: Crime, Culture, and Comparative Political Economy*, in "Annual Review of Criminology", 2018, Vol. 1, p. 195.

⁶ B. Gruszczynska, E. Kaczynska, *Poles in the Russian Penal System and Siberia as a Penal Colony (1815 1914): A Quantitative Examination*, in "Quantification and Criminal Justice History in International Perspective", 1990, Vol. 15, No. 4 (56), p. 95-120; Peter H. Solomon, Jr., *Soviet Penal Policy, 1917-1934: A Reinterpretation*, in "Slavic Review", 1980, Vol. 39, No. 2. p. 195-217; M. Raef, *The well-ordered Police State. Social and institutional change through law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600 – 1800*, New Heaven University, 1983.

convicts occurred throughout the period of the Russian state existence. In spite of the fact that in all editions of the *Russkaya Pravda* (Old Slavic: Правда Русьская. Eng.: Russian Truth. The first legal code of the Eastern Slavs⁷) there are no mentions of such punishments as restriction and imprisonment, Russian historiography specifies existence of practice of people maintenance in earth prisons as a kind of punishment. Such criminal sanction also included forced labour of convicts. Academician S. M. Soloviev qualified this phenomenon as slave labour.⁸

The first mention of the imprisonment places in the Russian state refers to the 10th – 12th centuries *Chronicles of Nikon* (rus.: *Никоновская летопись*) and *Lavrentiy* (rus.: *Лаврентьевская летопись*) provide us information about the detention of the heretics in the dungeons and cellars of the Episcopal houses. Criminals were imprisoned not only in monasteries and bishops' houses. Often violators of the law were placed in monastic deserts and monasteries under protection of brotherhood.⁹

In our opinion, it is worth disagreeing with the opinion of S. Stefanov,¹⁰ that in the historical and legal aspect the use of labour of citizens convicted in criminal offenses can be analysed only since the 17th century, when appeared the first legal sources regulating the work of convicts in Russia. Progressive for its time was the legislation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, where on the basis of *Russkaya Pravda*, Polish court codes and the laws of other European States, were allocated penitentiary functions of the state. In the Statute of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from 1588¹¹ criminal penalties such as imprisonment and forced labour were

⁷ Robert E. Bjork (Editor), *The Oxford Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 4, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.

⁸ С. М. Соловьев, *Сочинения* [Works]: В 18 кн. Кн.1: *История России с древнейших времен* [History of Russia since ancient times]. Т.1–2, Москва. Голос, 1993.

⁹ М. А. Колчин, *Ссылные и заточенные в острог Соловецкого монастыря в XVI – XIX вв.* [Exiled and imprisoned in the jail of the Solovetsky monastery in 16th – 19th centuries], Москва, Посредника, 1908; А. С. Пругавин, *Монастырские тюрьмы в борьбе с сектантством: к вопросу о веротерпимости* [Monastery prisons in the struggle against sectarianism: the question of religious tolerance], Москва, Посредника, 1905.

¹⁰ С. О. Стефанов, *Праця як міра карального впливу при виконанні карних покарань в історії Української держави (період до 1900 з.)* [Labour as a punitive measure impact at execution of criminal sanctions in the history of the Ukrainian state (before 1900)], in *Актуальні проблеми політики: зб. наук. праць* [Actual issues of the politics: collection of scientific works], Одеса: Юридична література, 2000, Вип. 9, с. 431-437.

¹¹ *Статут Вялікага княства Літоўскага 1588* [Statute of Grand Duchy of Lithuania]: Тэксты. Давед. Камент, Минск, БелСЭ, 1989.

provided as a punishment and a correction mean for offenders. The Statute provided norms for the detention of convicts in prisons with differentiated conditions, depending on the category to which the offender was assigned.¹²

In the work of N. I. Naryshkina¹³ it is pointed out that in the basis of the criminal and penitentiary legislation of the Russian state and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 15th-17th centuries were many common provisions, but the involvement of convicts to forced labour in Lithuania started earlier, while in Russia it became widespread only in the 18th century. It is noteworthy that in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, during the analysed period, codified sources of criminal and penitentiary law were developed. New codifications contained a lot of progressive provisions for that time, such as pardon, compensation for convicts, conditions of detention and food provision of prisoners. At this time, in the Russian state, the execution of criminal penalties was regulated by Prince's (later Czar's) decrees, orders, certificates and other acts, which largely contained only prohibitions, duties and regulations. The convicts of that time had practically no rights in Russia.

CONCILIAR CODE 1649

The Conciliar code adopted in 1649 became the first codified source of criminal law in Russia¹⁴ (hereinafter the Code of 1649), where deprivation of liberty in prison was provided as a sanction in more than 40 articles. Thus, deprivation of liberty, depending on the severity of the crime, had an indefinite term or limited duration. Sources of the Code of 1649 were: Rules of the Holy

¹² О. І. Андрушак, *Праця як засіб виправлення і виховання засуджених (історико-правовий нарис)* [Labour, as the way of correcting the convicts (historical and juridical essay)], in "Юридична Україна" [Juridical Ukraine], 2011, № 6, с. 17-21; Ж. В. Хацук, *История развития экспертизы в судопроизводстве* [History of development of expertise in legal proceedings], in "Вестник Гродненского государственного университета им. Я. Купалы" [Bulletin of Grodno state University n. a. Kupala], 2015, № 1(87), с. 94 – 103.

¹³ Н. И. Нарышкина, *Функционирование тюрем в Российском государстве и Великом княжестве Литовском в XV–XVII вв.: сравнительно-правовое исследование* [The functioning of prisons in the Russian state and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 15th – 17th centuries: comparative legal research], in "Вестник Института: преступление, наказание, исправление" [Bulletin of the Institute: crime, punishment, correction], 2012, № 4(20), с. 22 – 25.

¹⁴ *Sobornoe ulozhenie ot 29 janvarja 1649 g.* [Conciliar code, dated 29 January 1649], in <http://base.garant.ru/57791500/> (Accessed on 12.08.2018)

Fathers and Apostles; Town laws of the Byzantine Emperors; court laws adopted in 1497, 1550, 1589, the decrees of kings and knights' sentences; Lithuanian Statute; statutory (decree) books of the Violent order.¹⁵

Violent order – one of the governing bodies of The Russian state in 16th-17th centuries. Government officials from nobility, who were required to solve criminal cases have been mentioned in Russian normative acts since 1539. Presumably, it was a temporary Commission established to prevent robbery, which then intensified. Later, the temporary Commission became permanent, and thus was established the Robbery order, which was first mentioned in 1571 and continuously operated until the 18th century.¹⁶

This gives us the opportunity to conclude that in the Code of 1649 was made the reception of a number of Byzantine law rules, which can be explained by the prolonged influence of Byzantine culture on the development of the Russian state. At the same time, early national legal sources and developments of European States were widely used.

For the Commission of property crimes with selfish intent, imprisonment with compulsory work for the state interest was provided. Work in the vast majority of cases took place outside the places of detention. According to the Code of 1649 forced labour had the character of additional punishment. Articles 9, 10, 11, 15, 16 prescribed the direction of thieves and robbers to "...all sorts of production where the Emperor will indicate" after imprisonment.¹⁷ Places of organization of these works were usually Siberia or border towns in the South.

¹⁵ К. А. Долгополов, *Историко-правовые тенденции развития наказания в российском уголовном праве* [Historical and legal trends in the development of punishment in the Russian criminal law], in "Вестник Северокавказского государственного технического университета" [Bulletin of the North Caucasian state technical University], 2011. №3 (28) С. 201 – 203; А. А. Кулешов, *Становление тюремной системы: отечественный и зарубежный опыт* [Formation of the prison system: domestic and foreign experience], in Матер. междунар. науч.-практ. конф. *Уголовно-исполнительная система России: проблемы и перспективы* [Penitentiary system of Russia: problems and prospects] (г. Самара, 22.05.2015 г.). – Самара : Самарский юрид. инст. ФСИН, 2015. – С. 152 – 155; Е. Н. Леонтьева, *Система источников русского права XVII в.* [The system of sources of Russian law of the 17th century], Чебоксары, ЧКИ РУК, 2009

¹⁶ К. А. Неволин, *Образование управления в России от Иоанна III до Петра Великого* [Establishment of public administration in Russia from John III to Peter the Great], in "Журнал Министерства народного просвещения" [Journal of the Ministry of Public Education], 1844, № 1, с. 25 – 31.

¹⁷ В. А. Крымов, *Предпосылки становления процессуального порядка начала*

It should be noted that the researchers note the extreme severity and repression of the Code of 1649, where the death penalty was provided in more than 60 kinds of cases. The Code envisaged violent punishments, distinguished by extreme cruelty.¹⁸ A widely spread phenomenon in the 17th century was serving a criminal sentence (including life imprisonment) in monasteries. Herewith, the process of serving the sentence was regulated by Church acts. This also applies to the organization of convicts' labour. Adopted on the 26th of December 1697 "Instructions to clerical elders or decent overseers from his Holiness Moscow Patriarch Adrian", regulated relations in the sphere of serving a life sentence. This Act determined that civilians' convicts of should be put in shackles and must carry out "the work which fit them".¹⁹ At the same time, correspondence and communication with the outside world were prohibited, the possibility of going outside the prison was excluded, regular educational work in the form of religious exhortations was to be carried out, and severe supervision in the form of a guard was provided.²⁰

THE PETER THE GREAT ERA

As already noted, the convicts' labour in the pre-Peter the Great era was an episodic phenomenon and was not widespread. During the reign of Peter the Great started the active use of convicts' labour for the purpose of obtaining material benefit by the state. Convicted for crimes were sent to exile (the place of

производства по уголовному делу в российском законодательстве XI-XVII вв [Preconditions for establishment the procedural order for initiation of proceedings in a criminal case in the Russian legislation of the 11th-17th centuries], in "Вестник Института: преступление, наказание, исправление" [Bulletin of the Institute: crime, punishment, correction], 2018, № 1(41), с. 82 – 87.

¹⁸ В. Строев, *Историко-юридическое исследование Уложения изданного царем Алексеем Михайловичем в 1649 году* [Historical and legal research of the Code published by Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich in 1649], Санкт-Петербург, Тип. Имп. Акад. наук, 1833.

¹⁹ Н. И. Нарышкина, *Правовое регулирование тюремного заключения в России во второй половине XVII века* [Legal regulation of imprisonment in Russia in the second half of 17th century], in "Уголовно-исполнительное право" [Penal Law], 2012, № 1(13), с. 29 – 32.

²⁰ С. Ю. Ведров, Д. В. Углицких, *Осуществление надзора за лицами, отбывающими пожизненное заключение в Российском государстве с XII и до начала XX вв. (историко-правовые аспекты)* [Supervision of persons serving life imprisonment in the Russian state from the 12th to the beginning of the 20th centuries (historical and legal aspects)], in "Вестник института" [Bulletin of the Institute], 2008, №4, с. 79 – 82.

penal servitude), where their work was used free of charge. Deprivation of liberty for convicts, sentenced for penal servitude, could be appointed for a definite term or for life. It is noteworthy that in addition to the servitude of convicted men (construction, mining, the first plants' building), women's labour was also used. Women guilty for crimes worked in specially created spinning houses.²¹

Note that Peter the Great created not only the system of exile on penal servitude, which existed with certain changes for about 200 years. Innovation was in the construction of prisons near the factories and plants. In some cases, enterprises were conjunct with penitentiary institution and formed a single complex of corrective labour (production and prison complex). To prisons were sent people "of inappropriate and irreverent behaviour, whom no one wants to hire, who are lazy, healthy, poor and bacchanal. Who don't want to work for themselves feeding and eat bread in vain."²²

In the early period of the reign of Peter the Great one of the main places of convicts' exile was Azov, and the first mention about the convicts' direction for the execution of criminal penalties there contained in the Royal Decree "On the punishment of the townspeople in exchange for bribes with the chosen people to the tavern customs or duties" (1699).²³ It is noteworthy that penal servitude became the main sanction in the fight against crimes related to corruption at that time. It should also be noted that in Peter's times work at shipyards in port cities was considered as a kind of penal servitude, while work at mines and factories in Siberia was not considered as penal servitude. Therefore, penal servitude at the port shipyards often passed into the Siberian exile to mines, salt factories and mining plants. It can be explained by the great significance of the shipbuilding branch, which was determined by the content of Peter's military and economy reform. In this case, economic imperatives were more important than state law enforcement and correctional functions.

Despite the high level of repressiveness of criminal law in Peter's the Great times, which had been preserved from the time of the Code of 1649 adoption,

²¹ B. Clements, B. A. Engel, C. D. Worobec (eds.), *Russia's Women: Accommodation, Resistance, Transformation*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991.

²² М. В. Бебякин, *Эволюция благотворительных обществ для помощи осужденным в Российской Империи* [Evolution of charitable societies for the help for prisoners in the Russian Empire], in "Человек: преступление и наказание" [Man: crime and punishment], 2016, № 1, с. 44 – 48.

²³ *Российское законодательство X–XX вв.* В 9-х т. Т. 6. *Законодательство периода становления абсолютизма* [The Russian legislation of 10th -20th centuries, 9 vol., vol. 6, Legislation of the period of formation of absolutism]], Москва, Юрид. лит., 1988.

humanization of criminal proceedings was initiated during the reign of this monarch. Peter's the Great reforms manifested in reducing the level of criminal sanctions' repressiveness. A significant number of crimes have ceased to be punished by death or torture, and have been replaced by exile and penal servitude. At the same time, in the criminal law of the Petrine era there is a prototype of correctional labour, when the town officials for the improper performance of their duties, petty theft and bribery were sent to exile on remote areas to perform the same tasks that they were engaged in before the criminal conviction.²⁴

PEAK OF THE ABSOLUTISM ERA

In the work of N. D. Sergievskiy on this issue was indicated that the "In the old Russia non-productive exile almost wasn't applied. Exiled for public or military service, to outskirts or for agricultural works after arrival immediately were sent into action: ploughing, forest cutting, building. Convicted officials were exiled for the same work they acted before sentencing. Exiled people were given land and a loan for horse purchase and for any village inventory. Only in rare cases of disfavour exiled convicts were imprisoned at the place of exile."²⁵ At the same time A. P. Solomon noted that "the Moscow government treated the exiles with great favour and was alien to any contempt for them, not considering them as rejected, what they were considered in that time; labour of the exiled convicts, according to the view of the that period, was a kind of public service, legal status of the exiles was defined as a rank."²⁶

There is a noteworthy collection of norms of feudal law of the first half of the 18th century, which were in force on the left Bank Ukraine, which was adopted in 1743 and was called "the Law for litigation of people from Malorossia."²⁷

²⁴ N. Kollmann, *Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Russia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012

²⁵ Н. Д. Сергеевский, *Наказание в русском праве XVII века* [Punishment in Russian law of the 17th century], Санкт-Петербург, А. Ф. Цинзерлинг, 1887.

²⁶ А. П. Соломон, *Ссылка в Сибирь: очерк ее истории и современного положения: для Высочайше учрежденной комиссии о мероприятиях по отмене ссылки* [Exile to Siberia: an essay on its history and present situation: for his Majesty's established Commission on the activities for the abolition of exile], Санкт-Петербург. тип. С.-Петербург. тюрьмы, 1900.

²⁷ *Права, по которым судится малороссийский народ* [The Law for litigation of people from Malorossia], высочайшим всепресветлейшия, державнейшия великия государыни императрицы Елисавет Петровны, самодержицы всероссийския, ее

Articles 22 and 23 of these Law directly described the issues of prisons' establishment and facilities construction. Conditions of prisoners' detention, their receipt of prison payment (collected after release from the prisoner at the expense of the money earned during the serving of sentence).²⁸

A significant expansion of the scope of penal servitude for convicts occurred on the 17th January 1765 with the adoption by Catherine II "Decree on granting landlords the right to send peasants to penal servitude".²⁹ Hereinafter, the decree acquired the force of law, and powers of the landlords to send their serf peasant on penal servitude substantially expanded. Serf peasant could be sent on penal servitude for disobedience to his landowner, thus the measure of such disobedience was defined by the landowner himself. At the same time, there were some restrictions on the age and health of convicts, sentenced to penal servitude. They had to be younger than 45 years old, physically and healthy able to work. It is noteworthy that at the first request of the landowner, the convict could be returned back to his disposal.³⁰ The decree of 1765 did not regulate the process of organization of convicts' hard labour, but it deserves attention as the first source of law in Russia, clearly indicating the use of forced labour as a kind of a criminal punishment.

Among the penitentiary innovations adopted under Catherine the Great should also be noted punishment for intentional crimes against the property of citizens. In 1781 was adopted by the Nominal decree "About the court and the punishments for theft of different types and the establishment of work houses in all the Provinces."³¹ Those guilty in theft were sentenced to detention in

императорского священнейшего величества повелением: из трех книг, а именно: Статута литовского, Зерцала саксонского и приложенных при том двух прав, также из Книги порядка, по переводе из полского и латинского языков на российский диалект в едину книгу сведенные, в граде Глухове, лета от рождества Христова 1743 года / под ред. А. Ф. Кистяковского, Киев, Унив. тип. (И. И. Завадзкого), 1879.

²⁸ О. Е. Кутафин, *Российская автономия* [Russian autonomy], Москва, Проспект, 2008.

²⁹ Д. Тараторин, *Русский бунт навеки. 500 лет гражданской войны* [Russian rebellion forever. 500 years of civil war], Москва, Litres, 2016.

³⁰ J. Ohlin, *Criminal Law: Doctrine, Application, and Practice*, Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters Kluwer, 2012

³¹ Именной указ от 03.04.1781 г., данный Сенату "О суде и наказаниях за воровство разных родов и о заведении рабочих домов во всех Губерниях" [Personal decree of 03.04.1781, given to the Senate "On the court and penalties for theft of different kinds and the establishment of working houses in all Provinces"], in <http://base.garant.ru/58105240/#ixzz4HfhKYQfz> (Accessed on 12.08.2018)

workhouses, where they worked for the benefit of the state.³²

Issues of organization and regime of convicts' labour still remained unresolved in the Decree of 1781, but it contained a number of fundamental innovations for that time.³³ The decree introduced a system of sanctions for theft of property and recurrence of the crime. For theft of property in the amount of less than 20 rubles, it was provided to send the offender to the workhouse where he had to work until he reimburses the cost of the stolen and a fine of 6% of the amount of damage. The recurrence of this crime involved doubling the fine (the second part of which was sent to the income of the workhouse) and two lashes. Repeated relapse was punished by a triple fine (two-thirds of the fine went to the income of the workhouse) and three lashes. It should be noted that there was another kind of work houses, which were created in 1775 on the basis of art. 390 of "Institutions for the management of provinces."³⁴ However, in this type of workhouses operated not for criminals' detention. They served for persons incapable for independent work to provide feeding themselves. It is worth to note that in some science works these two types of workhouses were mixed.³⁵

The personnel policy in the selection of employees for workhouses is also notable. In the "Institutions for the management of provinces" stated, that on service should accepted: "decent guards, honest people and other necessary

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Г. О. Бабкова, *Уголовно-процессуальные законопроекты Екатерины и российское законодательство второй половины XVIII в. (к истории указа «О трех родах воровства» 1781 г. и «Устава благочиния» 1782 г.)* [Ekaterina's criminal procedural bills and the Russian legislation of the second half of the 18th century (to the history of the decree "On three kinds of theft" of 1781 and "The Charter of the deanery" of 1782)], in "Актуальные проблемы российского права" [Actual problems of the Russian law], 2015, № 2(51), с. 9 – 20.

³⁴ *Благочестивейшая самодержавнейшая великая государыня императрицы Екатерины Вторья учреждения для управления губерний Всероссийския империи* [Institutions for the management of provinces] (07.11.1775), in <http://constitution.garant.ru/history/act1600-1918/2350/> (Accessed on 12.08.2018)

³⁵ О. М. Григор'єв, *Історіографія розвитку пенітенціарної системи і законодавства України (до 1917 г.)* [Historiography of the prison system and the legislation of Ukraine (before 1917)], in "Ученые записки ТНУ им. Вернадского. – Серия «Юридические науки»" [Scientific notes of TNU "Vernadsky". - Series «Juridical sciences»], 2009, №. 1, Т.22, с. 36-39; Ю. И. Скуратов, Л. В. Глазкова, Н. С. Грудинин, А. А. Незнамова, *Развитие организованной преступности в России: системный анализ* [The development of organized crime in Russia: a system analysis], in "Всероссийский криминологический журнал" [Russian journal of criminology], 2016, Т. 10, № 4, с. 638–648.

people for surveillance, avoiding all the frills.”³⁶

In parallel along with the legal institute of work houses took place the development of the institute of exile on penal servitude. Hard labour in exile was aimed at solving a number of economic, politic, military and demographic problems. Also, issues of providing labour for newly created enterprises and the settlement of sparsely populated territories of the Russian Empire had to be solved.

The legal regulation of penal servitude was to determine the places of exile and crimes, which identified for the convict branch, region or the territory of penal servitude. Regulated by law was the delivery of convicts to the places of serving sentences, their clothing and food. All questions of the organization of labour, including working hours and rest time, internal regulations and etc. were solved exclusively by the administration of places of imprisonment. The convicts worked at shipyards, mines and mining plants. Crimes against sexual integrity and sexual freedom of the person were punished by sending to galleys. It is noteworthy that sending to the galleys also punished “concealment of souls” in the census during the reign of Peter the Great.³⁷

An attempt to legally divide the types of penal servitude depending on the degree of public danger of the crime was carried out in the Decree of 1775, which identified three groups of prisoners. However, this innovation practically did not change the position of prisoners and the principles of differentiation in the execution of criminal penalties were reflected in the law enforcement policy of Russia much later.

The reform of the penitentiary system during the second half of the 18th century is connected with two normative documents, which have followed one after the other: “About the prisons’ facilities construction”(1773) and “Prison Regulations” (1788). A detailed analysis of these documents was carried out in the work of M.N. Gernet.³⁸ The project of Catherine the Great and the subsequent “Prison Regulations” are evaluated in the scientific literature as a result of the Empress’ fascination with the liberal ideas of Diderot, Voltaire, Jean Jacques Rousseau and other European thinkers of that time. Despite the progressiveness of the ideas put in the basis in these documents, much of what was stated in them

³⁶ N. Kollmann, *By Honor Bound: State and Society in Early Modern Russia*, New York, Cornell University Press, 1999.

³⁷ И. Я. Фойницкий, *Учение о наказании в связи с тюрьмоведением* [The doctrine of punishment in connection with prison studying], Санкт-Петербург, Типография Министерства путей Сообщения, 1889.

³⁸ М. Н. Гернет, *История царской тюрьмы* [The history of the Czarist prison], в 5 т., изд. 3, Москва, Госюриздат, т. 1 (1762 - 1825), 1960.

is not implemented until nowadays, and a significant number of important aspects of sentences' serving by convicts at that time remained unresolved. On this occasion M.N. Gernet pointed out the following: "this work (project of Catherine the Great "About the prisons' facilities construction") did not extend to such essential aspects of prison life as work and discipline. Education and upbringing were also let alone."³⁹

Some attention was paid to the issue of convicts' labour and its organization in places of deprivation of liberty in the work of N. D. Sergievsky "Punishment in Russian law of the 17th century".⁴⁰ Among the purposes of criminal punishment in the analysed work was allocated the reception of material benefits from the offender. According to N. D. Sergievsky, this reason explained the desire of the state to use forced labour of prisoners, which was considered in two varieties: work in prison and exile on penal servitude.⁴¹ A much greater spread of penal labour was caused by the needs of a growing Empire, which required to populate large areas and provide food and other goods to military garrisons on the outskirts. In the kind of outskirts were usually meant Territories of Western Siberia and Malorossia.

The development of criminal and penitentiary legislation of the studied historical period determined the formation of the Imperial legal policy aimed at the formation of local legal systems in the newly annexed territories. The first Malorossian legislation on the territory of modern Ukraine was formed during this process. This practice was further applied after the accession of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Finland to the Russian Empire in the 19th century.

RESULTS

The analysis of the legal framework, as well as practice of convicted criminals' labour organization in Russia in the 17th – 18th centuries makes it possible to form a holistic view on the penal policy of the Russian state in the studied period. Results of the research determine positive historical experience and effective political and legal solutions, the essential relevance of which preserves in modern conditions. At the same time, the identification of negative experience and unsuccessful decisions requires consideration and taking into account during the development of modern penitentiary policy.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁴⁰ Н. Д. Сергеевский, *Наказание в русском праве XVII века* [Punishment in Russian Law of the 17th Century], Санкт-Петербург, А. Ф. Цинзерлинг, 1887.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

Convicts' labour played a major role in the execution of criminal penalties in Russia. Labour was considered both as a mean of correction of criminal behaviour and as a way of the caused harm compensation. At the same time, the labour regime was actually the basis of the regime of serving the sentence. It is also noteworthy that labour has become the main form of criminal repression and has replaced a number of cruel medieval corporal punishments. Thus, the processes of convicts' labour organization had a significant impact on the processes of humanization of the Russian penitentiary policy of the 17th century. In the studied historical period two directions of development of penitentiary policy clearly traced. This reflected in the normative legal acts and law enforcement practice.

Penitentiary policy in the field of convicts' labour organization of the late 17th – mid 18th centuries was formed in the course of significant economic and political reforms of Peter the Great. The organization of convicts' labour was subject to the imperatives of the country's economic development. The penitentiary law had clearly expressed compensatory functions and was aimed at correction through compensation of material harm. The measure of criminal repression was largely determined by the nature of the crime and the peculiarities of the processes of labour organization at the priority objects of the state development. It should also be taken into account that criminal and penitentiary policy of the Russian state was poorly focused on the provision of class privileges. The legislation provided for a wide range of penalties for nobility and civil servants. Penalties for property crimes and corruption in considerable extent were punished by forced labour.⁴²

Further reforms of the penitentiary system were connected with the development of the second direction of the penitentiary policy in the sphere of labour organization. This direction was largely aimed at solving the problems of approximation of Russian penal law to modern European doctrines, as well as solving a number of domestic political problems associated with the strengthening of inter-class property and legal stratification. It should be noted that the formation of the second type of development of penitentiary policy in the heyday of absolutism did not have an objective economic basis and largely served the internal and foreign policy interests of the monarchy. The result was the accumulation of significant problems in the Russian society, which subsequently led to the need for a significant change in the penitentiary policy in the sphere of

⁴² M. Okenfuss, *The Rise and Fall of Latin Humanism in Early-Modern Russia. Pagan Authors, Ukrainians, and the Resiliency of Muscovy*, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1995.

labour organization in the 19th century, which were largely in line with the large-scale social transformations of the middle-end of the century.

CONCLUSION

The results of the research give opportunity to formulate a conclusion about the significant impact of foreign legal traditions on domestic legislation regulating the processes of convicts' attraction to work in the 16th – 17th centuries. It is also notable the significant role of the Church, both in the execution of sentences and in the process of convicts' labour organization. Large-scale reforms that affected all spheres of public life in the initial period of the reign of Peter the Great had a significant impact on the organization of convicts' labour. Exactly, during this period, the unified system of bodies and institutions executing criminal punishments started its forming. At the same time, the core basis for the creation of this system was the most important objects of construction and industrial development. The prototype of the modern penal system was formed in the period under study as part of the territorial and sectoral structure that performed specific functions for it. During the second half of the 17th century – the first half of the 18th century, convicts' labour remained to be a compensatory punishment. Humanization of this punishment was connected with the appliance of exile, where convicts were attracted to work (in some cases – equal to their profession) on the remote areas.

Penitentiary policy of Russia in the heyday of absolutism had a pronounced focus on strengthening the social and political system that was being formed at that time. The monarchy strengthened its position by forming a class of loyal to the throne landowners who had extended rights to participate in criminal and penitentiary proceedings. At the same time, the processes of convicts' labour organization had a decisive role in the sphere of criminal penalties' execution.

Most of the legislative innovations of the analysed period were directed on reinforcement of the class stratification of society, strengthening the power of the nobility. The economic aspect had less influence on the development of the penitentiary law than it had during the period of Peter's the Great reforms. At the same time, we note that the legal doctrine that determined the development of penitentiary law was also formed in isolation from the economic realities, which determined the initially "dead" nature of a number of normative acts. Orientation on the progressive political and legal teachings of European thinkers-contemporaries of the ruling monarch, has determined a significant humanization of the domestic penal legislation, which hasn't reflected on law enforcement

practice. Labour started to play role of a correction remedy, that wasn't aimed on getting a profit for the state. Despite the class character of the justice system, transformation of the convicts' labour phenomenon and its humanization took place in that time.

CAPTURED AND INTERNED UKRAINIANS IN ROMANIA, BULGARIA AND TURKEY (1918–1923): A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE CONTEXT OF UNKNOWN DOCUMENTS OF 1921

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Abstract: *Following the rapid collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, the patriotic forces that fought for Ukraine's independence against the Bolshevik and White Guard troops during 1917-1921, lost the military struggle and were interned in various camps in Europe and other countries. The article identifies two groups of Ukrainian military-political emigration formed during 1918-1923. The first group included the troops of interned Ukrainians, particularly in Romania. The second group was formed by the Ukrainian military, captured along with the White Guard troops interned in Bulgaria and Turkey. The authors pointed out that the Ukrainians interned in Romania had better living and working conditions, while the Ukrainian military members of General Wrangel's White Guard Army, held captive in the territories of Bulgaria and Turkey, have suffered greatly from harassment on national and political grounds. The letters published by the authors, written in 1921, which belong to the Ukrainian military in Bulgaria and Turkey and addressed to the officials of the Ukrainian People's Republic, convey their will, conviction, and desire to return to the ranks of the Ukrainian Army and continue the struggle for an independent Ukraine.*

Keywords: Internment, Ukrainians, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Ukrainian People's Republic, Army, correspondence.

Rezumat: *Ucrainenii capturați și deținuți în România, Bulgaria și Turcia (1918-1923): o analiză comparativă în contextul unor documente inedite din anul 1921. În urma prăbușirii rapide a Imperiului Rus, în anul 1917, forțele patriotice care au luptat, în perioada 1917-1921, pentru independența Ucrainei împotriva trupelor bolșevice și a celor aparținând Gărzii Albe, au pierdut în confruntarea lor militară și au fost internate în diferite lagăre din Europa și din alte țări. Articolul identifică două grupuri de emigrație militară-politică ucraineană formate în perioada 1918-1923. Primul grup a inclus trupele ucrainenilor internați, în special, în România. Cel de-al doilea grup a fost format de militarii ucrainenii capturați împreună cu trupele Gărzii Albe internate în Bulgaria și Turcia. Autorii*

au reliefat că ucrainenii închiși în România au avut condiții mai bune de viață și de muncă, în timp ce militarii ucraineni din Armata Gărzii Albe a generalului Wrangel, ținuți prizonieri pe teritoriile Bulgariei și Turciei, au suferit foarte mult din cauza urii pe motive naționale și politice. În scrisorile publicate de autori (redactate în anul 1921), aparținând militarilor ucraineni din Bulgaria și Turcia și adresate oficialilor Republicii Populare Ucrainene, transpare voința, convingerea și dorința de revenire în rândurile armatei ucrainene și de continuare a luptei pentru o Ucraină independentă.

Résumé : Ukrainiens capturés et détenus en Roumanie, Bulgarie et Turquie (1918-1923) : une analyse comparative dans le contexte des documents inédits de l'année 1921. A la suite de la chute de l'Empire Russe, l'année 1917, les forces patriotiques qui luttèrent, dans la période 1917-1921, pour l'indépendance de l'Ukraine contre les troupes bolchéviques et contre celles appartenant à la Garde Blanche, ont perdu la confrontation militaire et ont été enfermées en divers camps de l'Europe et d'autres pays. L'article ci-joint identifie deux groupes d'émigration militaire-politique ukrainiens formés dans la période 1918-1923. Le premier groupe inclut les troupes des Ukrainiens enfermés, spécialement, en Roumanie. Le deuxième groupe était formé des militaires ukrainiens capturés ensemble aux troupes de la Garde Blanche internées en Bulgarie et en Turquie. Les auteurs ont mis en relief que les Ukrainiens enfermés en Roumanie eurent des conditions meilleures de vie et de travail, pendant que les militaires ukrainiens de l'Armée de la Garde Blanche du général Wrangel, tenus prisonniers sur les territoires de la Bulgarie et de la Turquie, souffrirent beaucoup à cause de la haine sur motifs nationaux et politiques. Les lettres publiées par les auteurs (rédigées pendant l'année 1921), appartenant aux militaires ukrainiens de Bulgarie et de Turquie et adressées aux officiels de la République Populaire Ukrainienne, résulte la volonté, la conviction et le désir de revenir dans les rangées de l'armée ukrainienne et de continuer la lutte pour une Ukraine indépendante.

INTRODUCTION

The 100th anniversary of the national liberation struggle of 1917-1921 is widely celebrated in Ukraine at state level. After the collapse of the Russian Empire, as a result of the February Revolution of 1917, the power of the Ukrainian Central Rada was established in Ukraine (March 4, 1917 – April 29, 1918). After a short time, it was replaced by P. Skoropadskyi's Hetmanate (April 29, 1918 – November 30, 1918) and after its overthrow, the Directory came into force (December 19, 1918 – November 12, 1920), which restored the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR), and since November 12, 1920 the sole government of the UPR was carried out by S. Petliura. During this period, patriotically minded Ukrainians, guided by the idea of autonomy of the Ukrainian republic created their

own army and government, while fighting against the White Guard troops and the Bolsheviks. At the end of the bloody struggle, which ended with the defeat of the Ukrainian national troops, from November 1920 the effective army of the UPR crossed the Zbruch River, and since then Ukrainian troops have been interned and resettled in numerous camps in Europe (Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia). Instead, the White Guard military emigration went to Turkey and Egypt.

Consequently, assessments of events, aspirations and further plans for the lives of Ukrainians who, by virtue of various circumstances, were captured by the White Guard troops and, with them, were interned in Bulgaria and Turkey – were not properly covered by the scientific literature. Considering this, *the purpose* of this scientific study will be the publications of the correspondence of Ukrainian military (captured by the White Army) with the Government of the UPR through its diplomatic missions. These documents (correspondence) were not fully published, which actualizes their significance, since every scientist will be able to assess their meaning and thus makes it impossible to bias the assessments of the events of those times. It is the published documents that will make it possible to compare the situation of the captured Ukrainians in Turkey and Bulgaria with that of the ones interned in the camps of Romania.

As V. Vlasenko points out, these events gave contemporary historians the opportunity to distinguish three waves of military political emigration: the North-Western, Southern and Far Eastern. He emphasizes that the term “Ukrainian political emigration” in historical literature has two meanings. “In a broad sense, the entire emigration between the two world wars is considered political, because many political factors have played a key role. The second meaning is invested by the scholars, when it comes to a politically motivated, ideologically determined, organizationally structured part of emigration that professed the idea of Ukrainian statehood restoring in its various forms.”¹ He notices that “the first wave covers the period from the second half of 1918 to the end of 1919 ... the so-called “French” evacuation from Odessa,” when mostly rich people fled to the Balkans. “The second wave falls on the winter-spring of 1920, when, as a result of defeats of Anton Denikin’s army from Odessa and Novorossiysk, both civilians and Cossacks were evacuated. The third and most massive wave was observed in the autumn of 1920 after the evacuation of the Russian Army of Peter Wrangel from Crimea and the crossing of the

¹ В. Н. Власенко, *Вторая волна межвоенной украинской политической эмиграции в Румынии (зима-весна 1920 г.)* [The second wave of inter-war Ukrainian political emigration in Romania (winter-spring 1920)], in “Русин” [Rusin], 2014, № 2 (36), с. 270-284, с. 272.

Romanian border by separate units of the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR)."² Such a classification is not untrue and allows us to assume that the subject of the investigation is primarily concerned with the interned and captured Ukrainians, who entered the territory of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey in the third wave.

HISTORIOGRAPHIC APPROACHES

The subject of national liberation struggles in Ukraine was properly analysed in historical science. The available historiography allows to distinguish both broad-vector works, which have general assessments of those events, as well as special historical studies devoted to specific aspects of the problem that received attention. First of all, the conditions of the struggle of Ukrainian troops for independent statehood were deeply analysed by historian Ya. Tynchenko³, which laid the foundations for its in-depth study.

Conditions of living and political preferences of interned Ukrainians in Polish camps of Kalisz, Lancut, Shypiorno, Oleksandrov, Pikulice are covered by T. Sharavara⁴ in the context of activities of cultural and educational societies formed by internees. The historian argues that despite the complex moral condition of the military, they have made significant efforts to organize their life, their educational activities and have not lost hope for a further struggle for the restoration of the Ukrainian state.

A separate informative group of works was created by historian I. Sribniak, who analysed the features of internment of troops in the Balkans. In particular, he deeply highlighted military training, the organization of cultural work in the camps of Braşov, Giurgiu, Oradea Mare, Făgăraş, as well as the issue of cooperation with the Romanian authorities for the employment of Ukrainians outside the camps for the internees.⁵ The peculiarities of the existence of the white Russian

² *Ibid.*

³ Я. Тинченко, *Офіцерський корпус Армії УНР (1917–1921 рр.)* [Officer Corps of the Army of the UPR (1917–1921)], in <http://coollib.com/b/178326>

⁴ Т. О. Шаравара, *Випускники Віленського військового піхотного училища у боротьбі за українську державність (1917–1923 рр.): монографія* [Graduates of the Vilna Military Infantry School in the Struggle for Ukrainian Statehood (1917–1923): monograph], Київ: Видавництво Ліра-К, 2016, 216 с.

⁵ І. В. Срібняк, *Початки української військової еміграції на Балканах (1921–1923 рр.)* [The beginnings of Ukrainian military emigration in the Balkans (1921–1923)], in "Військово-історичний альманах" [Military Historical Almanac], 2006, Число 2, с. 45–55, in http://militarist.milua.org/via/VIA_13-sribnyak.pdf; І. В. Срібняк, *Обеззброєна*

emigration were covered in the documentary digest “Russian Military Expatriation of the 20’s and 40’s...”.⁶ The level of organization of Ukrainian emigration in Turkey in the 1920’s is described in the Ukrainian diary “Freedom”.⁷

THE DESTINY OF UKRAINIAN INTERNED MILITARY

Taking into account the substantial historiography of the issue, there are grounds for dividing the Ukrainian interned military into two groups. The first one consists of those who, since the beginning of the national liberation struggle, were part of the UPR troops and got into internment within the Ukrainian military units. The second one consists of those who find themselves in the interned units of the White Guard troops, on their own, or having the status of their captives. The destiny of interned Ukrainian military in Romania seemed better than the destiny of the Ukrainians, who were captured by the White Guard troops in the third wave of emigration.

V. Vlasenko⁸ and I. Sribniak⁹ note that about 500 thousand of Ukrainians were captives on the territory of European countries at the beginning of 1919. For the most part, these are the military of the second wave of emigration that came to the Balkans with the Wrangel troops. M. Jovanovyich points out that they often

але не скорена: Інтернована Армія УНР у таборах Польщі й Румунії (1921–1924 рр.) [Disarmed but not defeated: Interwar Army of the UPR in the camps of Poland and Romania (1921–1924)], Київ: Видавництво імені Олени Теліги, 1997, 187 с.

⁶ *Русская военная эмиграция 20-х – 40-х годов. Документы и материалы* [Russian military emigration of the 20’s – 40’s. Documents and materials]. Москва: Гея; Триада-Х, Триада-ф, 1998-2002: Том 1. *Как начиналось изгнание. 1920 – 1922 гг. Книга первая. Исход* [How the exile began. 1920-1922 The first book. Exodus], Москва: Гея, 1998, 432 с.; *Книга вторая. На чужбине*. [The second book. In a foreign land], Москва: Гея, 1998, 752 с.; Том 2. *Несбывшиеся надежды* [Unfulfilled hopes], Москва: Триада-Х, 2001, 484 с.; Том 3. *Возвращение* [Return], Москва: Триада-ф, 2002, 576 с.

⁷ *Українське життя в Туреччині* [Ukrainian life in Turkey], in “Свобода” [Freedom], 1935, 9 серпня, № 184, с. 3.: <http://www.svoboda-news.com/arxiv/pdf/1935/Svoboda-1935-184.pdf>

⁸ В. Н. Власенко, *Формирование украинской политической эмиграции в Румынии в межвоенный период (первая волна)* [Formation of the Ukrainian political emigration in Romania in the interwar period (the first wave)], in „Русин” [Rusin], 2014, № 1 (35), с. 105-120, С. 108.

⁹ І. Срібняк, *Полонені та інтерновані вояки-українці в Румунії (1919–1923 рр.)* [Captured and interned warriors-Ukrainians in Romania (1919-1923)], in “Пам’ять століть” [The memory of centuries], Київ, 1998, № 5, с. 116.

lived in transit camps for half a year.¹⁰

In Romania, the diplomatic corps represented by M. Galagan, a former member of the Ukrainian Central Rada, provided significant support to Ukrainians. Since October 1918, the Ukrainian mission in Bucharest was led by V. Dashkevych-Gorbatskyi, a supporter and participant of the White Movement. Professor M. Dogel, Colonel P. Nevodovskyi, writer V. Mayevskyi and others worked actively as part of the mission. The Consul General in Bucharest was K. Chebotarenko, the Vice Consul in Galați – the sotnyk Spyrydon Beletskyi. With the restoration of the UPR at the time of the Directory, the diplomatic corps also changed. In particular, “in January 1919, the Extraordinary Diplomatic Mission of the Ukrainian People’s Republic arrived in Bucharest, led by an engineer and journalist Yu. Gasenko and many others.”¹¹ Since June 1919, the mission in Romania was led by a scientist-agronomist, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the UPR K. Matsiievych. At the same time, the military mission of the UPR also acted, and it was reorganized from February 1920 into a department under the Extraordinary Diplomatic Mission. Its work was directed by historian and diplomat S. Delvig. At the same time, the mission of the Red Cross in the Balkans was led by the historian and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian State – D. Doroshenko.¹² Therefore, the work to support the captured Ukrainians was arranged. At the end of January 1920, the mission was liquidated. In the territory of Romania at the beginning of 1920 there were many Ukrainian military members of the First World War.¹³ Thus, subsequently their ranks were replenished with Ukrainians who fought for Ukrainian statehood as part of the UPR Active Army.

By the spring of 1919, up to 20 thousand people immigrated to the Turkish territory and from there to other countries. Romania has the largest number of refugees. In April 1919, in the south of Ukraine, part of the UPR Army was cut off from the main forces, and the Zaporizhzhya Corps was among them, as well as parts of the South-Eastern Group and the South Eastern Front group, retreated to the Romanian border. They crossed the Dniester during the bloody battles with the Bolsheviks, and later part of the troops returned to Galicia, and the wounded were left in Chișinău. Refugees arrived to Romania from everywhere. On December 28, 1920, the Ukrainian

¹⁰ М. Йованович, *Обзор переселения русских беженцев на Балканы* [Review of the resettlement of Russian refugees to the Balkans], in Е. М. Миронова (ред.), *Русский исход* [Russian exodus], СПб., 2004, с. 170–171.

¹¹ ЦДАВО [Central State Archive of Higher Authorities and Administration of Ukraine], Fond 3696, List 2, File 215, P. 8–9.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ І. Срібняк, *op. cit.*, с. 116.

units were disarmed and resettled in camps for the interned¹⁴.

The Government of the UPR provided funds to support citizens and interned troops. In general, according to studies of historians, interned Ukrainian military in Romanian camps settled down in camps in Braşov, Burdujeni, and other¹⁵.

Ukrainian diplomats made efforts to increase the number of Ukrainian Cossacks in Romania gradually, as the situation there was much more favourable, and it was primarily related to the moral climate. The Romanian authorities contributed to the employment of Ukrainians outside the camps. Consequently, in October 1921, in the Romanian camps “Făgăraş” and “Braşov” there were 238 people, besides 1100 interned for “free works” (in Giurgiu – 750, in Bucharest and in the suburbs – 152, and in other places – 200 Cossacks in small groups). As K. Matsiievych evaluated the situation, “the conditions for receiving wages, food and dwellings were quite good, so that both the Cossacks (private, – authors’ refinements) and the starshina (military Cossack rank) have the opportunity to save money, to dress and to some extent satisfy their cultural needs”¹⁶. In addition, the mission fully assisted in organizing daily life, cultural and educational activities, contributed to the delivery of books, magazines and even the organization of cooperatives. K. Matsiievych, the Head of UPR Diplomatic Mission, pointed out that some incidents occurred; the moral status of some Cossacks was reduced¹⁷. Professor I. Sribniak emphasizes that K. Matsiievych also reported that all this time the mission was the head of the guardianship of interned and runaway (fugitives), but the political and economic situation in Romania had changed, and the Ukrainian diplomats came to the conclusion that it was expedient to change that state of affairs. It was necessary to “reform this case and organize it on the principles of self-help and use for this other charitable institutions”. As a consequence, a community (community-assistance) committee and the Red Cross Committee were to be set up in Romania in a few weeks, which would have had to take over the care of internees. Subsequently, on the initiative of the mentioned committee, an entire range of donations was organized, including for the interned in Poland, for the “Native school”, military invalids, orphans and sick women in camps and for other charitable purposes¹⁸.

¹⁴ ЦДАВО, Fond 1075, List 2, File 474, P. 49.

¹⁵ В. Н. Власенко, *op. cit.*, с. 105-120.

¹⁶ ЦДАВО, Fond 1075, List 2, File 827, P. 56.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ І. Срібняк, *Українці в Бессарабії та Румунії 1921-1923 рр. (Таборове та позатаборове повсякдення інтернованих вояків Армії УНР)* [Ukrainians in Bessarabia and Romania 1921-1923 (Camp and out of camp everyday life of interned army soldiers of the UPR)], in “Русин”, 2017, № 3 (49), с. 130.

In general, researchers note the tolerant attitude of the Romanian authorities towards Ukrainians.¹⁹ In comparison with these facts, the fate of those Ukrainian Cossacks who were captured by the White Guard troops and were on the territories of Turkey and Bulgaria against their will deserves special attention.

The high moral status of the internees in Romania, the presence of a significant number of starshynas in the camps allowed creating a solid foundation for supporting the insurgent movement under the slogans of the UPR in Ukraine. Also, a significant number of Ukrainian Cossacks were at work in Bessarabia, near the Soviet-Romanian border, from time to time carrying out attacks on Red Army troops and Soviet institutions.²⁰

REALITIES AND DESIDERATA REFLECTED IN THE LETTERS OF THE INTERNED UKRAINIAN MILITARY

Ukrainians who were captured by the White Guard troops against their will, in particular by the Wrangel Army, were stationed in the “Bernadotte” camp (San Stefano), Sanzhak-Tepe (Hadem Kioi station) in Turkey and in separate camps near Sofia in Bulgaria. Their letters to representatives of the Ukrainian embassy in Turkey and Bulgaria are worthy of attention; they contain an appeal to the Government of the UPR and directly to the Commander-in-Chief Symon Petliura. In their correspondence Ukrainians recall Romania as a country through which some courageous people tried to get to their homeland and escape from the Bulgarian captivity.

I. Sribniak points out that “Ukrainian military emigration in the Balkan countries began to emerge, after the ending of the First World War and the release from the camps of hundreds of thousands of captured and interned Ukrainians, some of whom were in no hurry to travel to their homeland for various reasons. Due to the speed of political events in Ukraine, as well as the fact that the Ukrainian lands in 1919-1921 became the scene of the armed confrontation between White and Red Russia, some of the Ukrainians decided to stay in the country for a temporary stay until “better times.”²¹ In our opinion, such a statement is more relevant to those representatives of emigration who took an active part in the events of the Great World War. Instead, the participants at the national revolution in Ukraine from 1917 to 1921 (the days of national liberation struggles) demonstrated a strong desire to return to Ukraine, as evidenced by unpublished archival materials, in particular, their

¹⁹ ЦДАВО, Fond 1075, List 2, File 827, P. 56.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ І. Срібняк, *Початки української військової еміграції...*, с. 45.

correspondence with the UPR Government in the exile.

For example, in Turkey, the “Bernadotte” camp was established in San Stefano, where there were many Ukrainians captured by the White Guards. Ukrainians created their own community in the camp, chose I. Forostenko (Hvorostenko) as a leader, and A. Moisiiakha as a secretary. Their assessments of the events were described in a letter to Otaman Kosh of the Zaporizhzhia Low Cossacks and insurgent movements in Katerynoslavshchyna Mr. Rokhiv. On February 25, 1921, one of the letters was sent to the Embassy of the UPR in Istanbul.

The original language of submitted document was Ukrainian:

“A circle of Ukrainians	Embassy of UPR in Tsargrad /Turkey/
of the “Bernadotte” camp	to Otaman Kosh of the Low Zaporizhzhia
at San Stefano	Cossacks and insurgent movements in
February 25, 1921	Katerynoslavshchyna Mr. Rokhiv

Dear Mr. Otaman,

Allow us to express our sincere gratitude for the fact that, with your arrival to the camp, we were able to address the Chief Otaman of the Ukrainian Republican forces Simon Vasyliovych Petliura with a letter, in which we find out our difficult situation, we will tell about our hopes and wishes and in which we will refer to him as to our native father from Turkish strange land for us: “Father, do you hear my powerful word? “I hear”. We are waiting and we are counting all our hopes on him. You, Mr. Otaman, have long been known as an honest Cossack, and we are certain that you will immediately send our letter to Chief Otaman.

Honourable Mr. Otaman

Symon Vasyliovych!

From a distant foreign land, from Turkey, we are happy to welcome you, our only hope, our advice, the best son and the protector of our own Motherland – Ukraine. The difficult circumstances forced us to live where our grandfathers and great-grandfathers gained the Cossack glory surprisingly to all the baptized people and liberated those who, like we now, were suffering from torment and hard chains in Turkish captivity. There were not the Turks who have captured us, but ours, let me not mention, the recent accomplices – the Russians, who for centuries slaughtered not only our land, our Motherland Ukraine, but our souls. Now our souls and body are shackled with cold chains, there is impenetrable darkness around us and among which only we hear the squawk of a pack of carnivorous crows – the enemies of our Ukraine. It's cold, severely, and dirty. We are surrounded by enemies, but we hope that you, Mr. Otaman, the son of your native

Ukrainian Motherland, for whose happiness and will you fight, will not forget us slaves and, as glorious Cossacks, you will unleash the chains of our Russian enemies who hunted us down. We pray you to join us to the glorious Cossack army with which we can liberate our native land, our Motherland – Ukraine.

Chairman of the Community I. Forostenko. Secretary A. Moisiiakha.”²²

A significant number of Ukrainians were in the “Sanzhak-Tepe” camp at Hadem Kioi station. The Head of the Ukrainian community in this camp was Yu. Lebid, and the Secretary was Levchenko. Ukrainians appealed to one of the leaders of the insurgent movement Rokhiv with a request to send their letter to the Head of the UPR S. Petliura.

The original language of submitted document was Ukrainian:

“Sanzhak-Tepe” camp
at Hadem Kioi station /Turkey/
November 24, 1921
No. 10

Embassy of the UPR in Tsargorod
/Turkey/

To Otaman Kosh of the Zaporozhzhia Cossacks
and the insurgent movements in Katerynoslavshchyna, Mr. Rokhiv.

Dear Mr. Otaman.

We ask you to help us send this letter to our native father, Chief Otaman Symon Vasyliovych Petliura.

We think that your true Cossack heart will be the best application, and our request will be fulfilled by you, because it is known that we turn to you not for the first time, and for this period we know you as the best insurgent Otaman, who has not changed his policy during three-year struggle, and who was always going in the same direction to the way of building up the independence of our Motherland of Ukraine and who always fulfilled all the words that were pronounced. We congratulate you with our sincere heart and send you our best wishes. Hold tight our native yellow-and-blue flag of our Independent Motherland. We are your help. Only your gouk [exhortation, – the authors' refinements] will be enough for all existing people

²² ЦДАВО, Fond 1078, List 2, File 199, Арк 14 «Листи полонених українців з Болгарії та Туреччини до Петлюри про приєднання їх до армії УНР, травень 1921 р.» [Letters from captured Ukrainians from Bulgaria and Turkey to Petliura about joining them to the army of the UPR, May 1921].

at this moment, in very hard physical and even worse moral circumstances, every moment, every hour, to agree, without a single word, again to fight for our disadvantaged area. God and truth are on our side. We will win with his help.

Dear Chief Otaman!

The Ukrainians of the “Sanzhak-Tepe” camp (the one of those camps in which the Wrangel Army is located in Turkey at present) are coming back to you, Dear Otaman, warmly congratulating you on the true Cossack heart and send you the best wishes for your wonderful gigantic work. Such work that we think the whole world has not seen yet, even if we will not make a mistake when we say that it will not be seen in the future, such an energetic man who is so persistent and irreversible, with quiet but strong steps, without any help, being isolated from all the world, with a small [military force, – clarification of missing words], but with a spirit of the loyal sons of our Motherland is going to the target of existence of our Motherland Ukraine.

Do not be surprised, Mr. Otaman, reading these lines. Do not think that these lines are written with some tricks of mind. No ... You are really wrong, our Father, when you come to this opinion, but relying on you, Mr. Chief Otaman, as a brilliant man who has been so carefully educated by our tear-stained Mother Ukraine, we suppose that after reading these lines, your feeling will tell you that they are returning to you certain forces of Ukraine – worthy surnames of the Cossacks.

Yes, Father, yes ... Sorry, we will continue to call you like this, but that is really true. All of us who are returning to you were in the ranks of your native army, at the head of which you stand until the last hour. But the latest events of November 1919 forced us, for various reasons, to leave our dear army. Do not allow God to think that the betrayal of the government of our State has compelled us to leave out the possibility of continuing to fight for our Motherland. You will take great sin, our dear Father, when you are so guessing about your unfortunate children. And who we are who call ourselves your children, but who find ourselves in the hostile army for you.

And here we are, Father... Most of us were captured by Russians in 1919 – some of us were captured after injuries, but there are those who were captured completely healthy. We don't want to be dishonest, because this is not the Ukrainian Cossack's face, and let's say frankly that there are those who were not under the flag of the UPR, but took a large part in the insurgency against the enemies of Ukraine. There are even those who were not at all in our ranks and forcibly served in our hostile Russian army, but all the time they dreamed of getting into their Ukrainian Republican Army. For example, the one who, on behalf of the community, is writing this letter to you, the Honourable Mr. Otaman, was injured and captured near Koziatyn. All the time, from the beginning of the Ukrainian movement, he worked in

its favour for the first time in the Brigade of Otaman Natiiev, till the Hetmanate [before the establishment of the Hetman Skoropadskyi's authority, – clarification of the authors], and after that, in personal Cavalry Division of “Black Zaporozhtsy” of Colonel Diachenko and also in the insurgent detachments of Otaman Rektiv, whose headquarters was in the village of Chortomlyk in Katerynoslav. Having read these lines, you see now who is coming back to you with greetings. So most of us were in the hostile army unintentionally and [did not have anything in common with them, – clarification of the authors].

[....] Only by chance and thanks to various things and circumstances that were not good for us, we were supposed to serve in hostile army, and now we are telling the whole world that we need neither Russia of Trotsky, nor notorious Russia of Denikin. We are really Ukrainian citizens, who by all means support the modern Government of the UPR, headed by Chief Otaman Symon Petliura. This is the government that leads Ukraine to independent existence and which has the only right to speak from Ukrainian citizens to the whole world, because it is supported by the entire Ukrainian people. We do not want to know any Wrangels and their hangers-on Morkotuns, because it is good there for them to solve our national question in the comfortable salons of Paris using Russian money, while our army with the Chief Otaman gives us the best, even his own life, in order to gain freedom and independence of his native area. So, here's what the people's Ukrainian circles say to Mr. Morkotun²³: “Get out! You are a traitor, and get those

²³ Morkotun Sergiy Kostiantynovych, famous Ukrainian Mason. His father was a personal physician of the royal family of Romanovs and, besides this, held a high position in the St. Petersburg masonry. Having received the position of the Southwest Railroad Chief of Police, S. Morkotun founded the secret Francophone political organization “Young Ukraine”, to which Symon Petliura and Pavlo Skoropadskyi soon joined. At the same time, he attracted a famous Mason and a poet and artist Maxymilian Voloshyn to work in the movement. Coming to power, in 1918 Hetman Skoropadskyi appointed S. Morkotun as his secretary. He gained a reputation of an educated diplomat, traveled to Berlin for talks with Kaiser Wilhelm, and, using the Masonic government, persuaded Hetman to release the arrested S. Petliura, and later, when the troops entered the Directory, they forbade the prosecution of the overthrown Hetman. In Paris, where S. Morkotun departed in 1919, he created the Ukrainian National Committee, which published the magazine “La Jeune Ukraine”, on behalf of which he participated in negotiations with General P. Wrangel in 1920. S. Morkotun founded the branch from Paris of the Kiev Lodge “The Holy Apostle Andrew”. This branch existed until the end of the 1930's. Consequently, captive Ukrainians frankly did not trust him, because he could greatly serve the king, Hetman Skoropadskyi, he could manipulate with the fate of Petliura, negotiate with Wrangel and then he was suspected for relations with the

who are with you out from our hard but honest way of fighting for the independence of our land. Do not be Judas, because you will choke on the silverware that you get for your work from the Russians.”

Here are the words of the faithful sons of Ukraine, Mr. Otaman. Our main goal is the struggle, the struggle with all those who stand alone and will stand in the way of our common goal. Help us, Honourable Chief Otaman, to get out of the Turkish captivity and the Russian prison. Give us the opportunity again to fight for our unfortunate area. Help us get to our brothers – to the dear army as a head of which you have been working for three years. Not once we applied to your Ambassador in Tsargorod. He already had a good acquaintance with us and promised us to help everyone with everything he can do to get to our brothers, but we have decided also to ask you about this, and we think that You will not leave us here in distant Turkey, but you will help us get to the brothers who stand in the defence of our Government and our homeland. Accept the last congratulations from *three hundred senior officers* and Cossacks of the “Sanzhak-Tepe” camp in Turkey. May God help you on the path of our hard struggle for the very existence of our native land. Greet our brothers, we know they are in difficult situation right now, but let them be patient, we will come to the rescue. Let them not slip out our yellow-blue flag out of their hands, but keep it even stronger in their hands. God and the truth are on our side and this gives us (honest sons of Ukraine) the right to defend our land till death. It is better to die than to go under the yoke of Moscow. Thank you, our glorious Mr. Otaman. Glory to Your Labour!

The faithful sons of Ukraine will never forget the person who first raised the flag with arms in his hands and with the slogan “Long live Independent and Democratic Ukraine. Glory to the Cossacks. Glory to the Government.”

Authorized of the Community, sotnyk Holubiv. Chairman of the Community Yu. Lebid. Secretary Levchenko. Treasurer Grytsenko.

In accordance with the original:

Chief of the General Department of the Military camp office

Chief Otaman of the UPR army, poruchik / signature /”.

[Signature is read as Sochynskyi – assumptions of the authors] ²⁴.

Soviet authorities. <http://xn--80axedo.xn--j1amh/morkotun-sergiy-kostyantynovich/>;
<http://onestreet.kiev.ua/morkotun/>

²⁴ ЦДАВО, Fond 1078, List 2, File 199, P. 2 «Листи полонених українців з Болгарії та Туреччини до Петлюри про приєднання їх до армії УНР, травень 1921 р.» [Letters from captured Ukrainians from Bulgaria and Turkey to Petliura about joining them to the army of the UPR, May 1921].

Ukrainians were even in a more difficult situation on the territory of Bulgaria, as they experienced a variety of humiliations on national grounds, being captives of the White Guards. They rallied around the strong spirit of the "Sich" Community and voiced plans to return to Ukraine in an organized manner. Some Cossacks even tried to do it themselves, fleeing from Bulgarian camps, but could not go through Romania.

The original language of submitted document was Ukrainian:

"To the Chief Otaman of the UNR troops Symon Vasyliovych Petliura.

Being thrown by misfortune to Bulgaria, we – the Ukrainian rebels, the old members of Sich and the runaways [the fugitives – the authors' refinements] could not get used to the Russian fugitives, and their leaders, who demanded that we renounced our nationality and forced us to change our passports in Russian to get help from Russian Red Cross. When we asked Americans and Bulgarians to help us set up our own home, Russian speculators from the mission and the Red Cross /Petras-Feldman/ were making obstacles and intrigues all the time. But when we built a pretty white house in the ruin of the barracks without any help, the Americans and Bulgarians saw that Ukrainians were really capable of organization and labour /because they live cleaner than Russians/, they did not believe the Russian intriguers and began, at least Bulgarians, to help us. Having our own house, we are building a workshop /to which the Americans promised to give cars/ to enable our people to rally and not to bow before our enemies²⁵.

But as the sun has warmed, the grasslands have become green, the time for insurgence has come, we cannot just sit still, Father, we cannot work, we strive to return to native Ukraine to fight again with cursed riders [attackers, Bolsheviks, – clarification of the authors]. Some more impatient ones tried to go to Ukraine on their own, but they were arrested in Romania; it was told by those who turned back. Father, give us permission to move to our territory [the land, the Motherland, – clarifications of the authors]. We cannot wait when we hear every day that our brothers are fighting there, and we're wasting time in a foreign land.

In our community was founded "Sich", which entered the most severe militant element, and who is waiting for permission to go first. Reading the latest version of Universal and your call to us, we are sure that you will accomplish your goal, and call us to you as soon as possible, and not allow us to perish in a foreign country.

Head of the Community Otaman "Sich" Colonel /signature/.

Scribe of the Community V. Zhyvodar, Military Scribe of "Sich" Krupyt'skyi.

²⁵ ЦДАВО, Fond 1078, List 2, File 199. Арх 3.

April 5, 1921, Sofia, No. 78.

In accordance with the original.

Chief of the General Department of the Military camp office

Chief Otaman of the UPR army, poruchik / signature /" [signature is read as K. Shyian, – clarification of the authors]²⁶.

Due to correspondence of various diplomatic missions with the Government of the UPR in the exile, the Ukrainian military received a response directly from Symon Petliura, who explained that a quick return to their homeland was impossible under various circumstances. However, in a letter he encouraged them to persevere at combat training, to work on the level of education, to help each other.

The original language of submitted document was Ukrainian:

"The suffering sons of the suffering nation,
Glorious Ukrainian Cossacks!

The terrible fate forced us to leave our native land after a three-and-a-half-year struggle with our original Muscovite enemy for the state independence of our people, for their rights and the will of the hungry, naked and barefoot, without any help from the civilized world – whether it's a garment, or a medicine for losing blood.

Like our grandfathers, the Cossacks who fought for the liberation of their people and the land, we have to wander the lands of others, suffering from hunger and cold, and endure severe anguish over the native steppes, huts and land which was watered by bloody sweat of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers.

It even more oppresses us, even more painfully compresses the pain of the heart, with the thought that our native enemy, the Muscovite, now dominates in our land, that hundreds of thousands of our best people, our fathers, sisters and sons, are being exported by the Russians to distant Siberia and to the far and the cold Murmansk Peninsula and thousands of Muscovites migrate instead to Ukraine.

We were thrown everywhere in the world by evil fate: to Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Turkey, and even to distant Egypt. ... We are everywhere, and as our martyrs and grandparents said, we are there "where the ravens do not bring bones".

Tens of thousands of us, who were the Ukrainian Republican Army, led by myself and the Government of the UPR, are now in Poland, we know about you, being in other lands, and expect only a reasonable time to gather together, for all of us to get together and go together to free our Mother [Ukraine, – clarification of the authors] from captivity.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

You know, glorious Cossacks, that if we were able to gather all together, then we would have had already divided both sorrow and need together for a long time. It's a hard time now and it's impossible for us to get together, even at least at one land, but we believe that such a time will come and it is already close²⁷.

I and the UPR Government are taking all measures in the direction of connecting all of us scattered abroad, and in particular, about material assistance. But you know how hard it is for a miserable man to get something...

Belief in our fair deeds, our blood is shed across the rivers throughout Ukraine, realization that they are thinking about us in Ukraine, they are waiting for us there, sending messengers with news to our Government, and a guarantee that we have not long left to wait, the time is close when "blood of the enemy will flow in the Black Sea" and "slave children will pray in liberty" [lines from the poems of T. Shevchenko, – clarification of the authors].

Meanwhile, all of us, starting with the Cossack and ending with the highest senior, need to learn and study. We must be prepared to create a new, big, strong and rich Ukraine on the ruins. It is necessary that we return to our native land as educated, cultured, and prepared for the work of state building citizens. Struggle, equip senior and junior schools, courses and schools for illiterates, and professional schools and courses [for military training, – clarification of the authors].

Any illiterate should not return to Ukraine! Starshyna! A great task and responsibility for your subordinate Cossack are laid on you in front of our Motherland.

On behalf of the troops of the UPR staying in Poland and Ukraine, thank the brothers outside of these lands for sending greetings to me from the "Sanzhak-Tepe" camp /Turkey/, "Bernadotte" /in the city of San Stefano, Turkey/, and the community "Sich" in Sofia /Bulgaria/. In particular, in the name of the troops, I thank the Head of the circle of Ukrainians of the Bernadotte camp, Mr. I. Forostenko and the Secretary of this community, Mr. A. Moisiikh, the Head of the community of the Sanzhak-Tepe camp, Mr. Yu. Lebid, and members of the council of this community, Levchenko and Grytsenko and the authorized of the community sotnyk Golubiv and the Head of the Sofia Sich, Colonel Filonovych and scribes, V. Zhyvodar and Krupytskyi. The greetings were transmitted to the attention of all the troops. Glory to the Free and Independent Ukrainian People's Republic. Glory to its knightly army.

April 19, 1921 was signed by the Chief Otaman of the UPR Petliura.

The Chief of the Military Office of the Chief Otaman Vyhovskyi affirmed.

In accordance with the original:

²⁷ ЦДІАБО, Fond 1078, List 2, File 199. P. 7.

Chief of the General Office of the Chancellery, poruchik /signature/.²⁸

CONCLUSIONS

From the published documents, we know for sure that captive Ukrainians were not so much troubled by the Turkish or Bulgarian bondage as the humiliation of the Russian military from the Russian mission of the Red Cross. They always encountered intrigues and obstacles. In an effort to rebuild their homes in internment camps, they actually isolated themselves from the numerous White Guard armies. And only endurance, hard work, good faith proved Romanians, Bulgarians and Turks, that Ukrainians who were captured by Russians were another population, another nation, the people with a different type of thinking. Russian White Guard officers were forced to renounce their own convictions and nationality, but the Ukrainian military stood up. Also, we would like to emphasize that when the Romanian authorities contributed to the placement of Ukrainian military forces outside the camps, it was much more difficult to settle in the Turkish territory. As it was indicated in the Ukrainian diary "Freedom" on August 9, 1935: "Two communities of the former Ukrainian military united into one in 1927 in Turkey. The first community under the name of the Initiative Circle was led by the sotnyk Mykola Zabila, the second – the Tsargorod Council. The community continued to operate under the slogan "For native land!" It became an independent, national, illegal organization. The community consisted of representatives of Ukrainian communities of Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Cossacks from the units of Katerynoslav, Chernomorshchyna, Tavria and Crimea. The goal was mutual support, training, burial of the dead and an appeal to Turkish government officials to help them find a job. Only during those years, it was banned in Turkey to provide work to non-citizens of the country, so there was a problem of the choice of citizenship. Some former military men had not been properly working for more than a year, but they did not give up their citizenship²⁹. Despite the fact that, due to the establishment of the Soviet power in Ukraine, participants in the national liberation events of 1917-1921 could not return to their homeland, even though they were begging in foreign countries, they still did not give up their nationality.

²⁸ ЦДАВО, Fond 1078, List 2, File 199, P. 8 «Листи полонених українців з Болгарії та Туреччини до Петлюри про приєднання їх до армії УНР, травень 1921 р.» [Letters from captured Ukrainians from Bulgaria and Turkey to Petliura about joining them to the army of the UPR, May 1921].

²⁹ *Життя українців в Туреччині* [The life of Ukrainians in Turkey], in "Свобода" [Freedom], 9 серпня 1935 р., № 184, с. 3.

урток українців
табору "Бернадот"
при м. Сан-Отефано
5 лютого 1921 р.

Посольство У.Н.Р. у Царьгороді/Копія.
Туреччина/

Отаману Коша Низових Запоризьких козакі
і повстанських рухів на Катеринославщині
п.Реківу.

Шановний Пане Отамане.

Дозвольте Вам висловити щирю подяку за те, що своїм приїздом до табору дали можливість нам звернутись до Головного Отамана Українських Республіканських військ Симона Васильовича Петлюри в листом, в якому ми з'ясуємо наше тяжке становище, скажемо про свої надії і побажання і в якому ми Отаману, як рідному батькові в Турецької чужої нам землі рукнемо: "чуєш, батьку...ого могутнього слова "Чує" ми чекаємо і на нього покладаємо всі надії.Бас, пане Отамане, ми давно знаємо, як чесного козака і певні, що Ви негтайно надішлете нашого листа до Головного Отамана.

Вельмишановний Пане Отамане,
Симон Васильовичу.

В далекої чужої землі, - в Туреччині ми маємо частя Бас вітати, єдину нашу надію, нашу пораду, найкращого сина і захистника нашої рідної Неньки - України. Тяжкі обставини примусили нас жити там, де діди наші і прадіди добували славу козацьку на диво всьому хрещеному люду і визволяли тих котрі, як і ми тепер, страждали в мурах і тяжких кайданах в Турецькій неволі. Не турки нас заневолили, а ті наші, бодай не згадувати недавні спільники - росіяне, котрі ніками шмагували не тільки наш край, нашу неньку Україну, а і наші душі. Зараз наші душі і тіло окуті холодними кайданами, навкруги непросвітня темрява серед якої чути тільки клекіт зграйких воронів - ворогів нашої України. Холодно, темно, брудно. Кругом оточили нас вороги, але ми маємо надію, що Ви, Пане Отамане, син рідної Неньки - України за частя і волю якої Ви боретесь, не забудете і нас невольників і, як славетні запорожці розкуєте ланцюги якими скували нас наші вороги росіяне. Благаємо. скоріше нас приєднати до славного війська козацького, з яким ми підемо визволяти наш рідний край, нашу Неньку - Україну.

Голова громади І.Форостенко. Секретарь А.Мойсіяха.

З оригіналом згідно:

Начальник Загального Відділу Військово - Похідної Канцелярії Головного Отамана Війська У.Н.Р.,
Поручник

Figure no. 1. The letter from the community of Ukrainians of the "Bernadotte" camp to the Embassy of the Ukrainian People's Republic in Tsargrad (Constantinople) of February 25, 1921 [ЦДАВО, Fond 1078, Оп. 2, Спр. 199, Арк. 14.]

THE MAIN EVENTS OF THE FIRST PERIOD OF ARMED CONFLICT IN THE EAST OF UKRAINE (APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2014)

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Abstract: *The authors' fundamental objective is to bring to the attention of the international academic community the results of the military-historical investigation on the main events of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. The importance of this work is conditioned by the need of the Ukrainian society and the democratic international community for a comprehensive, objective analyse of the events associated with the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. For a better understanding of the military-historical processes, the authors suggest their own periodization of this armed conflict. The first period of the conflict is divided into three stages, each having its own features and characteristics.*

Keywords: *Armed conflict, Ukraine, aggression, Russian Federation, antiterrorist operation, periodization, Crimea, Donbas.*

Rezumat: *Principalele evenimente ale primei perioade a conflictului armat în estul Ucrainei (aprilie – septembrie 2014). Obiectivul fundamental al autorilor constă în aducerea la cunoștința comunității academice internaționale a rezultatelor investigației militar-istorice pe marginea principalelor evenimente ale conflictului armat din estul Ucrainei. Importanța acestei lucrări este condiționată de necesitatea societății ucrainene și a comunității internaționale democratice pentru o reflectare cuprinzătoare și obiectivă a evenimentelor asociate agresiunii Federației Ruse împotriva Ucrainei. Pentru o mai bună înțelegere a proceselor militar-istorice, autorii propun propria lor periodizare a acestui conflict armat. Prima perioadă a conflictului este împărțită în trei etape, fiecare având propriile trăsături și caracteristici.*

Résumé : *Les principaux événements de la première période de conflit armé dans l'est de l'Ukraine (avril - septembre 2014). L'objectif fondamental des auteurs est de porter à l'attention de la communauté universitaire internationale les résultats de l'enquête militaro-historique sur les principaux événements du conflit armé dans l'est de l'Ukraine. L'importance de ce travail est conditionnée par le besoin de la société ukrainienne*

et de la communauté internationale démocratique de couvrir de manière exhaustive et objective les événements liés à l'agression de la Fédération de Russie contre l'Ukraine. Pour une meilleure compréhension des processus historico-militaires, les auteurs suggèrent leur propre périodisation de ce conflit armé. La première période du conflit est divisée en trois étapes, chacune ayant ses propres typiques et caractéristiques.

INTRODUCTION

A famous American geostrategist, Zbigniew Brzezinski, expressed in his book, *The Grand Chessboard*, some ideas on bringing the post-Soviet Russia closer to the Western world. But, despite all the efforts made by the West to integrate Russia into a global economy based on free market principles, the Western expectations to have a post-imperial Russia as an European democracy, rather than an Eurasian state, failed. The Russian foreign policy establishment believe in a special Eurasian role, one that entails the subordination of the former Soviet Union republics to Moscow. Ukraine has a significant importance for Russia, due to its territory, population, geographic location, economy and culture.

As Z. Brzezinski mentioned, “without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an Eurasian empire”.¹ The failure of the American-led effort to expand NATO in terms of offering to Ukraine and Georgia the NATO Membership Action Plans in Bucharest in 2008, as envisaged by Z. Brzezinski, reawakened to a greater extent the ambitious Russian desires.² It provoked and attacked Georgia later the same year with impunity. The “reset” red button pushed by America and Russia gave to the latter a chance to follow its hidden agenda of rebuilding the collapsed empire.

All means to reach that aim were on use. These were the economic instruments, such as import restrictions on the Ukrainian agricultural products going to the Russian market, gas supply as a tool to constraint the Ukrainian government to make some political and economic concessions; political pressure and influence on the Ukrainian political elite; information and psychological operations conducted well before a consequent military invasion.

The occupation of the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea by Russian “little green men” backed by Russian Black Sea Fleet and regular troops for the South-West of Russian Federation and the armed conflict in the Eastern Ukraine are

¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York, Basic Books, 1997, p. 46.

² *Ibid.*, p. 201.

not isolated events. They are just decisive points of operational design in a Russian campaign plan against Ukraine. Labels such as “Ukrainian internal conflict” or “Civil war in Ukraine” are constantly being used by Russian aggressors to disguise their real intentions to return Ukraine under Russian control.³

The historiography of the events of that period is quite vast and it drew the attention of politicians, military specialists and civilian experts.

First, there are the Ukrainian sources of information – official documents, such as laws, government’s decisions and acts,⁴ the Ministry of Defence and the Ukrainian Armed Forces orders, the intelligence reports,⁵ witnesses’ history

³ *Сочинская речь президента Путина (полная версия видео)* [President Putin’s Speech in Sochi (full video version)], In “Русская весна” [Russian Spring], 25.10.2014, in http://rusvesna.su/recent_opinions/1414226504 (Accessed on 04.08.18); *Украина: предпосылки кризиса и сценарии будущего* [Ukraine: Prerequisites of the Crisis and Scenarios of the Future], Валдай: Международный дискуссионный клуб. Москва, 2014 года, in http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/ukraine_rus.pdf (Accessed on 03.08.18); Александр Дугин, *Украина: моя война. Геополитический дневник* [Ukraine: my war. Geopolitical diary], Москва, Центрполиграф, 2015, 624 с.; Путин, *На Украине идет полномасштабная гражданская война* [There is a full scale Civil War in Ukraine], in <https://ria.ru/world/20140523/1009021933.html> (Accessed on 06.01.18).; Путин, *На Украине идет гражданская война, уже многие там это понимают* [There is a full scale Civil War in Ukraine, many people there have already understood that], in <https://ria.ru/world/20150126/1044360467.html> (Accessed on 06.01.2018); Песков, *Донбасс не оккупирован Россией, там идет гражданская война* [Russia did not occupy Donbas, a Civil War is going on there], in <https://iz.ru/605571/2017-06-13/peskov-donbass-ne-okkupirovan-rossiei-tam-idet-grazhdanskaia-voina> (Accessed on 06.01.2018).

⁴ *Самопроголошені республіки у Донецькій та Луганській областях кваліфіковано як терористичні організації, 16.05.2014.* [Prosecutor's General's Office of Ukraine recognized so-called DNR and LNR as terrorist organizations], in https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=138582 (Accessed on 20.07.18).

⁵ *Аналіз ведення АТО та наслідків вторгнення РФ в Україну у серпні-вересні 2014 року (офіц. сайт МОУ, 13 серпня 2015 року)* [Analysis of the ATO and the consequences of RF’s invasion into Ukraine in August-September 2014, MOD official site, 13 September 2015], in <http://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2015/08/13/analiz-vedennya-antiteroristichnoi-operaczii--12694/> (Accessed on 26.07.18).; Ukrainian MOD Defence Intelligence, *Servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces who took part in combat actions in Ukraine*, in <http://gur.mil.gov.ua/en/content/russia-cambatants-suspected-of-committing-war-crimes.html> (Accessed on 20.07.18.); *Ukraine – a proving ground for modern and application of prohibited Russian weapons.* In

materials, military reports, investigations⁶ etc. It is worth to highlight the difficulties of foreign researches to work with these materials. Some of them required some access to restricted documents and data. There is a need to make some field trips in order to get information from the conflict zone, the military, the population. The researchers had to overcome some linguistic obstacles.

Secondly, there are the Western publications: the European and the North American. As stated by Volodymyr Kravchenko, researcher from the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies of the University of Alberta, they may be divided in two categories: anti-Ukrainian (pro-Russian) and pro-Ukrainian.⁷ The former one is predominantly represented by scholars of the Russian politics who focus their researches specifically on Russia, such as Richard Sakwa - the British researcher on Russia,⁸ Gerard Toal - an Irish political geographer,⁹ Samuel Charap - a RAND expert on Russia and Eurasia, Timothy Colton - an expert on Russia at Harvard University,¹⁰ Giovanna De Maio¹¹ - an Italian researcher and others. As some critics noted, being that Russia-centric, they are "heavily reliant on secondary sources and quotes from official Russian sources".¹²

Thirdly, the pro-Ukrainian "camp" embraces scholars on Ukraine, such as Taras Kuzio¹³ - a British-Canadian scholar and expert in Ukrainian political,

<http://gur.mil.gov.ua/en/content/list-of-russia-armed-aggression-against-ukraine.html> (Accessed on 20.07.18).

⁶ Mykola Balaban et al., *Donbas in Flames: Guide to the Conflict Zone*, Lviv, Security Environment Research Center "Prometheus" NGO, 2017, 100 p., in https://prometheus.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Donbas_v_Ogni_ENG_1-5_web.pdf (Accessed on 08.08.18).

⁷ Volodymyr Kravchenko, *Review Essay: Frontline Ukraine*, in "East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies", 2016, Volume III, No. 1, p. 160.

⁸ Richard Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands*, London: I. B. Taurus, 2015, 297 p.

⁹ Gerald Toal, *Near Abroad: Putin, the West, the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus*, Oxford University Press, 2017, 272 p.

¹⁰ Samuel Charap and Timothy Colton, *Everyone Loses: The Ukrainian Crisis and the Ruinous for Post-Soviet Eurasia*, Routledge (Adelphi series), 2016, 212 p.

¹¹ Giovanna De Maio, *Russia's view of Ukraine after the crisis*, in "IAI Working Papers 16", 04 February 2016, 21 p.

¹² Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine 'Experts' in the West and Putin's Military Aggression*, in "Cicero Foundation Great Debate Paper", 06 September 2017, No. 17, in http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Kuzio_Western_Experts_on_Russian_Aggression_Ukraine.pdf (Accessed on 26.07.18).

¹³ Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: Democratization, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism*, Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2015, 611 p.; Taras Kuzio, *Putin's*

economic and security affairs, Paul D'Anieri¹⁴ - an American political scientist, Igor Sutyagin¹⁵ - a British-Russian expert on Ukrainian-Russian relationships, Tor Bukkvoll¹⁶ - a Norwegian researcher, and others.

The most difficult situation has occurred with the sources. Despite of the great amount of publications, one should notice the absence of any pluralism of opinions, the censorship, the total closure of sensitive information (especially casualty statistics), and the assassination practice of the opposition leaders and critics¹⁷. The ordinary readers will hardly separate facts from propaganda and information operations. Usually, authors of publications follow a certain official justification logic for the Russian actions in Crimea and Donbas, they usually cite predominantly Russian sources, exploit Russian imperial and Soviet time myths on Ukraine history¹⁸, identity etc. Some authors admit and excuse the Russian military intervention in Ukraine;¹⁹ others deny the Russian involvement as a key part of the

War Against Ukraine: Revolution, Nationalism, and Crime, Space Independent Publishing Platform, 2017, 474 p.

¹⁴ Paul D'Anieri, *Understanding Ukrainian politics: power, politics, and institutional design*, Armonk (NY), Sharpe, 2007, 299 p.

¹⁵ Igor Sutyagin, *Russian Forces in Ukraine*, Royal United Services Institute, March 2015, in https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201503_bp_russian_forces_in_ukraine.pdf (Accessed on 26.07.18).

¹⁶ Tor Bukkvoll, *Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas*, in "Parameters", (46)2, Summer 2016, in http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pub/parameters/issues/Summer_2016/5_Bukkvoll.pdf (Accessed on 31.07.18).

¹⁷ Ingo Mannteufel, *Opinion: Political assassination of Boris Nemtsov still not solved*, in <https://p.dw.com/p/2ffJu> (Accessed on 11.07.18); *ESDP and NATO: better cooperation in view of the new security challenges*. Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP, Riga, Latvia, 5 March 2015, in https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_117919.htm (Accessed on 03.07.18).

¹⁸ Геннадий Зюганов, *Кризис на Украине и его глубинные корни* [Crisis in Ukraine and its deep roots], in <http://www.politpros.com/journal/read/?ID=3779&journal=167> (Accessed on 03.08.18).; Геннадий Осипов, *Политический шантаж – преддверие глобальной катастрофы* [Political blackmail – the eve of the global catastrophe], in "Экономические и социальные перемены", ИСЭРТРАН, № 4 (34), 2014, с. 24 – 35, in <http://esc.vscs.ac.ru/article/549/full> (Accessed on 04.08.18).

¹⁹ Дмитрий Лабаури, *Донбасский разлом: причины, суть, итоги конфликта на Юго-Востоке Украины* [Donbas Fault: causes, essence, results of the conflict in the South-East of Ukraine], in <http://magazines.russ.ru/ural/2015/1/12lala.html> (Accessed on 03.08.18).

conflict and insist on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict as a civil war²⁰. Sometimes, Russian authorities organise some forums, such as the Valday Discussion Club (a Moscow-based think tank) with the aim of promoting an official policy toward Ukraine, to suggest Moscow-desired future scenarios for Ukraine.²¹

The authors believe that it is appropriate to show the military events in Ukraine based on Ukrainian perspective, instead of viewing the Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine through the lens of Moscow.

Fourthly, East-European researchers, such as Slovakian Róbert Ondrejcsák²² and Soňa Rusnáková,²³ Latvian researches Artis Pabris and Andis Kutors,²⁴ experts who work for the NATO STRATCOM Centre of Excellence in Latvia, and counter the Russian propaganda and fake news on the events in Ukraine.

Finally, there are the international official documents, such as the UN resolutions, the International Court of Justice Appeals,²⁵ the International

²⁰ Анатолий Цыганок, *Донбасс: неоконченная война. Гражданская война на Украине (2014-2016). Русский взгляд* [Donbas: unfinished war. Civil War in Ukraine (2014-2016). The Russian view.], Москва, АИРО, 2016, 576 с.; Иван Котляров, *Украина: гражданская война и попрание международного права украинскими вооруженными формированиями* [Ukraine: Civil War and International Law Violations by Ukrainian Armed Forces], in "Политическое просвещение", 2014, №5 (82), с. 100 – 118, in <http://www.politpros.com/journal/read/?ID=3786&journal=167> (Accessed on 04.08.18).

²¹ *Украина: предпосылки кризиса и сценарии будущего* [Ukraine: Prerequisites of the Crisis and Scenarios of the Future], Валдай: Международный дискуссионный клуб, Сентябрь 2014 года, Москва, in http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/ukraine_rus.pdf (Accessed on 03.08.18).

²² Róbert Ondrejcsák, *US Policies towards Russia in the Light of War in Ukraine: From Engaging a "Cooperative Power" to Defensive Containment of Regional "Challenger"*, in http://stratpol.sk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Panorama2014_Ondrejcsak.pdf (Accessed on 28.07.18).

²³ Soňa Rusnáková, *Russian New Art of Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine*, in "Slovak Journal of Political Science", 2017, no. 3-4, <https://doi.org/10.1515/sjps-2017-0014> (Accessed on 28.07.18).

²⁴ Artis Pabris, Andis Kutors (eds.), *The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe*, The Centre for East European Policy Studies, University of Latvia Press, 2015, 182 p., in https://www.academia.edu/12573225/The_War_in_Ukraine_Lessons_for_Europe (Accessed on 30.07.18).

²⁵ *Україна подала позов проти Російської Федерації до Міжнародного суду ООН* [Ukraine filled a lawsuit against the Russian Federation before the International Court of Justice], in <https://mfa.gov.ua/u/press-center/news/53743-ukrajina-podala-pozov-prots-rosijsykoji-federaciji-do-miznarodnogo-sudu-onn> (Accessed on 26.07.18).

Criminal Court²⁶ and the MH17 catastrophe investigation materials.²⁷

There were not any expectations in the Ukrainian society in 2014 that a military conflict would ever emerge in the Ukrainian territory at that time. Implementing the imperial plans of the Kremlin leaders, the Russian Federation launched a so-called “hybrid war” against Ukraine, which consists in the occupation of a part of Ukraine, hidden military aggression, elements of information, economic warfare, support for terrorism and irredentism.

With the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine, there is a need for a comprehensive reflection on the historical experience of the development of forms and methods of armed confrontation in order to incorporate it into the struggle for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

A large variety of literary sources dedicated to the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine²⁸ covers the military-historical issue in the field of the ideological struggle.

²⁶ Report on Preliminary Examination Activities. International Criminal Court. Office of the Prosecutor, 4 December 2017, p 19-27, in https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf (Accessed on 04.08.18).

²⁷ JIT: Flight MH17 was shot down by a BUK missile from a farmland near Pervomaiskyi, 28 September 2016, in <https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/@96068/jit-flight-mh17-shot/> (Accessed on 04.07.18); Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament: Annual Report 2016–2017, the APS Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2017, 52 p.

²⁸ В. Брехуненко, В. Ковальчук, М. Ковальчук, В. Корнієнко, „Братня” навала. Війни Росії проти України XII-XXI ст. [“Brothers” invasion. Russia’s Wars against Ukraine in the 12th -21st centuries], Київ, ТОВ “Бізнесполіграф”, 2016, 248 с.; Г. М. Перепелиця, Україна – Росія: війна в умовах співіснування [Ukraine – Russia: war in the Conditions of Coexistence], Київ, Видавничий дім «Стилос», 2015, 880 с.; Г. Боряк, В. Головка та інші, 25 років незалежності: нариси історії творення нації та держави [25 Years of Independence: Essays of the History of the Building of the Nation and State], НАН України; Ін-т історії України, Київ, Ніка-Центр, 2016, 796 с.; Т. Березовець, Анексія: острів Крим: хроніки “гібридної війни”: дослідження захоплення півострова [Anexation: Crimea: Chronicles of the “hybrid war”: Exploration of the Capture of the Peninsula], Київ, БрайтСтарПаблішинг, 2015, 391с.; В. Гусаров, Ю. Карин, К. Машовець, Д. Тымчук, Вторжение в Украину: Хроника российской агрессии [Invasion of Ukraine: Chronicle of the Russian Aggression], Київ, БрайтСтарПаблішинг, 2016, 240 с.; В. П. Горбулін, Донбас і Крим: ціна повернення [Donbas and Crimea: the Return Cost], Нац. ін-т стратег. дослідж., Київ, НІСД, 2015, 473 с.; С. Лойко, Аеропорт [Airport], Київ, БрайтСтарПаблішинг, 2015, 328 с.; Сергій Марко, Хроніка гібридної війни [Chronicle of Hybrid War], Київ, Альтерпрес,

And this is not an accident. Those who won are largely determined on the ideological front. The President of Ukraine, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko said on the eve of the Ukraine Defender Day in 2016: "Who would have thought that such a great significance of the state defence belonged to historians ...? The defence of Ukraine should take place not only with arms in hands. Historians can give a battle in hybrid warfare".²⁹

ARGUMENTATION

The armed conflict in the East of Ukraine is just one chain in the "hybrid war" enforced by the Russian leadership at the beginning of the 21 Century. "Hybrid warfare" is currently the most used concept for the description of the aggression of Russia.

The Russian Federation is making enormous efforts to hide its aggression from the international community, trying to treat the events that took place, since 2014, on the Crimean Peninsula and Eastern Ukraine, as an internal conflict in the form of a civil war. However, beyond all reasonable doubt, this is precisely aggression. The definition of aggression is given by the UN General Assembly resolution No. 3314 (XXIX) of December 14, 1974. According to the Art. 1, "aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition". And according to the resolution's Art.3, "any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, qualify as an act of aggression: (...) (c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State; (d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; (e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; (g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another

2016, 248 с.; В. Н. Ткаченко, *Россия: беспутье агрессора* [Russia: Aggressor's Off-road], Київ, Издательство ЛОГОС УКРАИНА, 2016, 432 с.

²⁹ Зустріч Президента України Петра Порошенка з істориками [The Meeting of the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko with Historians], in <http://www.Pravda.Com.Ua/News/2016/10/6/7122836/>.

State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein".³⁰

In our opinion, the actions of the Russian Federation, which have been committed by it on the territory of Ukraine since February 2014, are covered by the norms of the afore-mentioned resolution. In such context, it is necessary to draw attention to the decision of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, dated March 1, 2014 No. 48-СФ "On the Use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the territory of Ukraine".³¹ This step was aimed at legalizing the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation against the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other military formations and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine, on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the south of the Kherson region in order to block the actions of the Ukrainian authorities, capture the bases of the Ukrainian military units and the units of law enforcement agencies of Ukraine, the mass media offices and the lines of strategic communications of the Crimean peninsula. These actions actually began on February 20, 2014.

Within a month, the Russian Federation achieved complete control over the territory of the occupied Crimean Peninsula. On March 16, 2014 an illegal referendum was held, which came into force with the Federal Constitutional Law of March 21, 2014 No. 6-ФКЗ.³² Therefore, from the date of 21.03.2014 the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol are considered Moscow territory. Hence, the decision of the Federation Council on the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine has become obsolete.

But this decision was cancelled only on July 25, 2014 by the relevant decision of the Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian

³⁰ UN General Assembly resolution No. 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, in <http://www.un-documents.net/a29r3314.htm> (Accessed on 06.08.18).

³¹ *Об использовании Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации на территории Украины : Постановление Совета Федерации* [On the Use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the territory of Ukraine], in <http://council.gov.ru/activity/documents/39979/> (Accessed on 03.08.18).

³² *О принятии в Российскую Федерацию Республики Крым и образовании в составе Российской Федерации новых субъектов – Республики Крым и города федерального значения Севастополя* [On Adoption in the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the creation of new subjects in the Russian Federation: the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, the city of the federal level], Федеральный конституционный закон от 21.03.2014 г. № 6-ФКЗ, in <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/38220> (Accessed on 03.08.18).

Federation No. 296-СФ³³. The fact testifies that the purpose of military aggression was not exhausted by the occupation and annexation of Crimea. The authors believe that the abrogation of this decision is related to the reaction of the international community to the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation, and meant to avoid the occurrence of negative consequences announced for the Russian Federation by international organizations and other countries.

The Resolution 68/262 adopted by the UN General Assembly on March 27, 2014 underscores that the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on March 16, 2014, having no validity, cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of the city of Sevastopol.³⁴ The Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol are recognized as temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation, where human and civil rights of the Ukrainians, the Crimean Tatars and the persons belonging to other ethnic and religious groups have being violated by the Russian occupation authorities.³⁵ The National Security Strategy of Ukraine from 2015 emphasised this fact: "Section 1. Initial Provisions. ... The Russian Federation, striving to reverse the will of the Ukrainian People for the European future, has occupied a part of the Ukrainian territory: the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and launched military aggression against Ukraine in the eastern regions attempting to undermine unity of the democratic international community, to revise the world order which was formed upon the end of the World War II, and to violate fundamentals of international security and law, enabling unpunished use of force in the international arena."

³³ *Об отмене постановления Совета Федерации Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации от 1 марта 2014 года № 48-СФ «Об использовании Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации на территории Украины»*: Постановление Совета Федерации [On the Revocation of the Resolution of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation dated March 1, 2014 No. 48-СФ], in <http://council.gov.ru/activity/documents/44424/> (Accessed on 07.08.18).

³⁴ *Territorial integrity of Ukraine*: The UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262, in http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262 (Accessed on 07.08.18).

³⁵ *Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)*: UN General Assembly Resolution № 71/205 dated 19.12.2016, in http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/205 (Accessed on 08.08.18); *Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine*: UN General Assembly Resolution № 72/190 dated 19.12.17, in http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/72/190 (Accessed on 08.08.18).

Also, the Section 4.3: "... Ensuring readiness of the state, its economy and society to defend and repel the armed aggression in all of its aspects (including hybrid warfare), and upgrading the defence capability of the state are the key priorities of the national security policy".³⁶ The Military Doctrine of Ukraine of 2015 also defined in item 28 that "nowadays, Ukraine considers the Russian Federation as its military enemy".³⁷ The resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, dated January 27, 2015 and the resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 2067 "Missing persons during the conflict in Ukraine", dated June 25, 2015, recognized Russia as the aggressor state. Contrary to all international laws, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was annexed. The war in Donbas, unresolved and artificially supported by the Russian Federation, is continuing.³⁸

On November 16, 2016, Fatou Bensouda, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court disclosed the Report on the preliminary examination of the situation in Ukraine (2016), which concerns both the situation in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, linking events in these regions. Paragraph 158 of this report states that the situation on the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol is equivalent to the international armed conflict which began at the latest on 26 February, when the Russian Federation deployed members of its armed forces to gain control over parts of the Ukrainian territory, without the consent of the Ukrainian Government. And paragraph 166 highlights two periods of particularly intense battles in the East of Ukraine, in Ilovaisk (Donetsk oblast) in late August 2014 and in Debaltseve (Donetsk) from January to February 2015 in particular, when the increased intensity of fighting during these periods has been attributed to alleged corresponding influxes of troops, vehicles and weaponry from the Russian

³⁶ Oleksandr Lytvynenko, Philipp Fluri, Valentyn Badrack, *Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine on May 5, 2015, «On the National Security Strategy of Ukraine»"*. The Security Sector Legislation of Ukraine [Third Edition], Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies, Kyiv, 2017, 714 p., in http://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Security-Sector-Legislation-Ukraine-2017_eng.pdf (Accessed on 10.08.18).

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Постанова Верховної Ради України "Про Звернення Верховної Ради України до Його Всесвятості Варфоломія, Архієпископа Константинополя і Нового Риму, Вселенського Патріарха щодо надання автокефалії Православній Церкві в Україні" [On the Appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to His Holiness Bartholomew, Archbishop of Constantinople and New Rome, Ecumenical Patriarch to Provide Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine] від 16.06.2016 року № 1422-VIII, in <http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1422-19> (Accessed on 24.07.18).

Federation to reinforce the positions of the armed groups.³⁹

The armed aggression of the Russian Federation began on February 20, 2014, when the first cases of violation of the Ukraine state border crossing over the Kerch Strait by troops of the Russian Federation were recorded. Already after the actual armed aggression, on March 1, 2014, the Council of Federation adopted a statement of the President of Russia, V. Putin, on the permission given to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to operate on the territory of Ukraine. The medal "For the return of Crimea", which was established by the order of the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation dated March 21, 2014, is among the vast variety of evidence of Russian armed aggression. The dates of these special operations of Russians in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea - from February 20 to March 18, 2014 - were engraved on the medal. V. Putin testified that the operation of the Russian intelligence services involving military units and squads took place, particularly in the film "The Crimea. The Way to the Homeland".⁴⁰

After the Crimea annexation and having ambitious plans to seize territories in the East and South of Ukraine, in spring 2014 the Russian intelligence services conducted a series of operations under the title "Русская весна" (Russian Spring) to create a quasi-state entity, the so-called "Новороссия" (New Russia). In order to create a threat of invasion and use force, the leadership of the Russian Federation deployed troops close to the Ukrainian borders.⁴¹ On February 28, 2014, at a meeting of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, the Defence Minister reported that up to 38 thousand servicemen, 761 tanks, 2200 armoured vehicles, 720 artillery systems, about 90 combat aircrafts and 40 attack helicopters were concentrated along the state border with Ukraine in direction to Kyiv, Kharkiv and Donetsk.⁴² Following instructions from Moscow, the armed

³⁹ *Report on the preliminary examination of the situation in Ukraine*: The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, in https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-pe_eng.pdf (Accessed on 08.08.18).

⁴⁰ *Крым. Путь на Родину* [The Crimea. The Way to the Homeland], in https://russia.tv/video/show/brand_id/59195/episode_id/1180834/video_id/1147633/ (Accessed on 05.09.17).

⁴¹ *The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist Operation in the East of Ukraine in 2014–2016*, NATO Graphic & Printing, 2017, p. 19, in <http://nuou.org.ua/pro-universytet/dokumenty/finish/8-zahalna-diialnist/1941-the-white-book-of-the-anti-terrorist-operation-in-the-east-of-ukraine-in-2014-2016/0.html> (Accessed on 08.08.18).

⁴² *Стенограма засідання РНБО України у зв'язку з початком російської агресії в Криму* [Transcripts of the meeting of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine in connection with the beginning of Russian aggression in the Crimea], in

conflict in the East of Ukraine unfolded from the beginning of April 2014. Russian agents and mercenaries controlled by Russian intelligence services moved to an armed confrontation with the legitimate authorities.

The flow of the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine was divided by the article authors into periods which, in turn, were divided into stages, according to the specific features. The first period was called **“Overcoming the «hybrid aggression» and the active engagement of the ATO forces in the liberation of Donetsk and Lugansk regions from the Russian terrorist groups. Holding off the Russian troops invasion (beginning of April – September 5, 2014)”**. We have to mention that the first period, analysed in this study, is divided into three stages.

FIRST STAGE

The first period began with the stage “Deployment of the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine by the intelligence services of the Russian Federation (April-June 2014)”. At the initial stage of the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine, the efforts of the intelligence services of the Russian Federation were focused on destabilizing the situation in the Donetsk region, including massive creation of illegal armed groups, arms engagement and terrorist methods and ways of confronting the legitimate authorities. Moscow sent mixed forces, comprising military personnel (“vacationers” and “retirees”), Russian nationalists, so-called “soldiers of fortune”, the veterans of the Caucasian and Balkan wars and other “hot spots”, and just criminals who were mixed with the local recruits to the East of Ukraine.⁴³ Created by the Kremlin authorities, illegal armed groups were run by citizens of the Russian Federation, mainly the officers of the Russian intelligence services, particularly I. Girkin (“Strelkov”), B. Sisenko (“Iskra”), I. Bezler (“Bess”), as well as the criminal representatives, as A. Pavlov (“Motorola”). Combat groups were formed in the territory of the Russian Federation and in the occupied Crimea. They were armed and then transported across the border. All this suggests that the real causes of the armed conflict lie not in domestic Ukrainian problems, but in the interference and incitement of armed confrontation outside. The events in April 2014 in Donbas were a Russian intelligence services-special operation that was concealed as civilian protests.

<https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/02/22/7099911/> (Accessed on 08.08.18).

⁴³ Дмитрий Лабаури, *op. cit.*

According to the information of the resistance group, as of April 9th, the number of the illegal armed group personnel exceeded 2.5 thousand people.⁴⁴ The Russian special forces and the terrorist groups, which they created, attacked border guard units, seized the police and secret service departments, vehicles, banking and media facilities, blocked military installations, blackmailed and brainwashed the local population, seized hostages and committed intentional murders.⁴⁵ Thus, as a result of the aggressive actions of the Russian invaders, the concealed occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk regions began. The Russian Federation makes all possible efforts to conceal its own aggression as a civil war in Ukraine.

In order to intensify the armed conflict in Ukraine, Kremlin leaders sent the paramilitary formations of the Russian “Cossacks”; battalion “Восток” (East), manned by Chechens, who were citizens of the Russian Federation; armed terrorist groups “Русский Сектор” (Russian Sector), “Оплот” (Bulwark) and others. Under the leadership of representatives of the Russian intelligence service, some illegal armed formations were created in the East of Ukraine, namely “Армия Новороссии” (The Army of New Russia), “Армия Юго-Востока” (The Army of South-East), “Народное ополчение Донбасса” (People’s Militia of the Donbas), “Луганская Гвардия” (Luhansk’s guard).⁴⁶

Obviously, it is not correct to call these illegal armed formations as “separatists”, “pro-Russian” and their representatives as “bandits”, “militia” (although this practice still exists). Politicians, military, science and media representatives from different countries cannot find the right terms to describe the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine. These difficulties are not accidental, as they are the result of hybrid war techniques. Moscow political strategists and tacticians put a lot of effort to create the illusion of a civil war in Ukraine⁴⁷. They also provoked the Ukrainian side, and especially the international community, to use distorted and inaccurate terminology to impede the correct evaluation of

⁴⁴ В. Гусаров, Ю. Карин, К. Машовец, Д. Тымчук, *Вторжение в Украину: Хроника российской агрессии* [Invasion in Ukraine: A Chronicle of Russian Aggression], Киев, БрайтСтарПабблишинг, 2016, 240 с.

⁴⁵ *The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist...*, p. 21.

⁴⁶ Про відсіч збройній агресії Російської Федерації та подолання її наслідків [On counteracting the armed aggression of the Russian Federation and overcoming its consequences], Постанова Верховної Ради України про Заяву Верховної Ради України, 21 квітня 2015 року № 337-VIII, in <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/337-19> (Accessed on 08.08.18).

⁴⁷ Анатолий Цыганок, *op. cit.*; Иван Котляров, *op. cit.*

happenings and form a negative perception of the public opinion and institutions towards the events in Ukraine.

The fact that, on April 6, 2014 the terrorists seized the buildings of the regional state administration in Donetsk and Kharkiv, and the office of Security Service of Ukraine in Luhansk (where a considerable number of small arms was stored) almost simultaneously⁴⁸ indicates the coordination of actions by Russian sabotage and terrorist forces and local traitors. On April 7, 2014 the collaborators controlled, managed and funded by Russian intelligence services announced the creation of a so-called “Донецкая Народная Республика” (Donetsk People’s Republic) and “Харьковская Народная Республика” (Kharkiv People’s Republic). A headquarters of resistance in the South and East (“Штаб Южно-Восточного сопротивления”) that insisted on secession of the Eastern regions from Ukraine (creation of so-called Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) (“Луганская Народная Республика”) was announced on April 27, 2014 and was established in Luhansk.⁴⁹ At the same time, there were attempts of the Russian intelligence services to destabilize the situation in Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk regions.

The “initiation” of the massive use of weapons is clearly revealed in simultaneous capture of Sloviansk, city council in Artemivsk, city police station and city council in Kramatorsk, by the armed Russian-terrorist groups and the armed attack in Krasnyi Lyman on April, 12. The next day, the reconnaissance group of officers of the main office (Bureau) of the Security Service of Ukraine and the Alfa unit were ambushed and suffered losses near Sloviansk. The first battle of the Russian terrorist groups with representatives of the security and defence sector of Ukraine took place⁵⁰ then.

Due to the direct threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state, and in order to stop the surge of terrorism, organized by the Russian intelligence services in the Eastern regions of Ukraine, on April 14, 2014 the leadership of Ukraine announced the beginning of an antiterrorist operation (ATO).⁵¹ The term

⁴⁸ Mykola Balaban et al., *op. cit.*, p. 33.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 33–35.

⁵⁰ *The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist Operation...*, p. 21.

⁵¹ Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 13 квітня 2014 року "Про невідкладні заходи щодо подолання терористичної загрози і збереження територіальної цілісності України". Указ Президента України [On the decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of April 13, 2014 "On urgent measures to overcome the terrorist threat and preserve the territorial integrity of

“terrorists” was used in view of the actions that had been taken place in East of Ukraine, with regards to the Ukrainian Law “On countering terrorism”, which defines “terrorism as a socially dangerous activity that lies in deliberate, purposeful use of violence through hostage-taking, arson, murder, torture, intimidation of people and authorities”.⁵² Interestingly enough, the Russian Federal Law “On countering terrorism” gives even more relevant details on what was happening in the Eastern and Southern Ukraine in the definition of “terrorism – ideology of violence and practice of influence on decision-making by public authorities, local self-government bodies or international organizations connected with frightening the population and (or) other forms of unlawful violent actions”.⁵³ Since then the state has begun to function under special conditions.

All structures of the defence and security sector have been involved in the ATO: the Security Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, the State Special Transport Service and other agencies formed, in accordance with the laws of Ukraine, military formations and specialized law-enforcement bodies. In addition, volunteer formations, known as “volunteer battalions”, joined the ATO. The emergence of such phenomenon in the Ukrainian society as the volunteer movement is associated with the “Революція гідності” (Revolution of Dignity) (or “Maydan Uprising” against the President Yanukovich’s decision to stop the Ukrainian integration into EU and drift the country into Russia’s political-economic project “Таможенный союз” (Tax Union) and due to the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. As of April-May 2014, the following Ukrainian volunteer groups (formations) acted in the ATO area: “Добровольчий український корпус” (Volunteer Ukrainian Corps), battalions “Азов” (Azov), “Донбас” (Donbas), “Дніпро” (Dnipro), “Айдар” (Aidar) and several hundred volunteers, as well as a number of other volunteer groups which called themselves battalions, but their number was insignificant. However, the government forces failed to take full control over the situation in the East of Ukraine immediately. As a consequence of the help of armed units of the

Ukraine”: Decree of the President of Ukraine], in <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/405/2014> (Accessed on 09.08.18).

⁵² *Про боротьбу з тероризмом* [On the countering terrorism], Закон України від 20.03.2003 № 638-IV, in <https://zakon.help/law/638-IV/> (Accessed on 10.08.18).

⁵³ *О противодействии терроризму* [On the countering terrorism], РФ, Федеральный закон от 06.03.2006 г. № 35-ФЗ, in <http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&prevDoc=102370057&backlink=1&nd=102105192&rdk=0> (Accessed on 10.08.18).

Russian Federation, consisting of regular units and units subordinated to the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, units and special units subordinated to other agencies of security and defence sector of the Russian Federation, their advisers, instructors and irregular illegal armed groups, armed gangs and groups of mercenaries that were created, subordinated, managed and funded by the Russian Federation, as well as through the occupation administration of the Russian Federation in Ukraine,⁵⁴ the situation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions was aggravated considerably. The enemy used guerrilla-war tactics, attacked the roadblocks and the ATO base camps, and ambushed military vehicles convoys.

On the 16th of January, Ukraine submitted to the International Court of Justice the Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Race Discrimination.⁵⁵

In a series of events aimed at the struggle for Ukraine, terrorists showed inhuman cruelty and sadism.⁵⁶ Thus, on May 9, 2014 the enemies captured colonel Serhii Demydenko, deputy commander of the Dnipropetrovsk territorial defence battalion (he was promoted to colonel posthumously) during the battle, cut his ears and poked his eyes.⁵⁷ On May, 13, the terrorists ambushed the convoy of one of the units of the 95th separate airmobile brigade near Sloviansk. As a consequence, 6 soldiers lost their lives and 11 were wounded. Existing positions, containers from Russian RPG-18 "Mukha", RPG-26 "Ahlen" were found at the

⁵⁴ Закон України "Про особливості державної політики із забезпечення державного суверенітету України на тимчасово окупованих територіях у Донецькій та Луганській областях" від 18 січня 2018 року [Law of Ukraine "On the peculiarities of state policy on ensuring state sovereignty of Ukraine in temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts" dated January 18, 2018], in <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2268-19/page> (Accessed on 09.08.18).

⁵⁵ Україна подала позов проти Російської Федерації до Міжнародного суду ООН, in <https://mfa.gov.ua/u/press-center/news/53743-ukrajina-podala-pozov-proti-rosiysykoji-federaciji-do-miznarodnogo-sudu-on> (Accessed on 26.07.18).

⁵⁶ Mykola Balaban et al., *op. cit.*, p. 65–72.

⁵⁷ Ярослав Тимченко, Ірина Мороз, Максим Попов та ін., *Книга пам'яті військовослужбовців Збройних Сил України, які загинули, захищаючи суверенітет, територіальну цілісність та недоторканість України* [Memory of soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, who perished defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine], Кн.1. Вінницька, Волинська, Дніпропетровська, Донецька, Житомирська та Закарпатська області [Volume 1. Vinnitsa, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr and Transcarpathian regions], Київ, Національний військово-історичний музей України, ЛАТ&К, 2016, с. 154.

ambush site.⁵⁸ A tragedy near Volnovakha marks a special drama among the many events. On May 22, 2014 at around 4:30 am, a Russian armed group attacked the roadblock of the ATO unit. 17 defenders of Ukraine lost their lives and 32 soldiers were wounded.⁵⁹ This is only a small part of the tragic events which unfolded in April-May 2014.

All these events prompted the development of the ATO combat power, improvement of the management system to prevent the spread of destabilization processes throughout the territory of Ukraine. On May 20, 2014 the headquarters for the anti-terrorist operation was formed on the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In order to manage the military units effectively it was agreed to divide the area of operation into sectors ("A", "B", "D", later – sector "C") and to form appropriate headquarters. In addition, taking into account the importance and territorial location of Mariupol, a separate area (area "M") was created for its security.

The Ukrainian troops conducted an operation to unblock the Donetsk airport on May 26, 2014. Airborne unit effectively supported by the Air Force defeated the enemy.⁶⁰ The remnants of the Russian armed group members left the Donetsk airport.

At the end of May, the military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, jointly with the law-enforcement authorities and the Ukrainian volunteer formations regained control over the Dobropilskyi, Oleksandrivskyi, Velykonovosilkivskyi, Volnovaskyi, Marinskyi, Volodarskyi and Starobeshivskyi regions.⁶¹

In June, the ATO forces conducted a number of successful operations and took control over Semenivka and Krasnyi Lyman. The operation that was conducted in the southern part of Krasnolymanskyi region and liberated Yampil and Zakitne on June 18-19, 2014⁶² enabled the ATO forces to block the Sloviansk area

⁵⁸ *The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist Operation...*, p. 23.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ О. Турчинов, *Без прямого російського втручання ми б уже до кінця травня звільнили всю територію Донецької і Луганської областей* [Without direct Russian intervention, we would have released the entire territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions by the end of May], in "Народна армія", 20.04.2017, in [http://na.mil.gov.ua/files/pdf/5496-\(20-04-2017\).pdf](http://na.mil.gov.ua/files/pdf/5496-(20-04-2017).pdf) (Accessed on 09.08.18).

⁶¹ *В ході АТО повністю очищена від бойовиків північ Донецької області* [During the ATO the north of the Donetsk region was completely cleared of militants], in https://zn.ua/UKRAINE/v-hode-ato-polnostyu-ochischen-ot-boevikov-sever-doneckoy-oblasti-146414_.html (Accessed on 09.08.18).

⁶² *The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist Operation...*, p. 25.

from this direction. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian troops captured the Russian terrorist strongpoints in the south of the Donetsk region, neutralized the intruders and regained control of Mariupol on June 13.

Control of more than 250 km of Ukrainian-Russian border was restored by the end of June 2014. The crisis area was isolated almost completely, except for the part of the state border of Izvaryne – Sievero-Hundorivskiyi – Parkhomenko that remained open for the Russians.

One of the very important tasks was taking control of the Luhansk airport and maintaining it. The airport was isolated. However, on June 14, 2014 Russian terrorists shot down a military transport aircraft IL-76MD on approach to landing which resulted in the death of 40 paratroopers and 9 crew members.⁶³

In the second half of June 2014 P. Poroshenko, the President of Ukraine, put forward a plan for the peaceful settlement of the situation in Donbas, ordered the military formations of Ukraine the unilateral ceasefire⁶⁴ from June 20 to 27 and urged the hostile party to participate in the negotiations. Further, the unilateral ceasefire was extended up to the end of June 30. However, at the order of Moscow, the hybrid Russian armed formations continued their aggressive actions. During a week of “silence”, 27 Ukrainian servicemen were killed and 69 others were wounded.⁶⁵ There were some calls like “We will advance Kyiv” in the “LPR” and “DPR” collaborationist groupings.⁶⁶

It became clear that a resolution of the armed confrontation in the East of Ukraine by political means failed and the conflict must be eliminated by military means. Under such circumstances, P. Poroshenko, the President of Ukraine, decided to end the unilateral ceasefire⁶⁷ and ordered the ATO forces to start active actions against the illegal armed formations as from July 1, 2014.

⁶³ Mykola Balaban et al., *op. cit.*, p. 38; *У СБУ розповіли, хто саме збив український Іл-76 в Луганську* [The SBU said who exactly shot down the Ukrainian IL-76 in Lugansk], in https://espresso.tv/news/2017/10/07/u_sbu_rozpovily_khto_same_zbyv_ukrayinsky_y_il_76_u_lugansku (Accessed on 08.08.18).

⁶⁴ Mykola Balaban et al., *op. cit.*, p. 38–39.

⁶⁵ *The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist Operation...*, p. 27.

⁶⁶ *Мы дойдем до Киева как минимум – Борoday* [We will reach Kyiv at least - Boroday], in <http://au-donetsk.ru/forum/my-doydem-do-kieva-kak-minimum-borod/> (Accessed on 09.08.18); *Стрелков: "Новороссия" - это только начало... Скоро до Киева дойдем* [Strelkov: "Novorossia" is just the beginning ... Soon we'll reach Kyiv], in <http://mignews.com.ua/sobitiya/inukraine/4109932.html> (Accessed on 10.08.18)

⁶⁷ Mykola Balaban et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 38–39.

SECOND STAGE

The second stage “Liberation of the territory of the East of Ukraine from Russian terrorist cells (July 1-August 24, 2014)” was favourable for the ATO forces.

In July 2014, the total number of illegal armed formations created by the Russians in the East of Ukraine exceeded 15 thousand people. Up to 50 training camps for fighters were deployed both on the territory of the Russian Federation and on the occupied territories of Ukraine. The Russian occupying forces were armed with up to 45 tanks, more than 150 armoured combat vehicles, up to 30 missile multiple launcher systems, 60 artillery pieces and mortars, 20 anti-tank missile systems, more than 25 anti-aircraft missile systems, up to 100 man-portable air-defence systems and 150 trucks.⁶⁸ The biggest part of the Russian occupying forces was concentrated in Donetsk, Luhansk, Sloviansk, Horlivka, Makiivka, and Snizhne.

The ATO forces sought an isolation of the crisis area and actively fought against terrorists and saboteurs. About 580 km, including 212 km along the state border with the Russian Federation, had been successfully isolated by that time. 125 checkpoints, 13 company and platoon positions were established.⁶⁹ The number of protected and defence facilities continued to increase.

For a complete liberation of temporarily occupied territories the ATO leadership envisaged certain steps: to restore full control over the whole state border with the Russian Federation; to divide the territories controlled by the Russian occupying forces into separate areas; to encircle large group(ing)s of the Russian terrorists and create the conditions for their further disarmament, and in case of resistance to create conditions for their defeat.

At that time, the largest Russian armed formation was located in Sloviansk, in the Donetsk region. In order to encircle Sloviansk from all directions and to cut off the supply routes, the operation was conducted on July 1-4, 2014. The aim of the operation was to liberate Mykolaivka and to take control of the main ways by which the militants were supplied with weapons, ammunition and other material. Receiving information on the absence of the Russian troops and their mercenaries in Artemivsk, the assault squad of the reinforced company of the 95th separate airmobile brigade entered the city and took control without a single shot being

⁶⁸ *The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist Operation...*, p. 27.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

fired.⁷⁰ The head of the Russian armed formation that operated in Sloviansk, I. Girkin (pseudo “Strelkov”), realizing that the city would be encircled in a few days, decided to escape. During the night of July 4-5, 2014, the Russian terrorist groups left the city in the direction of Donetsk and Horlivka. Thus, the Ukrainian troops liberated Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and Artemivsk and by July 7 they took full control of the territory of Artemivsk, Marinsk and Sloviansk regions.⁷¹ Subsequently, Druzhkivka (July 8, 2014), Siversk (July 13, 2014), Dzerzhynsk (July 16-17, 2014), Sieverodonetsk and Lysychansk (July 18-20, 2014), Debaltseve (July 24-26, 2014), Vuhlehirsk (July 12-13, 2014), Zhdanivka (July 15-17, 2014) were liberated (see **Picture no. 1**⁷²).

As a result of the active actions of the units in July-August 2014, the Armed Forces of Ukraine suffered significant losses in personnel, weapons and military equipment in the East of Ukraine. At the same time, they were being systematically reinforced by Russian mercenaries and servicemen of the armed forces of the Russian Federation “sent for vacation”. The supply of weapons and military equipment like tanks, artillery systems, anti-tank weapons and advanced anti-aircraft missile systems continued. In addition, there were cases when certain units of the armed forces of the Russian Federation intruded on the territory of Ukraine.

Evidence of Russia’s military presence in the Donbass has repeatedly been published by independent think-tanks (RUSI, Atlantic Council), teams of independent investigators (Bellingcat), Ukrainian intelligence and journalists.⁷³ One of the most complete databases, containing identification findings of servicemen and units of the Russian Armed Forces recorded on the

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p. 28.

⁷¹ *Ibid*.

⁷² Global Security, 11-14 Jul 2014, in <https://twitter.com/WarfareStudies> (Accessed on 15.12.18)

⁷³ *Аналіз ведення АТО та наслідків вторгнення РФ в Україну у серпні-вересні 2014 року (офіц. Сайт МОУ, 13 серпня 2015 року)* [Analysis of the ATO and the consequences of RF’s invasion into Ukraine in August-September 2014, MOD official site, 13 September 2015], in <http://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2015/08/13/analiz-vedennya-antiteroristichnoi-operaczii--12694/> (Accessed on 26.07.18); Ukrainian MOD Defence Intelligence, *Servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces who took part in combat actions in Ukraine*, in <http://gur.mil.gov.ua/en/content/russia-cambatants-suspected-of-committing-war-crimes.html> (Accessed on 20.07.18); *Ukraine – a proving ground for modern and application of prohibited Russian weapons*, in <http://gur.mil.gov.ua/en/content/list-of-russia-armed-aggression-against-ukraine.html> (Accessed on 20.07.18); Igor Sutyagin, *op. cit.*

Donbass in 2014-2016 was collected by volunteers of the international community InformNapalm.⁷⁴

In response to the successful actions of the ATO troops, Russia began to use artillery against them from their own territory. In the same points the Russian artillery units crossed the state border to fire shells from the territory of Ukraine. Systematic shelling of the military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and other Ukrainian formations in the sector "D" from the territory of the Russian Federation began on July 11, 2014. The enemy used BM-21 "GRAD" multiple rocket launchers and mortars. One of the units of the 24th separate mechanized brigade of the Ukrainian forces in the vicinity of Zelenopillia was then defeated by the fire from the Russian territory. During the shelling, the unit was almost completely destroyed: 24 servicemen lost their lives and 76 were wounded.⁷⁵ Obviously, regular artillery units and units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were involved in firing across the border.

On July 17, 2014 a Boeing 777 passenger aircraft of the Malaysian Airlines which was flying from Amsterdam (the Netherlands) to Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) was shot down by a Russian-made Buk missile system near Torez, Donetsk region. 283 passengers and 15 crew members were killed by the Russian terrorists.⁷⁶

Due to a threat that Donbas airfields could be used by the Russians, the ATO forces intensified their efforts to sustain the control of Donetsk and Luhansk airports. During July 20-21, 2014 the ATO forces conducted an operation in the area of Raivka, Vesela Hora, Kondrashivka-Nova, created a corridor for safe passage of convoys to Luhansk airport and set up roadblocks in threatened areas (see **Picture no. 277**). At the same time, they conducted the operation to liberate the area of Kurakhove, Pisky and seize Donetsk airport.⁷⁸ The actions of the Ukrainian servicemen deep in the occupied territories were decisive. So, on July

⁷⁴ *Proofs of the Russian Aggression: InformNapalm releases extensive database of evidence*, in <https://informnapalm.org/en/proofs-of-the-russian-aggression-informnapalm-releases-extensive-database-of-evidence/> (Accessed on 09.08.18).

⁷⁵ *The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist Operation ...*, p. 28-29.

⁷⁶ *JIT: Flight MH17 was shot down by a BUK missile...; MH17 crash: Criminal investigation MH17*, in <https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/> (Accessed on 09.08.18); *US Court Fines Russian Separatist Leader £400m for Shooting Down MH17*, in <https://www.khodorkovsky.com/us-court-fines-russian-separatist-leader-400m-shooting-mh17/> (Accessed on 09.08.18).

⁷⁷ Global Situation, 23-27 Jul 2014, in <http://warfarestudies.tumblr.com/image/93104087321> (Accessed on 15.12.18).

⁷⁸ *The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist Operation ...*, p. 29.

2014 a unit of the 25th detached paratroopers brigade launched some assaults and raids in the direction of Debaltseve, Shakhtarsk that ensured an autonomous advance of the main raid of the core of the 95th detached airmobile brigade in the direction of Lysychansk, Debaltseve, Shakhtarsk, Petrivske, Savur Mohyla mound, Stepanivka, Dmytrivka, Miusinsk, Krasnyi Luch, Sloviansk.⁷⁹ The raid lasted from July the 18th to August the 10th, 2014 (24 days). Ukrainian paratroopers overcame more than 450 km of roads, including 170 km with engagements. On the July 28th, together with the battalion-size tactical group (further - BTGr) of the 30th detached mechanized brigade, they assaulted and captured the strategically important feature – Savur Mohyla mound.⁸⁰ They supported their comrades-in-arms on the battle field in a difficult time. At the beginning of August, they secured the withdrawal of the ATO units that carried out tasks at the state border and occurred under the Russian artillery destructive fire.

The raid tasks were assigned in consideration of the fact that in late July – early August the situation in the sector “D” seriously aggravated. Russian mass-media commented this situation as a formation of the so-called “Южный котел” (South pocket). Significant loss of personnel, weapons and military equipment as a result of artillery shelling from the Russian territory forced the ATO leadership to plan and conduct on the 3rd – 4th of August 2014 an operation of withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces units and the State Border service of Ukraine on a safe distance from the state border.⁸¹ Savur Mohyla mound became the place of Ukrainian military glory in August 2014, which from July 28, 2014 was under the control of Ukrainian defenders. On August the 12th 2014, a special purpose group of soldiers under the command of Colonel I. Gordiychuk broke through to the mound Savur Mohyla. On the 18th of August, a squad of Colonel Potiehin joined the defenders of the mound. Ukrainian soldiers controlled the movement of Russian mercenaries and columns with military equipment and goods from the Russian Federation, targeted artillery fire of the ATO forces.⁸² In order to annihilate the defenders of Savur Mohyla, Russian artillery was shelling the mound almost 24 hours a day, and the Russian mercenary troops carried out numerous attempts to

⁷⁹ *Raid. Documentary*, in <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=co-AHRfrSro> (Accessed on 09.08.18).

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist Operation ...*, p. 30.

⁸² Серж Марко, *Хроника гибридной войны* [Chronicle of Hybrid War], Київ, Альтерпрес, 2016, с. 75–86.

assault a strategic altitude. Armed forces and units of the Russian Federation supported them by firing across the border⁸³. However, Ukrainian soldiers, in spite of the extraordinary pressure, firmly defended the site and retreated only by order of the Command.

In general, the situation in the East of Ukraine remained difficult, but under control. By mid-August 2014, about 40 thousand people were involved in the anti-terrorist operation. There were more than 32 thousand of the Armed Forces personnel alongside with 5.5 thousand pieces of heavy weapons and other military equipment. The National Guard of Ukraine deployed to the operation area up to 3 thousand men, the State Border Service of Ukraine – up to 3 thousand men, the Security Service of Ukraine - up to 2 thousand men.⁸⁴ During May-September 2014, the ATO forces conducted more than 40 operations, released more than two-thirds of the occupied territories, more than 100 towns and villages of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.⁸⁵ Gradually, the Armed Forces and other military units of Ukraine managed to reverse the situation and take it under control. During the liberation of towns and villages, separate hostile groups were localized and destroyed. There were no significant casualties among the civilian population. As a result of the offensives, raids, search-shocks, assaults, and special operations of the ATO forces, the narrowing of the isolation ring, the gradual removal of it from the state border and partial security of the state border in threatening directions became possible. At that time, there was a real possibility of blocking the Russian occupation forces in the districts of Donetsk, Makiivka, Gorlovka, Luhansk, their encircling and cutting into separate pockets. The preconditions of the successful end (i.e. for Ukraine) of the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine were created. In these circumstances, the Russian Federation intervened to prevent this development of events.

⁸³ Maksymilian Czuperski, John Herbst, Eliot Higgins, Alina Polyakova, Damon Wilson, *Hiding in Plain Sight. Putin's War in Ukraine*, The Atlantic Council of the United States, 2015, 33 p., in https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191186/Hiding-in-Plain_Sight_0529.pdf (Accessed on 09.08.18); *Russia Shelled Ukraine in August 2014. Satellite Images of 539 Craters Analysed*, in <https://informnapalm.org/en/russia-shelled-ukraine-in-august-2014/> (Accessed on 09.08.18); Sean Case, Klement Anders, *Putin's Undeclared War. Summer 2014: Russian Artillery Strikes against Ukraine*, in https://www.bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ArtilleryAttacks_with_Cover_EmbargoNote.pdf (Accessed on 09.08.18).

⁸⁴ *The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist Operation...*, p. 30.

⁸⁵ *Біла книга-2014. Збройні Сили України* [White Book-2014. The Armed Forces of Ukraine], Київ, МОУ, ГШ ЗС України, 2015, с. 10.

THIRD STAGE

The third stage “The invasion of the Russian Armed Forces military units on the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine (August 25 - September 5, 2014)” shows Russia’s efforts to stop the conflict resolution on Ukrainian terms.

In August 2014, realizing the approaching collapse of the “Новоросси́я” (New Russia) project, the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation decided to deploy its regular troops to the territory of Eastern Ukraine⁸⁶. This decision led to the escalation of the armed conflict, increased destruction of the region’s infrastructure, caused a significant increase in the number of victims among military and civilian population. At midnight of August 24-25, 2014, the situation in the ATO zone changed dramatically (see **Picture no. 3**⁸⁷). After a powerful artillery strike of 200 artillery pieces from the territory of the Russian Federation, a number of Russian units covertly invaded the territory of Ukraine.⁸⁸ Russian servicemen, as before, in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, did not have any documents and identification insignia on their uniforms or their military equipment. The state border was crossed by the eight battalion-size tactical groups. They moved quickly towards Ilovaisk and Luhansk. Several small groups crossed the border near Novoazovsk in the direction of Mariupil.⁸⁹ The only group of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation near the Russian-Ukrainian border in the South of the Rostov region with the spearhead to Donetsk included about 4 thousand servicemen, up to 20 tanks, up to 90 units of armoured combat vehicles, up to 30 pieces of artillery systems and up to 20 MLRS.⁹⁰ The invasion was confirmed on August 26, 2014 after the capture of 11 military servicemen of the 98th airborne division (Kostroma). Over time, it was possible to find out that units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation entered the territory of Donetsk and

⁸⁶ Дмитрий Лабаури, *op. cit.*

⁸⁷ Global Situation, 18-24 Aug 2014, in <http://warfarestudies.tumblr.com/image/95734796876> (Accessed on 15.12.18).

⁸⁸ В. Муженко, *Дванадцять днів що змінили хід АТО* [Twenty Days that Changed the ATO's Course], in “Народна армія”, 21.08.2015, in <http://na.mil.gov.ua/files/pdf/5410-%2821-08-2015%29.pdf> (Accessed on 09.08.18).

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Аналіз бойових дій в районі Іловайська після вторгнення російських військ 24–29 серпня 2014 року* [Analysis of Combat Actions at Ilovaisk after the Russian troops’ invasion in August 24-24, 2014], in <http://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2015/10/19/analiz-illovausk--14354/> (Accessed on 06.08.18).

Luhansk regions, in particular from the 19th detached mechanized infantry brigade, 7th and 76th airborne divisions, 31st and 56th detached assault brigades, 64th regiment of the Northern Fleet Marines.⁹¹

A special resonance in the society was the Ilovaysk tragedy (24 August 29, 2014).⁹² For the release of a group of about 1.2 thousand men encircled in the Ilovaysk region, a reserve group of up to 2 thousand men was prepared. Taking into account the current situation, the decision was made to conduct an operation to release the troops from the pocket on September 2, 2014. But due to the enemy's powerful fire impact, the Ukrainian units had to be extracted long before the planned time. With the aim to avoid bloodshed from both sides, the "safe corridors" were agreed at the highest Russian and Ukrainian military levels. Under the guarantee of Russia, the withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops from Ilovaisk was scheduled for the morning of August, 29. The movement was planned in columns according to two routes.⁹³ However, Russian troops betrayed treacherously and shot columns in the open areas of roads from their ambushes. As a result of the cunning actions of Russians, 366 Ukrainian soldiers were killed, 429 were injured, 158 disappeared, and 128 were in captivity.⁹⁴ When the columns left Ilovaisk, information from one of the special-purpose groups operating in the enemy's rear was received. According to this information, one of Russians BTRs carelessly took a base camp, where units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were deployed a week ago. Taking into account the knowledge of all coordinates and areas, the Command of ATO forces was able to adjust the artillery fire carefully. As a result of a powerful rocket-artillery strike, the operational group of the GRU (Main Intelligence Department) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was liquidated, and the battalion tactical group of the enemy suffered significant losses: more than a hundred killed and many injured, weapons and military equipment were destroyed.⁹⁵

⁹¹ *The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist Operation...*, p. 31.

⁹² *Аналіз бойових дій в районі Іловайська...*

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Юрій Луценко прозвітував про результати розслідування кримінального провадження за фактом розв'язання і ведення представниками влади та збройних сил Російської Федерації агресивної війни проти України 02.09.2016* [Yurii Lutsenko reported on the results of criminal investigation on the Russian state and military authorities responsibility over the beginning and conduct of the aggressive war in Ukraine], in https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=191816 (Accessed on 05.08.18).

⁹⁵ В. Муженко, *Дванадцять днів що змінили хід АТО* [Twenty Days that Changed the

The tension of the battles associated with the Russian invasion was growing progressively. Two days later intensive battles were taking place in the suburbs of Lugansk, near Novosvitlivka and Khryzhivate, Donetsk and Ilovaisk, Marinka and Starobeshev. Only on the 27th of August 2014 the ATO forces opened fire 34 times. In the Luhansk airport region, at the Hryaschivate – Novosvitlivka line, there were also encircling, fierce and brutal battles conducted by the units of the 80th airborne, 24th mechanized and 128th mountain-infantry brigades, battalion “Айдар” (Aidar) and a small group of 51th mechanized brigade.⁹⁶

The battles of the greatest intensity were in the region of Luhansk airport, where the enemy used reinforced tank battalion, with the support of the infantry against the Ukrainian defenders. The balance of power was not in favour of Ukrainians and was even worse than early at Ilovaisk. When Ukrainian troops, after fierce battles, broke through the encircling and withdrew, the Russians were afraid to advance upon Luhansk airport for another three days. During the battles near Luhansk the defenders of Ukraine demonstrated heroism and courage. The units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation suffered significant casualties.⁹⁷ According to the information received by the ATO headquarters from intelligence sources, the Commander of one of the units of the Marine Corps of the Northern Fleet of the Russian Federation, who participated in hostilities under the Luhansk airport, withdrew his unit into the territory of the Russian Federation, without permission of the Highest Command, because of some great losses of personnel.⁹⁸

After the Russian troops invasion, the ATO units were ordered to move north of Luhansk (August 30-31, 2014). At the same time, the defence of the so-called Bakhmut highway (in the Lugansk-Lisichansk section) was enforced. To stop the further offensive of the enemy on Mariupol, on September 25th, 2014, the 79th and the 95th separate airmobile brigades' raids were conducted in the area of Komsomolsk, Telmanove, and Novoazovsk.⁹⁹ These raids demonstrated to the Russian leadership that there were sufficient reserves able to strike the enemy, to break his plans on the encircling and capture of Mariupol. The enemy's intention

ATO's Course], in “Народна армія”, dated 21.08.2015, in <http://na.mil.gov.ua/files/pdf/5410-%2821-08-2015%29.pdf> (Accessed on 09.08.18).

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ В. Муженко, *Дванадцять днів що змінили хід АТО* [Twenty Days that Changed the ATO's Course], in “Народна армія”, dated 21.08.2015, in <http://na.mil.gov.ua/files/pdf/5410-%2821-08-2015%29.pdf> (Accessed on 09.08.18).

⁹⁹ *Raid. Documentary*, in <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=co-AHRfrSro>. (Accessed on 09.08.18).

to break through the co-called “Southern corridor” towards Crimea was not materialized.¹⁰⁰

The authors believe that the resistance of Ukrainians and the painful losses of the enemy forced the Russian leadership to refuse a second-echelon force deployment into Ukraine. Gradually, the ATO’s forces stabilized the contact line and prevented further movement of Russian hybrid occupying forces into the depths of Ukrainian territory. The analysis of the results of operations (combat actions) in late August-early September 2014 shows that, despite the unfavourable situation, the Ukrainian Armed Forces together with the National Guard of Ukraine, other military formations, law enforcement agencies and with the participation of volunteer units caused heavy casualties to the enemy and tied down its main forces, ruined the Russian leadership’s plans of seizing the South-Eastern regions of Ukraine and occupying the towns of Stanitsa Luhanska, Shchastia, Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, Debaltsevo, Artemivsk, Sloviansk and Mariupol.

CONCLUSIONS

The military occupation of the Crimea and the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine became the next steps in the “hybrid” war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Some false terms, that were suggested by the Russians for legitimization of their aggressive war against Ukraine and frequently used by medias and in some political circles, such as “separatists”, “pro-Russian”, “bandits”, “militia” - for illegal and hostile to Ukraine armed formations, and “civil war” for the events that happened in the East of Ukraine in March 2014, should not be taken for granted by academia.

There are several countries active in modern Europe where separatist movements exist. Ukraine is one of them. However, today’s events in Ukraine should not be seen much in the perspective of separatism but rather in the context of irredentism, when a certain group of people desire to join the neighbouring state to their region (if not the whole country), especially if this state has created a long-standing influence capability.

Those armed groups that were created by Russia in the so-called “DPR” and “LPR” should be appropriately called: armed formations of the Russian Federation, consisting of regular units and units subordinated to the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, units and special units subordinated to other security agencies of the Russian Federation, their advisers, instructors and

¹⁰⁰ *The White Book of the Anti-Terrorist Operation ...*, p. 32.


irregular illegal armed groups, armed gangs and groups of mercenaries established, subordinated, managed and funded by the Russian Federation.

Thus, the “war in Donbas”, according to the authors, can be classified as the armed aggression of the Russian Federation, which caused an armed conflict in the East of Ukraine. Ukraine used its security and defence sector’s forces to deflect and deter the aggression. The form of their application from April 14, 2014 to April 30, 2018 became a counterterrorist operation. It is divided into major periods and further on into stages that qualitatively differ in essence and content from the military-strategic, socio-political situation and the nature of the hostilities. The concept and methodology related to the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, due to its special “hybrid” character, requires further refinement by researchers.

The third stage brings us to the end of the first period of proposed periodization of the conflict. The second period of “hybrid war” in the East of Ukraine, to be called as “Localization of the conflict in some districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions”, began on September 5, 2014 and lasted until April 30, 2018 when ATO was transformed into the Joint Force Operation. It consists of five stages following the previous three ones: the fourth stage – “Stabilization of the fighting line in the East of Ukraine (September 5, 2014 - January 14, 2015)”, the fifth stage – “Repelling of the second offensive of the Russian occupying troops (January 15 - February 20, 2015)”, the sixth stage – “Strengthening the line of defence in the East of Ukraine (February 21, 2015 - September 20, 2016)”; the seventh stage – “Disengaging forces of belligerent parties. Strengthening the line of defence (September 21, 2016 - November 2017); and the eighth stage – “Completion of ATO (November 2017 - April 30, 2018)”.


The range of main events of the second period of the armed conflict is the subject of a next article.

Annex no. 1




Picture no. 1. Situation in ATO zone on 11-14 July 2018

Annex no. 2



Picture no. 2. Situation in ATO zone on 23-27 July 2018



Picture no. 3. Situation in ATO zone on 18-24 August 2018

**TURKEY'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT:
THE CHALLENGES, ADVANTAGES & DISADVANTAGES
TESTED BY MAVI MARMARA TAKE-OVER RAID**

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Abstract: *Until Israel's foundation Turkey did not pay much attention to Palestine in the same way that its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, had done. Nonetheless within a few decades of Israel's foundation in 1948, the Jewish state became a source of contention for Turkish-Arab relations. Turkey was one of the countries that recognized Israel soon after its proclamation of independence. During UN efforts and reports to find a way out for Arab-Israeli conflict before 1948 Turkey had supported Arab arguments opposing any kind of disintegration in Palestine lands. Turkey's foreign policy towards Israeli-Arab conflict had a neutral-active perspective which could ease the process of confidence building measures and solution of matters. For a long time, Turkey was a peace facilitator having good relations with both sides. The sharp turn came at the beginning of 2000's. Thus arguments on Turkey's intend to be "new leader of Sunni Islam" in the Middle East, particularly since 2008 escalated especially after the Israeli takeover raid. The aim of this study is to unearth and analyse the so-called new foreign policy concept and the role of Israeli takeover raid in 2010 Gaza flotilla. Turkey's shifting foreign policy concept, arguments on its post-Ottoman tendencies, leadership preferences and possible effects on its fluctuating popularity in the Arab communities considering possible challenges, advantages and disadvantages are also analysed.*

Keywords: Turkey, Israel, Palestine, Mavi Marmara, New Foreign Policy, Arab world

Rezumat: *Noul concept al politicii externe a Turciei: provocările, avantajele și dezavantajele testate prin raidul de preluare a Mavi Marmara. Până la întemeierea statului Israel, Turcia nu a acordat prea multă atenție Palestinei, la fel de mult precum o făcuse predecesorul său, Imperiul Otoman. Totuși, după câteva decenii de la înființarea Israelului, în anul 1948, statul evreiesc a devenit o sursă de controverse în cadrul relațiilor turco-arabe. Turcia a fost una dintre țările care au recunoscut Israelul la scurt timp după proclamarea independenței acestuia. Înainte de 1948, în cadrul eforturilor și rapoartelor ONU de a găsi o soluție pentru conflictul arabo-israelian, Turcia a susținut argumentele arabe care se opuneau oricărui fel de dezintegrare a teritoriilor palestinienilor. Politica externă a Turciei față de conflictul arabo-israelian a avut o perspectivă activ-neutră, care ar fi facilitat procesul de construire a măsurilor de încredere și de soluționare a problemelor. Pentru o lungă perioadă de timp, Turcia a fost un facilitator de pace, având relații bune cu*

ambele părți. Schimbarea bruscă s-a produs la începutul anilor 2000. Astfel, intenția Turciei de a ajunge, în special din 2008, „noul lider al islamului sunnit” în Orientul Mijlociu, a devenit tot mai evidentă, mai ales după raidul de preluare israelian. Scopul prezentului studiu este de a explora și analiza așa-numitul noul concept de politică externă și rolul raidului israelian de preluare a flotilei din Gaza în anul 2010. De asemenea, sunt analizate modificarea conceptului de politică externă a Turciei, argumentele privind tendințele post-otomane ale acesteia, preferințele pentru statutul de lider și posibilele efecte asupra popularității sale fluctuante la nivelul lumii arabe, în contextul posibilelor provocări, avantaje și dezavantaje.

Résumé : Le nouveau concept de politique étrangère de la Turquie: les défis, les avantages et les inconvénients testés par le raid de prise du Mavi Marmara. Jusqu'à la fondation de l'Etat d'Israël, la Turquie ne prêtait pas beaucoup d'attention à la Palestine, de la même manière que son prédécesseur, L'Empire Ottoman. Néanmoins, quelques décennies après la fondation d'Israël en 1948, l'Etat juif est devenu une source de discorde pour les relations turco-arabes. La Turquie était un des pays qui a reconnu l'Israël peu après la proclamation de son indépendance. Au cours des efforts et des rapports de l'ONU pour trouver une issue au conflit israélo-arabe avant 1948, la Turquie soutint les arguments arabes opposés à toute forme de désintégration sur les terres de Palestine. La politique étrangère de la Turquie vis-à-vis du conflit israélo-arabe eut une perspective neutre-active qui pourrait faciliter le processus de mesures de renforcement de la confiance et de résolution des problèmes. La Turquie a longtemps été un facilitateur de la paix, entretenant de bonnes relations avec les deux parties. Le tournant est survenu au début des années 2000. Ainsi, l'intention de la Turquie d'être le « nouveau dirigeant de l'islam sunnite » au Moyen-Orient, depuis l'escalade de 2008, en particulier après le raid israélien est devenu plus évidente. Le but de l'étude ci-jointe est de découvrir et d'analyser le soi-disant nouveau concept de politique étrangère et le rôle du raid de prise de contrôle par Israël de la flottille de Gaza de 2010. Le concept changeant de politique étrangère de la Turquie, les arguments sur ses tendances post-ottomanes, ses préférences en matière de leadership et ses effets possibles sur sa popularité fluctuante au niveau du monde arabe, compte tenu des éventuels défis, des avantages et des inconvénients, seront également analysés.

PALESTINE CAUSE IN THE VIEW OF TURKEY'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT

Turkish-Palestinian relations alike to the rest of the Arab countries have a long past. Similarly, Turkish-Jewish relations had been close since after the medieval period. During this time, it was on Ottoman soils that Jews could make their homes and practice their religion freely and were even deemed as equal citizens under Ottoman *millet system*. Turkish Republic was thus the only Muslim-majority country that had good relations with Israel from the very beginning.

Turkish foreign policy until 2003, putting Islamic references aside, mostly was leaded by secular precedencies.¹ So that, five years ago, in 1998 Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) intervened policy making to prevent the rise of Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) that had a strong Islamic discourse. But the intervention caused a kind of butterfly effect and paved the way of reverse course, the generals never planned or foreseen. When another Islamic rooted Justice and Development Party (JDP) (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) won the elections and had a rising impetus, traditional Turkish Foreign Policy towards Muslim Arabs also started to change secular preferences were put aside. Because the JDP voters are mostly so-called "nationalist-conservatives", they were ready to support new pro-active one-sided foreign policy towards "Muslim Arab comrades".

As Social Constructivists put forward, for ideological parties the foreign policy is not only a matter of national interests, but also of acceptable ideological behaviour in foreign relations. The concept of "national interests" is a kind of legitimization applied by politicians to justify their ideological policies, while hiding their actual aim.² In this point leaders play strategic material power games, albeit domestically constrained. Generally, all around the world ideological parties borrow the epistemic, normative and ideological understandings, rules and discourses that enable them to act upon the sphere in which they would like to reshape or have an effect on.³ It is not clear whether that was the case at the very beginning when JDP rise to power at the end of 2002 or not. Nevertheless, when time passed and JDP felt itself strong capable to cope with secular foreign policy understanding, it was high time for a sharp change at the foreign policy making.

Moreover, the grave effect of its background, realistically it was not only the ideological preferences of ruling party JDP's shifting foreign policy. JDP has come to power 11 years after the collapse of Communist Block. Turkey's post-Cold War era pro-active policy initiatives towards Central Asia (historical Turkistan) and Balkans were not as successful as expected because of the unchallengeable existence of Russia in Turkistan and EU in the Balkans, respectively. Thus, when JDP came to power a new foreign policy approach towards Middle Eastern countries as well as ideological preferences was a severe necessity towards multi-

¹ İsmail Köse, *İngiltere'nin Arap İsyanı Tertibi (1914-1918): İsyanın Cumhuriyet Dönemi Hükümet Programlarındaki Dış Politika Yansımaları* [Britain's Plot for Arab Revolt (1914-1918): The Revolt's Reflections on Republic Era Government Programs], in "Elektronik Siyaset Bilimi Araştırmaları Dergisi", VIII, 2017, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 49-58.

² Jill Strans et. al, *An Introduction to International Relations Theory*, 3rd ed., London, Pearson Education Limited, 2010, pp. 186-187, 192.

³ Walter Carlsnaes et al., *Handbook of International Relations*, London, Sage Publications, 2001, pp. 100-101, 110.

alternated foreign policy making process. Despite both were not always advantageous, it expected that historical ties and religious fraternity could ease implementation of new foreign policy approach.

When Turkey decided to relive its historical heritage, Iran by leading the Shia one of the two mainstream Islamic sects, was already in the field. Hence Turkey, historically the last-seat of Caliphate about 407 years (1517-1924) could lead Sunni Islam. But, Turkey since the foundation of Republic in 1923, by its enlightenment, westernization, gender equality, secular state structure, democracy and contemporary targets was mentally far from the Middle East. Re-entry into the political arena in the Middle East where almost all international actors more or less have interest either hegemonic or middle sized was not an easy job.

Turkey firstly should persuade Arab Society that it changed its former distanced secular foreign policy precedencies and should boldly show that it was ready to handle Palestinian cause which almost all hopes was lost for a peaceful solution protecting Muslim Palestinians' rights. Nonetheless, as it was very well argued by N. Greenwood Onuf, to implement their plans international agents face with both material and social limits.⁴ Even agents are societies, when JDP and its new foreign policy approach assumed as an international agent it is easily seen that new foreign policy understanding of JDP did not have a holist freedom. Contrarily to its expectations, there were several complex structural challenges to cope with. If the social groups assumed as agents in the region, in this case the first thing to do was to attract ongoing support of masses and if could be handled possible backing of clerical class were vital in post-feudal Middle Eastern societies.

Therefore, Palestine cause ontologically became an important litmus test for Turkey's so-called new foreign policy approach towards Sunni Arab world. Akin any Muslim country on the earth, if Turkey could preserve and protect Palestinians' rights against Israel and moreover if any country including Turkey could challenge the undefeatable Israel for Arabs either on the battle field or diplomatic table it easily could be the hero of the streets and gain ground to be new leader. Such kind of great success, also definitely contributes rising support of domestic voters. As it is very well remembered, Egyptian leader Gammal Abdel Nasser had lost the battle in the field during 1956 Suez Crisis, but could achieve a diplomatic victory on the table hitherto he was hero of the Arab people until his

⁴ Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, Columbia, University of South Caroline Press, 1989. pp. 59-62; Alexander Wendt, *The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory*, in "International Organization", Vol. 41, 1987, no. 3, pp. 356-358.

death⁵. History had presented a new chance. There was a gap in Arab world for leadership, any candidate who would like to be enthroned as the new leader, it should be flagman of Palestine cause. For Turkey that kind of policy would mean confrontation with Israel. Such development more or less would pave the way of several grave side effects for traditional balanced Turkish foreign policy. Because the lands of Palestine are inalienable both for Jews and Muslims, there was almost no hope that the deadlock could be solved by peaceful means.

Until 1917, the area today called Palestine and the most part of the Arabian Peninsula had been under Ottoman rule for around four hundred years. Palestine did not exist as a unified administrative unit under the Ottoman Turks, rather the territory that later emerged as Palestine was divided among several Ottoman districts. During Ottoman period, the local Arabs were not known as Palestinians either. Today's administrative divisions emerged during the British Mandatory period (1917-1948).⁶

Jewish, Christian and Muslim believers have holy sites in Al-Quds (Jerusalem) and therefore the city has a *sui generis* position in international law bearing the title of "*corpus separatum*". Contrary to its geographically small size, Palestine hosts some of the most important religious shrines of three monotheistic religions. The Israeli rule since 1948 over the Holy Land has had complex implications, particularly for Muslim Palestinians. The blockade over Gaza imposed by Israel is one of the serious problems Muslim Palestinians faced with in the last decades. During that period Turkey regardless ruling political party was a peace facilitator that had good neutral-active relations with both Israel and Palestine.

Political parties are the purposeful actor organizations of democratic societies whose foreign policies help reproduce or transform the desired foreign policy into practice. Hence societies are made up of social relationships which common expectations and desires structure the interactions between groups.⁷ As it is very well argued by Constructivists, identities are effective agents for state behaviours. Similarly, as a political party JDP has been brought together kinfolk identities and tendencies together which its voters ontologically at the very beginning more or less have been asking more active foreign policy towards Middle East countries and especially to Palestine. At this context, a concrete analyses of JDP period new Turkish foreign policy concept and future of Turkish-

⁵ See Adid Davışa, *Arap Milliyetçiliği – Zaferden Umutsuzluğa* [Arab Nationalism – From Victory to Despair], Istanbul, Literatür Publishment, 2004, pp. 150-160.

⁶ *Report of the High Commissioner on the Administration of Palestine, 1920-1925*, London, Printed and Published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1925. pp. 2-6.

⁷ Wendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-338.

Israeli relations the takeover raid could be an excellent case study. The operation was the gravest threat in both countries' 52 years lasting diplomatic relations. Meanwhile the raid was a challenge to Turkey's new pro-active unbalanced foreign policy concept.

The sharp shift had started in 2008, especially after the leading role of Ahmet Davutoglu decided to play a much greater role in the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey's ties with Israel were the first to sacrifice as the "entry ticket" to the region. That was meant to capture hearts and minds of Arab Society in general with a PR stunt. But Turkish foreign policy makers were very well aware of the fact that, when traditional neutral-active and sometime neutral-passive foreign policy approach is considered, unbalanced and one sided foreign policy as Americanism was during the first two decades of the Cold War, would be a kind of reverse course.⁸

Alliances and hostilities are not solid in the Middle East. To cope with new threats or benefit from newly emerged opportunities, use of balanced rhythmic shuttle diplomacy is a *sine qua non* rule. *Mavi Marmara* was the milestone for Turkey to denounce or disown its undeclared leadership aspect. When the challenge came due Israeli take-over operation Turkish policy makers, in convenience with traditional foreign policy approach, decided to confront Israel diplomatically using the soft power as much as possible but nobody in Ankara thought that hard power including use of militaristic force also should be put on the table against Israel. That point also was bearing the risk for the end of hopes for Arabs who expected Turkey to be a new challenging power against Israel.⁹

HOW THE TURKISH FLOTILLA SET OUT TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO GAZA

About 19 years after its foundation, Israel – a new hybrid state type very seldom cares for universally accepted international rules or human rights – began to complete military occupation on the Gaza Strip in June 1967. As part of the peace process that started in May 1994 ("the Oslo Accords") some territories of Gaza were freed from Israeli occupation. Because of rising international pressure Israel reluctantly had promised to disengage from Gaza and the West Bank. In addition, the territorial waters of Gaza would be included in the jurisdiction of the Palestinian

⁸ See *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-2000* [Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-2000], Vol. I-II, ed. Baskın Oran, İstanbul, İletişim Publication, 2013, pp. 615-648; 124-157.

⁹ *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi* [Journal of the Minutes of Turkish Grand National Assembly (here in after JM-TGNA)], Term: 23; Volume: 27; Year 4; Hearing Number: 109; Tuesday, 1 June 2010. pp. 479-492.

Authority.¹⁰ However, the victory of Hamas in 2006 elections and Israeli hostility towards Hamas meant the Oslo agreements were never came in force.

Hamas, following the elections assumed power in 2007 where after Israel began to impose a blockade on the Gaza Strip. Ending the occupation and lifting the siege on Gaza are prerequisites for Palestinian Arabs achieving sustainable economic development. Unsurprisingly GDP growth has been steadily declining since the Gaza blockade; in 2014 the approximate GDP score was -0.5%. The unemployment rate in Palestine has increased steadily and reached 27% at the end of the same year. Meanwhile the unemployment rate in besieged Gaza is approximately 44%, meaning almost half of the population does not have the opportunity to work and feed their families. The agricultural and industrial sectors' contributions to GDP dropped from 12% in 1994 to 4% and 23% to 14% in 2014, respectively.¹¹ Poverty has tripled since the imposition of the blockade.¹²

The blockade is arguably illegal under international law; because article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits collective punishment of civilians under occupation, and the occupying power [Israel] has to protect at least minimum safety rights of civilians.¹³ Israel's excessive treatments and blockade over Gaza, enlargement of unlawful settlements have been attracted widespread attention all around the world. Several initiatives, protests and activities were done to stop Israel and help besieged Palestinians especially people of Gaza living under a strict siege.¹⁴ The idea of sending a humanitarian assistance flotilla to Gaza born in mind due above mentioned facts. The attempt which later will be named as *Mavi Marmara* was organized under Turkish civil assistance agencies by support and participation of different international organizations.¹⁵

¹⁰ Article 5, paragraph 1 (a, b) and paragraph 3 of *Gaza-Jericho Agreement*, <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/ISR%2019940504.pdf> (Accessed on 25 September 2018).

¹¹ Mohammad Mustafa, *The Palestinian Economy: Towards a New Approach*, in "Middle East Business Magazine & News", October 26, 2015, in <http://middleeast-business.com/towards-a-new-approach/>; see Ayça Eminoğlu, *Tarihsel Süreçte Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinin Değişen Yapısı* [The Changing Structure of Turkish-Israeli Relations in Historical Process], in "Gümüşhane University Electronic Journal of the Institute of Social Sciences", Volume 7, No. 15 (2016), pp. 88-106.

¹² *UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council Report* (hereinafter **UNHRCR**), A/HRC/15/21 September 27, 2010. p. 10.

¹³ *Fourth Geneva Convention*, Individual responsibility, collective penalties, pillage, reprisals, Article 33.

¹⁴ See *Türk Dış Politikası* [Turkish Foreign Policy] 2001-2012, ed. Baskın Oran, Vol. III, İstanbul, İletişim Publication, 2013, pp. 401-421.

¹⁵ *Mavi Marmara* [Blue Marmara], in <https://www.ihh.org.tr/mavi-marmara> (Accessed on 14 December 2018).

Assistance unions were thinking that, there was enough strong legitimate ground to enter into Gaza's territorial waters and unload their humanitarian aid cargo in the city's port. Because although Israel's blockade and denial of any kind of sea usage on the Gaza Strip's territorial waters, international law states that the sea off the coast of a state is subject to that state's sovereignty. Thus, coastal states should enjoy certain rights to the seas adjoining their coasts.¹⁶ A distinction has long been made between the freedom of the high seas - over which no claims to sovereignty can be made- and territorial waters, over which coastal states enjoy particular rights and duties. After decades of discussions the United Nations Law of Sea Convention (UNLoSC) was created in 1982 and established the limit for a coastal state's territorial waters to 12 miles from the baseline.¹⁷

The attack on the *Mavi Marmara* should be analysed under this context. Flagship *Mavi Marmara* and the flotilla, when attacked were 72 nautical miles far from the nearest state and thus was in neither Israel nor Gaza's jurisdiction.¹⁸ If the flotilla could load its cargo in Gaza ports that would mean Turkey's challenge to Israel, such development would contribute Turkey's prestige in the Arab circles fostering its new leading role. Israel was very well aware of the coming fact and decided not to allow such breakthrough at any expense including breach to international law and long-lasting relations with Turkey.

According to their declaration the flotilla was carrying medical supplies, cement, iron, prefabricated houses, toys and food stuffs. The total weight of the cargo was almost 10.000 tons. The slogan of the Flotilla was: "*We are heading to Palestine; our cargo is humanitarian assistance*". The flotilla organizing committee consisted of different organizations from all around the world. They were the International Humanitarian Help (IHH) fund from Turkey, The Greek Ship to Gaza Campaign, The Swedish Ship to Gaza, The Free Gaza Movement, The International Committee to End the Siege on Gaza, and The European Campaign to End the Siege on Gaza (ECESG). The Turkish organization IHH has been attributed to the Turkish pro-Islamist movement, namely the Welfare Party, which was headed by late Necmettin Erbakan who displayed anti-Israeli sentiment during his chairmanship. The IHH was the pioneer of the organization (three ships in the flotilla out of eight belonged to the IHH), and although it was a civil initiative, Turkish-Israeli

¹⁶ Turkish National Commission of Inquiry, *Report on The Israeli Attack on the Humanitarian Aid Convoy to Gaza on 31 May 2010*, Ankara, 2011, pp. 50-52.

¹⁷ Tim Hiller, *Source Book on Public International Law*, London: Gavendish Publishing Limited, 1998, pp. 380-381.

¹⁸ The Turkel Commission, *The Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010*, pp. 219-220.

relations were on edge because of that leading role.¹⁹ Meanwhile Turkey's new role in the Arab world was also on the edge of to be successful or not.

The flag states were, Turkey (1), Comoros (1), Kiribati (1), Greece (1) Togo (1) USA (2) and Cambodia (1). The number of activists on-board the *Mavi Marmara* were 546, 353 of which were Turkish nationals. The total number of activists on-board the other ships were about 120 (separation of crew and activists number is not clear) from 18 nationalities. The total number of activists was approximately 666. The number of crew members of Turkish nationality was 47. Eighty (80) Turkish and foreign journalists and fifteen (15) parliamentarians from the EU were on board. The total number of people who participated in the flotilla was 742.²⁰

The flagship *Mavi Marmara* set out on May 30 from Antalya seaport at 00:30. The flotilla as a whole departed Cyprus on May 30, at 23.00 local time. The chosen course navigated international waters where any kind of Israeli action would be unlawful.²¹ The first intervention by Israel was offshore Haifa. The warning transmitted by Israeli radio was that "*any attempt to break the blockade would not be allowed*".²² The flotilla refused to return and went ahead on its pre-determined route. While the vessels were warned to change course no request was made for the cargo to be inspected.²³ The Israeli raid came 5.5 hours after the verbal warning at 04:26 am. local time on May 31. When attacked, the flotilla was 72 nautical miles from the coast and thus far from Israeli territorial waters.²⁴ The use of force was so excessive that nine Turkish citizens were killed and 50 people from various nationalities were seriously injured.²⁵

The operation was given the code name "*Operation Sea Breeze*" or "*Operation Sky Winds*". Corvettes, missile boats, helicopters, surveillance aircraft and possibly even possibly two submarines were deployed for the raid.²⁶ The exaggerated amount of deployed weaponry was so sophisticated that, as Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) had been prepared for a general warfare.

There were two choices for Turkey. (1) To retaliate Israeli unlawful act and send warships to hot waters to protect its flotilla and citizens. Such act easily could fuel a kind of limited or unlimited clash. (2) To protest Israeli movement and force

¹⁹ *Report of the Secretary-General's Panel on Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident* (hereinafter UNPoI), UN, September 2011, p. 4.

²⁰ UNHRCR, p. 66.

²¹ *Ibid*, pp. 35-36.

²² *Ibid*, pp. 22-23.

²³ *Ibid*, pp. 35-36.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 9.

²⁵ See UNHRCR, *passim*.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 22.

it to bend diplomatically. Most probably Ankara considering and avoiding any unwanted hot conflict, preferred to use diplomatic instruments. The side effect of the last choice of course would undermine prestige in the Arab Society. Use of diplomacy as a soft power instrument instead of hard power would mean that, during the last decade Turkish Foreign Policy has a strong discourse against Israel but akin the rest of the Arab countries Turkey also was not ready or volunteer to confront Israel militarily.

TURKEY'S USE OF SOFT POWER: RUPTURE IN TURKISH-ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Traditionally states are actors of hard power. Post-Cold War period brought changing actors and changing goals in international relations. Contrarily to militaristic strength and use of force, soft power seeks to enlarge a state's effect peacefully. Economic aids, environmental policies, human rights, democratic culture, technological superiority are the main tools of soft power.²⁷ Because unchallengeable hard power struggle in the Middle East, despite its high toned sharp discourse, realistically Turkey could only use soft-power in Palestine cause. It was possible to deploy coercive power against Israel but in that case, there would be a high risk for an uncalculated armed conflict.

Before studying the regional evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy during the period up to 2018, it is important to examine the rhythmic diplomacy mostly based on westernization in a defensive approach after the proclamation of Republic and relations towards Arab countries also should be considered after WWI.²⁸ Since the JDP's rise to power, Turkish foreign policy had shifted towards the Cold War focus on the geostrategic importance of being an economic and militaristic power in order to establish itself as a regional role model. The new unbalanced concept was backed by economic strength and increased activity on the world stage.²⁹

Sustainability of unbalanced foreign policy approach was a matter of discussion. Three important questions had arisen; (1) as a secular nation state was it possible for Turkey to track a one-sided biased foreign policy? (2) could

²⁷ See Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power*, in "Foreign Policy", No. 80, Autumn 1990, pp. 161-163. According to Nye, soft power is the attractive use of politics, cultural superiority, democratic traditions so on; hard power simply is the use of force and smart power is the balanced use of both. See also Joseph Nye, *Soft Power*, USA, Public Affairs, 2009.

²⁸ *C.H.P. Programı* [Republican Party's Program], Mayıs 1935, Ulus Basımevi: Ankara, 1935; "TC. Resmi Gazete" [Republic of Turkey Official Gazette], 10 March 1935, no. 2950, pp. 4915-4916; "TC. Resmi Gazete", 18 March 1943, no. 5358, pp. 4693-4696.

²⁹ *Türk Dış Politikası* [Turkish Foreign Policy] 2001-2012, pp. 429-434.

basic secular nation state rooted historic motives of the republic propel the country into its former neutral path, and (3) when good relations have been established with Israel, would Turkey stop supporting Palestinian cause, what the leading role would be and would Turkey practice a balanced active policy again? Answers of those questions were important but not easy, neither Turkey nor Israel could ignore each other in their turbulent geography. Admittedly, the strong anti-Israeli discourse and intended leading role was a grave problem for Turkey.

When faced with the Mavi Marmara crisis, Turkish diplomacy had started to reflect a renewed confidence with the formerly Ottoman geography. Continuing insecurity however, alongside renewed threats in the periphery, brought about considerable weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Actions always led counteractions in this new foreign policy concept. Turkey had represented itself as a legitimate democratic role model; one that must become attractive in every sense in the region as it was arguably the only country that could export a model of democracy to Muslim countries. However, Turkey's economic and militaristic capabilities still remained vulnerable and inefficient to undertake such work. The new foreign policy was formulated by Davutoglu, but his formulation was ultimately a failure as it resulted in isolationism of the state.

At the time of the *Mavi Marmara* setting out to Gaza, Turkey had since 1945 paid 12 million dollars towards assisting Palestine, with a further payment of 20 million dollars for the reconstruction of bombed and demolished infrastructure underway. In addition the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) had invested 50 million dollars in Palestine.³⁰

In order to understand this new Turkish foreign policy concept, one needs to carefully analyse stereotypes. Until the JDP Turkish foreign policy had been shaped by diplomats reluctant to intervene in neighbouring regions. Traditional foreign policy was not to take part in any conflict among Arab countries. After his handling of almost whole stating power denouncing traditional secular formed foreign policy, Davutoglu reformulated a new approach called "*pro-active foreign policy*". He had achieved political fame through his controversial book, "*Strategic Depth*", which repeated the old realist rhetoric and sought unreasonable ground for the improbable likelihood of unity in the Middle East.³¹ This meant that new foreign policy would aspire to intervene in any development in the periphery and close leading relations would be sought with the Arab dictatorships. Another approach of Davutoglu's was paradoxically the

³⁰ Özgen Acar, *Doğu Akdeniz'de Saldırıları* [Raids in Eastern Mediterranean], "Cumhuriyet", June 4, 2010, p. 10.

³¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu* [Strategical Depth Turkey's International Position], İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2014.

"zero problem with neighbours", which was almost impossible to implement together with so-called "proactive foreign policy". Even in the occurrence of rising favour amongst Arab populations, Arab elites and leaders were not happy with this new foreign policy concept. The new proactive foreign policy approach was a grave change and could even be described as an axial dislocation, since the foundation of the Turkish Republic was based on Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's phrase "*peace in the world; peace at home*".³²

Despite Davutoglu's sharp shift from traditional track, the decision makers of foreign policy were aware of the fact that the survival of nation state in the Middle East was not easy. This is because states in the Middle Eastern countries, somewhat anachronically, had duplicated the politics of the Medieval Europe, being fragmented by sectarian disagreements, tribal racism and endless political quarrels.³³ During this period, Turkish foreign policy makers hardly criticised Israeli illegal actions and excessiveness meanwhile a balanced policy both towards Israel and Arabs were implemented.

Considering the unlawful Israeli takeover raid, it is possible to say that despite long-lasting experiments on such disturbances Israel could not manage the crisis in its full capability. To avoid the kind of situation that resulted the operation should have been reassessed in the face of the resistance to the initial boarding attempt by the activists on the flotilla.³⁴ The operation created a localized humanitarian crisis because activists were treated brutally and faced wilful killing, inhuman or degrading physical or mental treatment, mutilation, misuse of handcuffs, kicking, hitting with the butts of rifles, beatings, derogatory sexual abuse, denial of access to toilets, dog biting, some were forced to kneel for hours, shooting live fire at blank range and drenching water from helicopters were just some of the ill-treatment carried out by IDF commandos.³⁵

The government led Arab media mostly preferred not to support Turkey, because Turkey's response to Israeli challenge and attack was also a matter of concern for ordinary Middle Easterners. Decades of conflict and fighting had proven that there was no escaping the fact that backed by US, Israel was an unchallengeable regional player. For the last decade Turkish Foreign Policy thinking had become increasingly prominent, particularly in the Middle East. More significantly as it was mentioned above the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) had begun to inspire hopes for a future for Palestine State.

³² See Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk* [Discourse], İstanbul, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1970.

³³ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-israil-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa> (accessed on 19 November, 2016).

³⁴ UNPoI, pp. 3-4.

³⁵ UNHRCR, pp. 29-31, 53.

Because Turkey decided to confront Israel diplomatically, on the first day of the raid PM Erdogan underlined Turkey's foreign policy, stating boldly that "*after now nothing would be the same as before [with Israel]*", describing the raid as "*state terrorism*".³⁶ Despite some domestic critics on the ruling JDP's firm support and favour towards Hamas, there was a wide-spread general anger across the country towards Israel's takeover operation. On the 3rd June the official response was so hard that Turkey was almost at the edge of declaring war with Israel. Most probably that was the expectation of Arab Society. But, Ankara reasonably had decided to avoid any kind of militaristic adventure at any expense. The battle would be deployed diplomatically. The Turkish parliament passed a cross-party joint resolution condemning Israeli operation. The resolution asked for an urgent apology from Israeli officials; trial and punishment of those responsible for the raid and payment of indemnity for damages and loss of life.³⁷ These demands would soon form the ground for the future normalization negotiations. It is a well-known fact that strong historical ties acted as peace facilitators during the re-establishment of relations. The first diplomatic response of Turkey was to bring the case to the UN and publicly condemn Israeli excessiveness. The second act was to recall the Turkish Ambassador Oğuz Çelikkol.

Due to public pressure neither part backed down on their stances; as a result, no progress could be achieved during the first two months of crisis. In the last week of July, the Gaza blockade and the demand for an apology became the deadlock preventing the normalization of relations. The Turkish side declared that if an official apology was not expressed by July 27; (1) Action would be taken to prosecute IDF commandos under international law; (2) Turkish diplomatic relations to Israel would be downgraded to chargé d'affaires or to the second secretary level and (3) Turkey would become initiate an active policy against Israel on the international stage. One year earlier on 8 June 2009, the UNSC had requested the urgent withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and the unimpeded provision and distribution of humanitarian assistance, having determined that the blockade was unlawful.³⁸ But Israel never committed to full withdrawal from occupied territories. Nevertheless, UNSC resolutions concerning Israel had in the past held little weight on the world stage. Thus the Israeli government was confident that it would not be on the end of an international backlash. Due to the structure of the international justice system, it was unlikely to be possible to prosecute IDF soldiers in the same

³⁶ *Meclis İsrail'i Kınadı* [The Parliament Condemned Israel], in "Cumhuriyet", June 3, 2010, p. 8.

³⁷ *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* [Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) Minutes], 110th Session, June 2, 2010.

³⁸ UN Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1860 (2009), pp. 1-2.

way that the Slobodan Milosevic and Ratko Mladic had been.

In light of this Israel rejected any international inquiry into the raid. To placate rising international pressure, an Israeli commission was established to investigate the raid. The commission was presided by the retired Justice Jacob Türkel. Also known as the 'Türkel Report', it was published at the beginning of 2011 and justifying all actions committed by IDF soldiers.³⁹ The report was criticised even in Israel that it was not a neutral and judicial document; rather that it was the report of a political commission.⁴⁰

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, sixty-two days after the raid, established a UN Panel of Inquiry (UNPoI) on 2nd August 2010. The Inquiry panel was headed by Geoffrey Palmer, former PM of New Zealand and Alvaro Uribe, former President of Colombia. Both Israel and Turkey had one representative in the UNPoI. Turkey was represented by S. Özdem Sanberk and Israel by J. Yosef Ciechanover.⁴¹ Participation was a difficult decision, Turkey unwittingly would contributed to the further legitimization of the blockade by agreeing to the creation of the Palmer Commission. In addition to the Palmer Commission an independent international fact-finding mission was established under the auspices of the UN. The mission commenced its work one week after the UNPoI.⁴² Neither Turkey nor Israel had any representative in latter mission.

Two diplomats - Samberk and Ciechanover - began to organise a series of meetings in an attempt to begin normalization. Meanwhile US Foreign Secretary Hillary Clinton and President Barack Obama began to engage in shuttle diplomacy. At the beginning of September the UN Report was not made public but was leaked to the world press.⁴³ The report legalized the Israeli blockade and takeover operation. As was foreseen by the Israeli government in the first days of the crisis, there was little criticism on the excessive use of force and unreasonable takeover process. The report also represented the possible results in the international court judgments regarding the IDF soldiers. As a result, the report was a failure both for universal humanitarian law and even customary international law. It was also a disappointment for Turkey since because it weakened almost all the legal bases of the government's arguments. After the failure of resolving this issue on the international arena, the only way out for

³⁹ The Turkel Commission, *The Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010*, in https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/alternatefiles/he/turkel_eng_a_0.pdf (accessed on 14 December 2018).

⁴⁰ *Who needs the Turkel Committee*, in "Haaretz", January 24, 2011.

⁴¹ UNPoI, p. 1, 4.

⁴² See UNHRCR, *passim*.

⁴³ UNHRCR, *passim*.

Turkey was to downgrade diplomatic relations.

Whilst rising Turkish-Israeli tension in the region was an issue, 2011 also became the start of a turbulent era for several Middle Eastern countries. In Egypt the long-lasting dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak was overthrown through mass demonstrations. The same outcome had occurred to the Tunisian Ruler Bin Ali. However, both countries' political cultures were not advanced enough to allow the formation of democratic governance. Notwithstanding, the riots continued to spread to other Arab dictatorships, shaking the already fragile stability in the region. Syria was soon at the edge of a civil war, while Libyan Dictator Gaddafi was overthrown. The movement, called "Arab Spring" had a wide spread effect at the beginning. This period was soon remembered as a time of change and, in some instances, a time of unsuccessful public movements. In any case, the region had become turbulent and more vulnerable than before. Iranian escalation of the sectarian Shia conflict worsened the situation. It was one of the historical moments in which Middle Eastern countries were soon in grave need to cooperate for sustainable peace and stability in the region.

Takeover operation against Turkish Flotilla which flagship was *Mavi Marmara* in 2010 was the most serious crises both countries faced with since 1949. So that, about 10 years ago, both countries' air forces arranging joint exercises in the Turkish airspace, yet in 2010 both were at the edge of an armed conflict. From the first day of the *Mavi Marmara* crisis, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu and his Cabinet declared on numerous occasions that, "*Israel would never apologize to Turkey*". Even Foreign Minister Lieberman said that "*it was Turkey who should apologize*".⁴⁴ Palestine cause was the vital point for Turkey because abandonment or any act leaving the cause down would eliminate Turkey's shaken popularity in Arab Society. In that case the new foreign policy towards Arabs and leadership concept to Sunni Islam would come to a dramatic end. Thus, normalization one way or another connected with at least minimum betterment of Israel's Palestine policy. Apologize and that pre-condition as one easily could expect became deadlock.

THE NORMALIZATION NEGOTIATIONS: SIGNING OF THE RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT

In the beginning of 2011, about one year after the crisis, if Israel had agreed to apologize and lift the Gaza blockade, the normalization and restoration of

⁴⁴ *İsrail: Siz özür dileyin* [Israel: You {Turkey} should apologize], in "Cumhuriyet", July 6, 2010, pp. 1, 11.

diplomatic relations could have been underway. But before apologize Israel would like to receive positive signal from Ankara that the apology would be accepted. This is because reconciliation, monetary contribution for the victims and an expression of regret for the nine killings would have been accepted by Turkey. The main point of contention that could not be resolved however was the insistence on lifting of the blockade on Gaza and an official Israeli apology.⁴⁵ The last two items were *sine qua non* conditions for both parties and, despite meetings between senior officials, any positive result was not borne. The disagreement in the Israeli cabinet was another problem that blocked the route for a resolution.⁴⁶

By the first anniversary of crisis Israeli politicians were still stating that Israel would not apologize. In May an Israeli based TV channel claimed that a senior Turkish envoy was sent to Israel by PM Erdoğan to negotiate with high-ranking officials including PM Netanyahu and find a common ground for normalization.⁴⁷ The US as peace facilitator had been hitherto trying to assist in the agreement of a solution. Unexpectedly on the first anniversary of the *Mavi Marmara* incident, a new flotilla was organised to head to Gaza. At the last minute however the IHH declared that the *Mavi Marmara* would not be participating.⁴⁸ Of course, its participation would have been very symbolic and inflammatory. The decision of the Turkish government not to involve was perhaps an early step towards the normalization of relations.

Neither Turkey nor Israel rejected claims of negotiations, though likewise such meetings were not made known to the public. In the Knesset a few deputies had begun to favour issuing an apology, with Ombudsman Micha Lindenstrauss having prepared a report that directed hard criticism at Netanyahu, Minister of Defence Ehud Barak and Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, reasonably claiming they had been unable to manage the crisis during takeover operation. About two years after the raid the Israeli public, the Knesset and politicians had begun to change their stance and began to negotiate Turkey's three basic conditions for normalization. Lieberman became one of the staunch supporters of the rejection of Turkey's demands. But later he changed his mind and in mid-2012 at a press conference with Turkish media he said that "normalization needs a packet of negotiations and an apology can be one of the items".⁴⁹

⁴⁵ TBMM [TGNA], August 17, 2016, p. 37.

⁴⁶ UNPoI, *passim*.

⁴⁷ <http://www.timesofisrael.com/channel-10-senior-erdogan-envoy-visits-israel/> (accessed on 17 September, 2016).

⁴⁸ *Mavi Marmara Gazze'ye Gitmiyor* [Blue Marmara will not go to Gaza], in <https://www.dunya.com/gundem/mavi-marmara-gazze039ye-gitmiyor-haberi-147594> (accessed on 14 December 2018).

⁴⁹ Lieberman: Özür paketin parçası olur [Lieberman: apologize may be a part of package],

Lieberman's statement was a sharp shift that encouraged normalization talks. During the conference it became evident that secret negotiations had taken place. Israel agreed to pay indemnity and to issue a diplomatic apology. Because its new foreign policy concept and so-called leading role, the real point of contention however were Turkey's insistence on lifting the Gaza blockade. It was in fact now impossible for Turkey to drop its unyielding stance on the blockade. If Turkey did so it would be blamed for betraying the cause and possibly lose its influence among Arabs. It would also mean hard criticism domestically for the JDP. It was not easy for the JDP to accept dropping the Gaza condition because its voters are mostly conservative, right-wing voters. Even from a humanitarian view the blockade on civilians was not justifiable. Thus any progress on normalization without making reasonable ground on the Gaza blockade was unacceptable to Turkey.

But Turkey trying to re-balance its Middle East policy started to implement a kind of track-two diplomacy. Last developments both in the Middle East and at foreign policy challenges had shown that the new leadership concept was not as easy to implement as it is seen on the paper. Even Arab rulers were not happy with new foreign policy. Because Turkish pro-active movements and escalation of oppressed societies started to shake Arab leaders to take some initiatives not to endanger their dictatorships they never intended. Thus there was an undeclared resistance towards Turkey. In 2012 diplomats from both countries met secretly four times. Two meetings were in Geneva, at least one in Rome and another in Brussels.⁵⁰ The Turkish delegation was headed by Feridun Sinirlioğlu Under Secretary of the MFA, and even the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu participated in one of the meetings. The Head of the Israeli delegation was J. Ciechanover. At the beginning of 2013 normalization had begun to progress, albeit slowly. The time for inflammatory statements had ended and confidence-building measures were underway. By the end of 2012 the *de jure* diplomatic relations were at the lowest level but in practice there was an accelerated rhythmic shuttle diplomacy between both countries.

Since the beginning of the crisis the US as peace facilitator had employed shuttle diplomacy to find a common ground. By 2013 however no progress had been made. Since the raid Turkey and Israel had witnessed several developments in the periphery and both noticed the value of mutual understanding and cooperation. On March 22, 2013 President Obama paid a visit to Israel. Following his visit, he called President Erdoğan and gave the phone to PM Netanyahu. It was

in "Cumhuriyet", July 24, 2012, pp. 1, 8.

⁵⁰ *İsrail ile Türkiye Anlaşma Arayışında* [Israel and Turkey Seeking a Way for Reconciliation], in <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/israil-ile-turkiye-anlasma-arayisinda-16457499> (accessed on 14 December 2018).

the first phone call between both leaders since the raid 34 months ago. The Israeli PM officially apologised for the raid and for the fatalities caused during the operation. President Erdogan accepted this apology on Turkey's behalf.⁵¹ This was an important step forward and normalization negotiations started soon after that call. The role of the US was therefore crucial.

After this apology there were three basic problems that still needed solving; namely, the amount of indemnity that would be paid out, the Gaza blockade and judgment of the IDF commandos. The raid had been brought before the Turkish courts. Dropping all of these cases was pre-condition for Israel, while the Gaza blockade was similarly one for Turkey. Nevertheless, a few months after the beginning of normalization the *Mavi Marmara* victims went to the International Criminal Court (ICC) on this matter. By the end of the year it appeared very likely that the ICC would reject hearing the case. The year 2013 was soon filled with talks on indemnity payments and the blockade. By mid-2014 Foreign Minister Davutoglu declared considerable progress had been achieved on existing disagreements and deadlocks.⁵² Meanwhile, one of the seriously wounded activists who had been hospitalised in for four years passed away. This brought the number of Turkish citizens killed due to the raid to ten.⁵³

Following secret meetings in Switzerland, both sides had reached an "understanding" aimed at the full normalization of diplomatic relations by the end of 2015. Talks were slow and sometimes small crises hindered progress. There was also the issue that even if a restoration of diplomatic relations was successful, rebuilding the pre-crisis cooperation was impossible in a short span of time. The confidence building process for such joint ventures would need more time for recovery. There was however a new factor that contributed to normalization negotiations and that was energy politics. Natural gas reserves were discovered in Leviathan and Tamar gas fields and Turkey's unchallengeable geographic location for the transmission of Israeli gas to European markets presented a new area of cooperation that would benefit both sides.⁵⁴

The first output of normalization talks came through in May 2016. Turkey lifted its long-lasting veto on Israel's demand to open a permanent office in NATO headquarters in Brussels and appoint a representative. The blockade continued to pose, at all the talks continued. On 28 June 2016, now six years after the raid

⁵¹ *Mavi Marmara: İsrail Türkiye'den Özür Diledi* [Blue Marmara: Israel Apologised from Turkey], in https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2013/03/130322_israil_turkiye_ozur (accessed on 14 December 2018).

⁵² *Abluka Manevrası* [Blockade Manoeuvre], in "Cumhuriyet", May 9, 2014, p. 18.

⁵³ *TBMM* [TGNA], August 17, 2016, p. 34.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

and almost five after the most serious crisis of diplomatic relations, a deal was signed between Israel and Turkey. Significantly, a few days before this deal was announced, the leader of Hamas, Halit Meşal, paid a visit to Turkey. He was likely to have been assured by Ankara that the deal with Israel did not mean Turkey had abandoned the Palestinian cause.⁵⁵

However, the deal was met by criticism and resistance from political parties in both states. There was still strong resistance in Israeli political circles, while Turkey was accused of abandoning the Palestinian cause. Sometime assertive diplomatic rhetoric has been directed more towards the domestic audience rather than towards the realities of the world politics. In this case awareness of the limits of the current/traditional foreign policy stance may be ignored. Both countries had in recent years become in grave need to cooperate due to the radical changes occurring in the Middle East, this time it was domestic audience of both sides would be ignored. Turkish-Egyptian relations after the coup had worsened, while the Syrian crisis had fuelled the fire around Turkey and Israel. The new foreign policy concept reformulated by Davutoglu at the beginning of 2010 made no achievements in the way of the “zero problem” rhetoric, and after five years it was in reality zero good relations with neighbours. Despite hard criticism and opposition in both sides, normalization was arguably inevitable because as always, national interests were of paramount importance.

The deal specified that Israel pay \$20 million towards an indemnity fund for the families of those killed in the *Mavi Marmara* takeover raid. It also allowed Turkey to provide humanitarian assistance to Gaza via Ashdod port. In exchange, Turkish legislation would end any outstanding legal claims against IDF commandos, and Turkey would be obligated to prevent Hamas from preparing attacks against Israel - including fundraising - on Turkish soil. In return Israel would prevent the PKK and Feto (Fetullah Gülen movement, which is considered a terrorist structure in Turkey) terrorist organisations to use its soil.⁵⁶ Turkey agreed to build a new power station, a water desalination plant and hospital in Gaza. Five days after the deal on 4 July Turkey sent 11.000 tons in humanitarian aid to Gaza.⁵⁷

While lifting the blockade had been a pre-condition for Turkey, the deal only

⁵⁵ Halid Meşal'den Türkiye'ye Teşekkür [Thanks from Halid Mesal to Turkey], in <https://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/2016/06/24/halid-mesalden-turkiyeye-tesekkür> (accessed on 14 December 2018).

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-20.

⁵⁷ Türkiye'nin Gazze'ye Yardımları [Turkey's Aids to Gazza], in <https://www.timeturk.com/turkiye-nin-gazze-ye-yardimlari/haber-5436> (accessed on 23 December 2018).

eased Israeli restrictions on the movement of goods and persons to Gaza via Ashdod port, which remained under Israel's strict control. This achievement was poor considering Israel had been allowing the entry of civilian goods into Gaza since June 2010, as a result of international pressure. Though the deal was reached after many hard talks and negotiations, Israel continued to hold its stance against lifting the blockade. The restoration of Turkish-Israeli relations without achieving this key point of contention could be seen as Turkey's abandonment of the Palestine cause. Such a comment has some reasonable grounds; nevertheless, diplomacy is an art of negotiation and the worsening security problems in the periphery combined with national interests forced Turkey to agree to maintain some influence on Israel, which also allowed more humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Another pre-condition for normalization put forward by Turkey was indemnity payments to the families of victims.

The wording of this deal was important because the judicial word "indemnity" should have been used. Instead, the Latin word "*ex gratia*", meaning "favour", was used. Thus the criticism on deal was that, "in recognition of loss" words are inconvenient *ex gratia* is not indemnity; rather, it is a kind of payment made freely.⁵⁸ Other critics focused on the fourth and fifth articles guarding IDF commandos from any kind of lawsuit. Detailed examination of the deal was important because when it was endorsed by the TGNA it would become an act of parliament under Article 90 of Turkish constitutional law. This would make it binding for all official institutions. There were thirty-two lawsuits in Turkey against Israel's raid, two of which (in the Kayseri and Nevsehir courts) found commandos guilty. After the reconciliation agreement was announced in June, Turkey sought to reassure the Palestinians on a number of occasions that the normalization of ties with Israel would not come at their expense, and that it would in fact benefit Gaza. About two weeks after the signing of the reconciliation agreement Turkey faced an unexpected disaster. On 15 July a US-based Feto fraction of the military commandeered tanks, helicopters and fighter jets in an attempt to topple the government. About 257 people were killed during the failed coup attempt.⁵⁹ This unfortunate event delayed the full normalization of diplomatic relations.

New ambassadors were also expected to be announced as soon as parliaments ratified the deal. Though the ratification process was complete by the

⁵⁸ Halid Meşal'den Türkiye'ye Teşekkür, p. 29.

⁵⁹ 15 Temmuz'da Türkiye'de Yaşanan Darbe Girişimi Hakkında Basın Açıklaması [Press Statement on Failed Coup Attempt in Turkey in July 15, 2016], in <https://www.ytb.gov.tr/haberler/15-temmuzda-turkiyede-yasanan-darbe-girisimi-hakkinda-basin-aciklamasi> (accessed on 14 December 2018).

end of the August, an agreement on appointing the new ambassadors had not been reached even by November 2016.⁶⁰ Both sides had been expected to name their ambassadors on the same day and that should have been in July. Another reason for this delay was the three day visit of Mahmut Abbas' to Turkey.⁶¹ The exchange of ambassadors had not been arranged yet the plan had been to extend an invitation from the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires Utkan to Israeli ministers. The invitations to the event were sent out by the Turkish Embassy, rather than by Utkan. This choice froze the diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey that had only just begun to thaw.⁶²

Finally, on 15 November both sides named their ambassadors. The Israeli Ambassador to Turkey, Eitan Na'eh, had served in Israel's embassy in Ankara for a number of years in 1993 after he had served Chicago in 1997 as deputy consul-general. Na'eh was ambassador to Azerbaijan from 2001-2005 and was therefore familiar with Turkish relations. The Turkish ambassador to Israel, Kemal Okem, was a foreign policy adviser to the Turkish Cabinet.⁶³ Thus diplomatic relations were restored and the future and speed of the rebuilding process had begun to be shaped by ordinary people and the success of the confidence-building process between both nations, particularly in relation to trade and touristic activities.

CONCLUSIONS

Challenges, advantages and disadvantages examined on the selected case study as Israeli take-over raid towards *Mavi Marmara* flotilla. Turkish-Israeli relations, the neutral-active role of Turkey as a peace facilitator, new positioning and re-positioning process of Turkish foreign policy also tackled with. Considering the international and regional dynamics the rupture and rebuilding process of diplomatic relations after the takeover operation, the difficulties and side effects Turkey faced with while maintaining its new foreign policy concept also was analysed.

Turkey, as a middle-sized actor in its region, started to pursue a well-balanced foreign policy to defend its interests in a non-confrontational way to ensure and foster its position in the Middle East. Fragile/failed states in the region collapsed and this instability in the periphery had knock-on effects on Turkey, including trans-border terrorism; immigration concerns; decreased economic

⁶⁰ "TC Resmi Gazete" [Republic of Turkey Official Gazette], no. 29818, September 1, 2016, p. 2.

⁶¹ Herb Keinon, *Naming or Envoy to Turkey Postponed Again*, in "Jerusalem Post", October 26, 2016, p. 2.

⁶² Greer Fay Cashman, *En Route to Normalization*, in "Jerusalem Post", November 2, 2016, p. 16.

⁶³ Herb Keinon, *Israel names new ambassador to Turkey*, in "Jerusalem Post", November 16, 2016, p. 1.

activity in crisis areas. Similar problems were faced by Israel. The result of the turbulence in the region was to aid the restoration and normalization of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel.

Peace facilitator role could be played without infringing Turkish neutrality. In that case peace facilitation role would ease conflict resolution process in the Middle East. It is possible to say that after 2010 Turkey's partiality in Middle East worsened the case both for Israel and Palestine. A few months later, for reasons which are not entirely reasonable, Israel bombed Gaza and employed the blockade, leaving many Palestinians with no way out and little means for survival. Neutrality became a difficult issue after this event. Contrarily, unbalanced foreign policy approach bears numerous vulnerabilities. Turkey, only secular country in the region could play a vital role for peace building. Neutrality and balanced rhythmic diplomacy were preconditions for such policy. Including Palestinians almost all sides could benefit such policy because the region in grave need for peace-building talks and confidence building measures. Turkey alone, could not solve that decades lasting problem but could ease peace making and at least could persuade parties not to escalate armed conflicts.

The question here that should be answered is whether Turkey's abandonment of Palestine caused a new axial dislocation; or is it only a return to 2007 when Turkey acted as a peace facilitator working to encourage the peaceful coexistence of Israel and Palestinians? A negative answer to this question presents a narrowly focused view of events, because it lacks of focus on historical background. National interests and security risks are always primary factors that help dictate foreign policy, and sometimes due external or internal developments priorities may be changed. Turkey did not abandon the Palestine/Gaza cause but has experienced that it could not solve the problem alone. The development after 2011, eventually forced both Turkish and Israeli decision-makers to ignore their differences and come to an agreement, is to a large extent glossed over after the emergence and failed Arab Spring and finding of gas reserves in the Mediterranean. The experiments proved that as long as challenges are stronger than the capabilities, the newly framed leading foreign policy concept needs major revision to be implemented. The case *Mavi Marmara* and rebuilding process of Turkish-Israeli relations contain clear signs of this argument.

**“ORPHANS WITH LIVING PARENTS”.
CHILDREN'S LONELINESS IN RUSSIAN NOBLE FAMILIES
(THE SECOND HALF OF THE XIX – BEGINNING
OF THE XX CENTURIES)***

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Abstract: *The article examines the relationship of children and parents specific to the Russian noble families. The greatest attention is paid to the evolution of the status of children. The state of the child, although living in a full family, but being in care of nannies or governesses, in the separate residences, is being studied. An analysis of the evolution of children's status is given – from their „uselessness” to the moment when they and their interests are placed at the centre of family relations. In their study the authors come to the conclusion, that during the XIX century the main „disease” of the noble family was the psychological condition of children – loneliness, in which „orphans with living parents” were growing up. Only at the very end of the XIX century, nobility parents begin to acknowledge the value of a child.*

Keywords: *Russia, XIX- XX centuries, noble family, parents, orphan, child psychology, loneliness of the child.*

Rezumat: *„Orfani cu părinți în viață”. Singurătatea copiilor în familiile nobile ruse din a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea și începutul secolului XX. Articolul examinează relația dintre copii și părinți specifică familiilor nobile din Rusia. Cea mai mare atenție este acordată evoluției statutului copiilor. Este studiată condiția copilului care, deși trăiește într-o familie completă, este îngrijit de bone sau guvernante, în reședințele separate. Se analizează evoluția statutului copiilor – de la „inutilitatea” lor și până la momentul în care ei și interesele lor sunt plasate în centrul relațiilor de familie. În studiul lor, autorii ajung la concluzia că, în secolul al XIX-lea, „boala” principală a familiei nobile a constituit-o starea psihologică a copiilor - singurătatea, în care creșteau „orfani cu părinți vii”. Abia la sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea, părinții nobili încep să conștientizeze importanța unui copil.*

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Résumé: *“Des orphelins avec des parents vivants”. La solitude des enfants des familles nobles russes de la seconde moitié du XIX-ème siècle – le début du XX-ème siècle.* L'article ci-joint examine la relation entre les enfants et les parents, spécifique aux familles nobles de la Russie. On y accorda la plus grande attention à l'évolution du statut des enfants. On y étudia la condition de l'enfant qui, quoiqu'il vive dans une famille complète, les nourrices et les gouverneurs le soignent, dans des résidences séparées. On y analysa, aussi, l'évolution du statut des enfants – de leur “inutilité” jusqu'au moment où ceux-ci et leurs intérêts commencèrent à être placés au centre des relations de famille. Dans leur étude, les auteurs arrivent à la conclusion que, le XIX-ème siècle, l'état psychologique des enfants – la solitude dans laquelle on élevait “les orphelins avec des parents vivants” – représenta “la maladie” principale de la famille noble. A peine à la fin du XIX-ème siècle, les parents nobles commencent à apercevoir l'importance d'un enfant.

INTRODUCTION

An important component of Russian society modernization, that took place in the second half of the XIX – early XX century, was a radical change of the noble family life. Evolution was carried out in two main directions. On the one hand, the nature of marriages changed. If in the middle of the XIX century parents of the bride couple acted as organizers of a new family, and it was created as an intergenerational union, then at the end of the century an increasingly important role was played by the personal choice of the spouses, and the marriage was supposed to be built not on the principles of house holding and economic expediency or family necessity, but on the basis of emotional intimacy and „love”.

On the other hand, evolution was subjected to the status of a child in a noble family. Occupying the lowest position in the family hierarchy, driven into remote rooms, the noble children of the mid-XIX century by the efforts of advanced pedagogy got to the beginning of XX the right to express their own „I”. Supporters of the concept of „free education” not only demanded the observance of the interests of children, but also the promotion of these interests – in family, in school, and in society as a whole – to the fore¹, with the goal of creating by the educators „conditions for spontaneous self-development of the child's

¹ В. А. Веремenco, *Выращивание революционера: концепция «свободного воспитания» в элитных школах России конца XIX – начала XX века* [Raising a revolutionary: the concept of "free education" in elite schools of Russia in the late XIX – early XX century], in "Самарский научный вестник", 2018, no. 1(22), с. 165-171.

personality, which do not distort the potential possibilities inherent in it”.² A significant part of the „new parents” from the nobility-intellectual families actively supported these ideas, in practice forming a new reality – „child-centric families”.

At first glance, these two messages, which put the emotional relations between family members to the base of family life, democratized its structure, were in no way contradictory. And love that binds parents was even more evident in their joint concern for children, in their active participation in their lives. However, this was the case if love between the spouses persisted, and if it passed? If there is no love, then the marriage built on its basis could no longer continue. Yet, how to combine this thesis with the idea of the supremacy of children interests? This dilemma was first seriously discussed in Russian society at the end of the XIX – beginning of the XX century, symbolizing the transition to a new type of family relations.

Thus, the purpose of this article is to analyse the evolution of the relationship between parents and children in the noble families of Russia in the second half of the XIX – early XX centuries. Evolution, in which, despite the gradual change in the status of children in family, the problem of child loneliness continued to persist.

Historiography of this topic is extremely small – the evolution of noble motherhood at the turn of the XIX-XX century, mainly in the part of caring for small children, was considered by N. A. Mitsyuk.³ Various aspects of relationship between parents and children of the nobles were investigated by one of the authors of this article.⁴

The main materials for revealing the problem of child loneliness in the noble families of post-reform Russia were the sources of personal origin, largely

² С. А. Ганина, *Концепция свободного воспитания: опыт социально-философской рефлексии феномена детства* [The concept of "free education": experience of socio-philosophical reflection of the childhood phenomenon], in "Общество. Среда. Развитие (Terra Humana)", 2012, no. 1, с. 185.

³ Н. А. Мицук, *Рождение матери: субкультура материнства в высших слоях общества индустриальной России* [Birth of a mother: subculture of motherhood in the upper strata of the society of industrial Russia], Смоленск, 2015.

⁴ В. А. Веременко, *Дворянская семья и государственная политика России (вторая половина XIX – начало XX вв.)* [Noble family and state policy of Russia (second half of the XIX – beginning of the XX century)], Изд. 2-е, испр. и дополн. СПб.: Изд-во «Европейский дом», 2009. 684 с; Eadem, *Дети в дворянских семьях России (вторая половина XIX-начало XX вв.)* [Children in noble families of Russia (second half of the XIX – beginning of the XX century)], СПб.: ЛГУ им. А.С. Пушкина, 2015, 204 с.

unpublished, clerical documents of the "Commission of Petitions for the Highest Name" of the second half of the XIX century. Fiction in the style of realism is used not accidentally. Its value as a source lies in the ability to reflect the mentality of its time and concrete nation, to contribute to the reconstruction of certain historical types of behaviour, thinking and perception.

"NO LOVE – NO PROBLEM..."

CHILDREN AND PARENTS IN A TRADITIONAL NOBLE FAMILY

In a traditional noble family, prevailing in Russia in the middle of the XIX century, parental involvement in the upbringing of children was of an episodic nature, and assumed the most general control, as well as organization of career of the young man and marriage party of the girl.

Children of early age were in care of fosterers and nurses, usually serfs. Parents rarely interfered in the order they established, limiting themselves (at best) to several visits to the nursery per day, or by polling the servants of everything was all right. Babies, sent in order not to interfere „to the distant rooms”, in turn, knew little and were afraid of their parents considering them as „strangers”.⁵ As a result, the emotional attachment of the child did not extend to the parents, but to the nannies. They became the most significant people for noble children. In hundreds of memoirs of noblemen kind words, addressed to his nurse, can be met. Such, for example, as M. S. Nikolaeva: „... All of us, except sister Elizabeth, are obliged to the good nurse, that we grew up in fear of God, in respect of parents, are all pretty well built up, without any outstanding physical defects”.⁶ Separation from the nanny, with transition to the care of a tutor (governess) and, especially, with admission to an educational institution, became for the noble children the main experience of childhood. And they tried, after returning home, to take the dearest person to themselves. There was even a certain tradition to give to a just-married noble girl with a dowry, among others, her nanny, who became the main assistant and confidante in a new house for the young housewife.⁷

At the age of 3-5 years, the child switched to the „use” of a governess or tutor. Various popular guides, quite adequately reflecting the place of home tutor

⁵ Отдел рукописей Российской национальной библиотеки (ОР РНБ) [Department of Manuscripts of the Russian National Library], Ф. 601. – *Половцовы*, Д. 1195, Л. 78.

⁶ М. С. Николева, *Черты старинного дворянского быта. Воспоминания* [Features of ancient noble life. Memories], in „Русский Архив”, 1893, no. 10, с. 159.

⁷ ОР РНБ, Ф. 601, Д. 1196, Л. 3.

in the house, argued that „the governess generally to some extent replaces the mother for children; so she must constantly be with them, caring not only about their education, but also about their physical well-being”.⁸ Mutual contacts of parents with their children who have left infancy, as before, did not differ with special frequency. As a rule, they assumed several „ritual” actions. In the morning children were brought to their father and mother, to greet. Sometimes during the day, if there were no guests in the house, and the parents were not very „busy”, the whole family met at the table. Finally, in the evening, the wish for „good night” was realized, and in special solemn occasions a common prayer was performed.⁹ For a reason in the course of the early childhood memories of the mid-XIX century, as in the preceding decades, father rarely appeared, and the image of mother „beautiful, distant, smelling perfume”, glancing into the nursery for a minute to kiss children before leaving for the ball, reception or elsewhere, rather comparable with a fairy, an unearthly being than with loved and close person.¹⁰

A rather typical picture of the „orphanhood” of children with parents in a noble family is painted by I.S. Turgenev in the „Noble Nest”: „Liza passed the tenth year, when her father died; but he did little about her. He was busy with affairs, constantly preoccupied with the increment of his financial position, bilious, harsh, impatient, he did not hesitate to give money to teachers, tutors, clothes and other children's needs; but could not stand, as he put it, to babysit with squeakies, Marya Dmitrievna [mother], in fact, did not much more than her husband deal with Lisa, although she bragged at Lavretsky that she had raised her children alone; she dressed her like a dolly, at her guests stroked her on head and called her into her eyes a clever girl and a darling – and only: the lazy lady was tired of all constant care. During the life of her father, Lisa was in the hands of a governess...”¹¹

F. M. Dostoevsky also did not ignore the topic of „fathers and children”, deepening into the inner world and childhood memories of his protagonist Arkady Makarovich in the novel „Adolescent”, he shows the relationship of parents to their son: „I was like a discarded and almost from birth placed in strange people... When my mother gave birth to me, she was still young and nice, and so, he needed her [father], and the screaming child, of course, was a nuisance at all, especially in travel. That's why it happened that until the twentieth year I hardly saw my

⁸ *Жизнь в свете, дома и при дворе* [Life in society, at home and at the court], Репринт, Москва, 1990, с. 94-95.

⁹ ОР РНБ, Ф. 326, Д. 15, Л. 2.

¹⁰ ОР РНБ, Ф. 601, Д. 1196, Л. 2-3.

¹¹ И. С. Тургенев, *Дворянское гнездо* [Noble Nest], Москва, 1983, с. 209.

mother, except for two or three cases in passing". And memories about his father further reflect the system of relations that was developed in society – „Versilov, my father, whom I saw only once in my life, for a moment, when I was only ten years old... who gave birth to me and thrown me in society, still not only didn't know me at all, but even never repented in it (who knows, maybe about my very existence he had a vague and inaccurate concept, since it later turned out that it was not he who paid money for keeping me in Moscow, but others)".¹²

Indicatively, despite the fact that both father and mother did not engage in their children equally, it was believed that in case of widowhood, a man himself cannot cope with children and he must attract any woman to their upbringing. This problem could be solved in several ways. It was not uncommon for the head of the family to invite a widowed or unmarried relative to his house; as a housekeeper, he had to supervise governesses and nannies. Noble memoirs contain numerous colourful descriptions of „aunties", engaged in the upbringing of children of „dead sisters" (kinship with whom in fact could be very remote). And since the position of „dependents" required „working off", then, as a rule, they really cared about children entrusted to them, becoming really close people for the latter.¹³ For example, for Misha Danchich it was a true tragedy when due to the repeated marriage of his father – the palace doctor K. M. Danchich – a kind and caring „aunt", who lived in their house on the rights of „housekeeper" for over 15 years, left the family.¹⁴

On the other hand, children could simply be sent from home in order to save their father from this „burden". Such a situation was often played out in children's Christmas literature: „Petr Savich..., decided to write to his wife's relatives in Siberia, asking them to come to Petersburg as quickly as possible and take Kolya [his son] on care. He admitted himself incapable of bringing up his son".¹⁵ Finally,

¹² М. Ф. Достоевский, *Подросток* [Adolescent], <https://www.litres.ru/fedor-dostoevskiy/podrostok/> (Accessed on 17.04.2018)

¹³ В. А. Верemenko, *«Дура в доме» – женская домашняя прислуга в дворянских семьях России второй половины XIX – начала XX вв.* [“Fool in the house” – female domestic servants in the noble families of Russia in the second half of the XIX – early XX centuries], in “Альманах гендерной истории «Адам и Ева»”, 2013, no. 21, с. 244-245; В. В. Каминский, В. А. Верemenko, *«...Я вышла замуж за любимого...» мемуары О. М. Меницкой-Зоммар (01.03.1874-31.01.1967)* [“... I married a loved one...” Memoirs of O. M. Menitskaya-Zommar (01.03.1874-31.01.1967)], in “История повседневности”, 2017, no. 1, с. 118-119.

¹⁴ ОР РНБ, Ф. 163, Д. 313-324.

¹⁵ *Рождественские рассказы для детей, с рисунками. Вып. Второй. Два брата*

father's repeated marriage was very often presented as a way of solving the issue of children from a previous marriage.¹⁶

At the age of 10-12 a significant part of teenagers went to schools. In traditional families preference was given to the closed educational institutions, which were believed to guarantee the „future” of children, providing boys with necessary knowledge to obtain a „place”, and girls with so much needed for a „profitable party” „purity and innocence”. This practice began to be negatively assessed in the noble-intellectual environment only in the last decade of the XIX century, when teachers began to talk about the consequences of separation of children from the family, which were deeply traumatic for the child's mind: „Parents, relatives and in general those people who, putting children in state institutions, were glad that they sold them off their hands, were guilty, and thought that if he is full, dressed and does not need anything else; but they are convinced of this, and they cannot even understand that such a life without leaving can lead to bitterness, so perhaps they are not to blame, because looking at everything deeply is not the quality of every person”.¹⁷

Before that period, many parents specially emphasized their detachment from children. This position is perfectly illustrated in L.N. Tolstoy novel „Anna Karenina”: „Children? In Petersburg children did not prevent their fathers from living. Children were brought up in institutions”.¹⁸

It is characteristic that even children sent to „institutions” rarely missed their parents. In numerous memoirs written both by the Cadets and the Institutes, the conditions of entry and life in an educational institution, relations with the administration, teachers and classmates are necessarily characterized, and even the place of „guests” is located.¹⁹ In the memories of house, „freedom”, nannies and aunts

[Christmas stories for children, with drawings. Vol. 2. Two brothers], СПб., Изд. ред. детского сада и Б. Белова, 1871, с. 15-16.

¹⁶ ОР РНБ, Ф. 163, Д. 313-324; ОР РНБ, Ф. 601, Д. 1196.

¹⁷ ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 732, Оп. 1, Д. 121, Л. 19.

¹⁸ Л. Н. Толстой, *Анна Каренина* [Anna Karenina], Москва, 1985, с. 684.

¹⁹ В. А. Веременко, *Особенности школьного быта дворян в государственных закрытых учебных заведениях России (вторая половина XIX – начало XX вв.)* [Specifics of the school life of noblemen in state restricted access educational institutions of Russia (second half of XIX – beginning of XX centuries)], in “Вестник Череповецкого государственного университета”, 2014, no. 8/61, с. 33-36; *Кадеты, гардемарины, юнкера. Мемуары воспитанников военных училищ XIX века. История воспитания* [Cadets, midshipmen, junkers. Memoirs of pupils of military schools of the XIX century. History of Education], <https://coollib.com/b/248625/read> (Accessed on 04.04.2018);

appear. And the child missed them, not the absent parents. And when the experiences were mentioned, in a context where there were no places for older members of the family: „Left alone in the corps, I did not cry, despite the terrible longing that seized me; I did not cry only because there were no tears in my character”.²⁰

In general, characterizing the „orphanhood” of noble children in a traditional family, their attitude to their parents, it is worthwhile to turn again to the „encyclopaedia of Russian life” – a novel by L. N. Tolstoy „Anna Karenina”: „Vronsky never knew a family life. His mother was in her youth a brilliant secular woman, who had during her marriage, and especially after, many affairs known to the whole world. His father he almost did not remember and was raised in the Pages Corps...

He did not respect his mother in his soul, and did not report himself he did not like her, although according to the concepts of the circle in which he lived, according to his upbringing, he could not imagine others relations to the mother, as highly submissive and respectful...”²¹

“LOVE AND HATRED”.

CHILDREN – „ORPHANS” IN SEPARATE FAMILIES: A NEW REALITY OF THE LATE XIX – EARLY XX CENTURIES

In post-reform Russia a new form of marriage, based solely on romantic attachment and community of personal interests of the family, begins to shape in the noble environment. It spread widely to the 1880s, and by the beginning of the XX century such a marriage became the only way to start a family, which was approved by society. Being married „love-match”, young people dreamed of maintaining an emotionally close relationship. High demands on the behaviour of a partner in family, unwillingness to put up with his „unworthy actions” significantly complicated interpersonal relations of the spouses. If love is gone, and it was „a stranger” near, then the family, formed according to the „inclination”, was expected by hard lines. In most cases, unrealized dreams of „personal happiness”, which became such a significant part of a person's life, spilled out in desire to create a new family, even if not consummated, but being built „on love”.²²

В. М. Боковой, Л. Г. Сахаровой, *Институтки: Воспоминания воспитанниц институтов благородных девиц* [Boarding schoolgirls: Memoirs of pupils of noble maidens institutes], Москва, 2001.

²⁰ В. Г. Бооль, *Воспоминания педагога* [Memoirs of the teacher], in “Русская старина”, 1904, no. 3, с. 620.

²¹ Л. Н. Толстой, *Анна Каренина...*, с. 75, 79.

²² В. А. Верemenko, *Дворянская семья и государственная...*

For the first generation of Russian nobility, who survived the „revolution of feelings,” the fate of children, who mostly continued to be educated according to the traditional pattern, with the minimum participation of their parents, was not a really important reason to deny personal happiness. So, thinking of her son, after leaving her husband for Vronsky, Anna spoke of suffering, but „separation from her son, whom she loved, did not actually torture her the first time... Anna rarely thought of her son”.²³ Her son Serezha was told that his mother died, explaining to him „that she died for him, because she is not good...”. But he not believes in this, „during the walks was looking for her... Every woman, sonsy, graceful, with dark hair, was his mother. At the sight of such a woman, a feeling of tenderness rose in his soul, such that he gasped and tears came to his eyes”.²⁴ Serezha knew that there was a quarrel between his parents that he would stay with his father, and „tried to get used to this idea”.²⁵

In the case of family breakdown, children were often not needed for both parents. Such collisions were often played out in literary works of the last quarter of the XIX century. Thus, in the novel „Alien Sins” by A. K. Sheller-Mikhailov²⁶, it is told about the destruction of family because of betrayal, the uselessness of „native” children neither for father nor mother, „orphans” with living parents and their upbringing by the aunt, who was trying to create a new world for children.

The novel begins with descriptions of relationship between parents – mother Eugenia Aleksandrovna Khryumina and father Vladimir Arkadyevich Khryumin. Family drama, wife does not love her husband, has a lover (from whom she is pregnant) and is ready to leave her husband and two of her children, the boy Eugeny and the girl Olya, for the sake of a new life with a loved person. After Eugenia Alexandrovna left the family, children stayed with their father, who did not love them, because „they were the children of a woman who “spoiled his life”... For the father, Eugeny and Olya were a heavy burden, „he never loved them and he was not sad to be in separation from them”, he would like to adopt them out, „but he did not have facilities to give them anywhere to a full board in a good family. Truly, they could be put somewhere for a cheap fee, but „society”... what they say in the „society”, if they know that he almost dropped his „legitimate”

²³ Л. Н. Толстой, *Анна Каренина...*, с. 444.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 499.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 683.

²⁶ А. Шеллер-Михайлов, *Чужие грехи* [Alien Sins], СПб., Тип. Императорской академии наук, 1880, http://az.lib.ru/s/shellermihajlow_a_k/text_1880_chuzhie_grehi_oldorfo.shtml (Accessed on 05.05.2017)

children". Vladimir Arkadyevich was not worried about children with their feelings and emotional experience; he cared about „status”, opinion of „society”. He threw hatred of his wife on children, considering them „the culprits of his needs and deprivations”.

Then the plot unfolds so that father gives children to their aunt Olympiada Platonovna. And only here in the new house, children receive love and care, everything they were deprived of in their own family, living with parents. The main character, boy Eugeny, through his internal dialogues and dialogue with his aunt Olympiada, characterizes his life with parents: „<...> His mother was absent for days, often he did not see her even five minutes a day, sometimes in the tone of a capricious girl she told children that „they bored her”, that they have to stop bothering her, that they have to go to the nursery, but he did not even think of the question: „does his mother love him?” He did not see and did not know any other relations of mother to children, and therefore he considered as natural these relations, existing in their family. Father, when he was not traveling abroad, lost his temper, screamed, got angry with children, nagged at them for every little thing, almost never caressed them, but it was also such a routine, such a constant event that children almost got over...”.

The materials of activities of the Commission of petitions²⁷, where requests submitted to the Emperor came for consideration, indicate that such stories were not an artistic exaggeration, but quite ordinary reality. The case of Captain Peter Gardenin, considered by the Commission of petitions in 1899, looks typical. The plot of this life drama is surprisingly similar to the novel above. After the couple estranged their daughter stayed with father. But the officer had neither financial opportunity, nor special desire to engage in a girl. The request to take care of the child was expressed by elderly relatives: the girl's grandmother – wife of Adjutant-General V. K. Gull and 2 grandmothers – state lady Countess E. N. Adelberg and the wife of Major-General Countess E. A. Adelberg. With the mediation of Commission officials, father agreed to hand over his daughter temporarily to the care of her grandmother, Countess Eugenia Aleksandrovna Adelberg, until the girl reached the age „when she could be placed in an institution of his choice”. But he set the conditions: „1/ that the mother of a minor must be completely eliminated from the care of spiritual and physical development of the child; 2/ that he, Gardenin, preserved a right to see his daughter at the place of her stay with grandmother at

²⁷ А. М. Семёнов, *История формирования Комиссии прошений в России* [History of formation of the Commission of petitions in Russia], *XX юбилейные Царскосельские чтения: материалы междунар. науч. конф.*, 20-21 апр. 2016 г., 2016, с. 91-95.

all times, when only he recognizes it necessary and possible; 3/ that he... was given the right to take his daughter to his place for a temporary stay up to three months per year; 4/ that the choice and change of nannies and governesses had to be carried out with his knowledge and consent; 5/ that he receives detailed information about the child on a monthly basis and 6/ that in case of any deviations from the normal course of the child's life he... must be immediately notified of this..."²⁸ Thus, with both living parents „orphan” Irina appeared in the house of grandmothers...

Thus, by the end of the XIX century against the backdrop of the growth of personal happiness value in the nobility of Russia, the practice of separate living of the spouses was spread, in which the interests of children were almost not taken into account, and the parents were much more concerned with their problems than with the emotional experiences and hurts of their children.

“ALL FOR THE SAKE OF CHILD”.

DISPUTES ABOUT CHILDREN IN THE NOBLE FAMILIES OF RUSSIA

As the gaze on parenthood in Russian noble family changed under the influence of a complex of economic and social reasons, more and more often mothers were involved in the matter of raising their own children, actively participating in the care of infants and in education of the elder.²⁹ In the most advanced families fathers also sought to spend time with their children, playing with them, checking their homework, conducting serious conversations... Unwilling to be part of their children's universe, fearing for their psychological health, many parents preferred education of adolescents in open educational institutions. Increasingly, the interests of children have become a priority in dealing with questions of the family's place of residence, diet and table menu, nature of summer holidays. The mutual affection of representatives of the older and younger generations increased.

In this situation, the question of whether it is worth preserving the appearance of family for the sake of children's tranquillity proved to be much more important for many noble spouses than observing public decorum or career problems – „We [V. V. Rozanov] received and receive many private letters regarding divorce – letters, sometimes telling long family stories, which are filled with pleas for divorce, then with fear of divorce... A husband who has lived in unhappy

²⁸ Российский государственный исторический архив (РГИА) [Russian State Historical Archive], Ф. 1412, Оп. 212, Д. 47, Л. 3, 4, 17.

²⁹ В. А. Веретенко *Дети в дворянских семьях России...*; Н.А. Мицюк, *Рождение матери...*

marriage for ten years, but does not consider it possible to dissolve it, because there is a daughter who is equally loved by his wife and him, writes to us”.³⁰ All the more, since the beginning of the XX century even the divorce of an officer for adultery, with declaration him the guilty party and discussion in the judicial session of the Spiritual Consistory of the „act itself”, had little effect on his career promotion.³¹

In many diaries written at the turn of the XIX-XX century and belonging to the pen of noble spouses (especially women) standing on the threshold of break-up, it were the children and their interests that acted as the main deterrent to the final decision. So, a caring mother and well-known artist Catherine Kavos, who nursed herself and cared for her children, having already made the decision to live separately with her husband Eugeny, with whom she had lived at that time for 15 years, finally changed her mind. And she was not stopped by the opinion of others around – in her environment, separating was a universal phenomenon, and not by material problems – as a portraitist she had a wide clientele and orders brought a quite steady income. But children... She did not trust her innermost feelings even to the diary, describing only the fear of possible influence of her intensions on children: „I became bad and made so much dark, sinful, criminal that I could not tell anyone, anyone and could not write this in the diary myself. I know that I must live for children and must be strong and good morally. But I consider myself unworthy, unworthy to live in moral way and my touch to them sometimes hurts my heart. Then, with this inner pain I lose my heart and have less force – to engage in them”.³²

But there also were such „advanced” parents in the nobility, who, although they raised children themselves, cared for them, yet they did not want to give up their personal happiness for them. On the other hand, they were unable to leave and forget about their children too. In this situation in the late XIX century a new line of family conflicts emerged – disputes about children. Separate living parents sought to regulate not only the material aspects of keeping children, but also tried to agree on the rules of their personal relationships.

Not infrequently it was not possible to reach an agreement peacefully, and then separate living noble spouses turned to the Commission for petitions for mediation. Sometimes even officials of this department could not convince parents

³⁰ В. В. Розанов, *Семейный вопрос в России* [Family issue in Russia], http://dugward.ru/library/rozanov/rozanov_sem_vop1.html#otkry (Accessed on 15.04.2018)

³¹ See, for example, the case of M. D. Bonch-Bruevich in В. В. Каминский, В. А. Веремёнко, *М.Д. Бонч-Бруевич — один из основателей Красной армии: страницы биографии* [M. D. Bonch-Bruevich — one of the founders of the Red Army: pages of biography], in “Новейшая история России”, 2018, no. 1, с. 57-69; РГИА., Ф. 1412, Оп. 213, Д. 87.

³² ИРЛИ РАН (Пушкинский дом), Ф. 445, – Е.С. Зарудная-Кавос, Д. 16.

to give children the opportunity to maintain relations both with their father and mother. For example, L.S. and M.V. Baranovsky did not invent anything for it but to share the children – son left with father, and daughters stayed with mother.³³

A vivid reflection of new relations in noble families can be the „family case of Princes Prozorovsky-Golitsyn”, which was examined in the Commission of petitions in 1896-1901. The main reason for discord and break of the couple's relations was the strongest love of both parents for their daughter, which turned into jealousy for each other. Father – Alexander Alexandrovich constantly coddled little daughter, „allowed her everything she wanted”, mother – Maria Petrovna – tried to teach her to order. As a result, „any, even a reasonable remark made by the mother to the girl, always aroused displeasure from the Prince, which he uttered in extremely harsh form”. Officials of the Commission who studied the circumstances of the case stated that „...the Prozorovsky-Golitsyn spouses attach only minor importance to the issue of establishing a separate life and mainly seek to limit each other's parental rights, having in mind primarily the child's benefit... Thus, the whole matter boils down to the solution of the question: which one of the spouses should be recognized as the most desirable educator of the child?” At the same time, officials were constrained to admit that the most relevant to the child's interests would be *„the removal of the young Princess Mary from the sphere of direct joint influence of both warring parents [our emphasis – V. V., O. S.] and her placement, for upbringing and education, into a closed educational institution, ... with granting both parents equal rights to date with her”*. But since the girl was only 5 years old at the time of commencement of the trial, until she reached adolescence she had to take turns to live with her mother and father, in the estate, in Tsarskoe Selo, abroad (it is characteristic that choosing their place of residence parents had to take into account interests of the child, and not the reverse). Supervision of the princess was entrusted to one tutor, who carried out the order not of the parents, but a special tutelary council composed of relatives of both spouses.³⁴

CONCLUSIONS

During the XIX century the main „disease” of the noble family was the psychological state of children – loneliness, in which „orphans with living parents” grew up. For many generations the relationship between parents and children had

³³ РГИА, Ф. 1412, Оп. 214, Д. 15.

³⁴ РГИА, Ф. 1412, Оп. 226, Д. 140, Л. 123-124, 181, 222-223; РГИА, Ф. 1412, Оп. 226, Д. 142, Л. 34-61.

a formally-traditional nature, which did not include personal participation. And if there was a conflict between parents on the basis of adultery, then children were not needed at all.

Until the last decades of the XIX century the problem of isolation of children in noble families was not standing, it was not simply noticed. It was a habitual way of life. Therefore, there are not so many memoirs that would reveal this topic. But family relations were described in the works of Russian classical literature of the late XIX century, which described the tragedy of relations between parents and children, who little knew each other, and consequently could not love.

Only at the very end of the XIX century, noble parents begin to recognize their children, and at the same time, fear of separation and desire to keep them near appears. For some parents, especially for mothers, it was the danger of separation from children, and not the opinion of society, family-clan interests or even material factors, that becomes the main obstacle to leaving the family. The other side of this process is the wide spread of disputes about children, in which the separate living spouses sought to resolve numerous controversial issues from the place of the child's permanent residence, conditions of meetings with him of a separately living parent, to organizing the life and keeping children. Truly, not always in the course of such discussions, interests of the child were taken as a basis, very often parents, above all, cared about achieving *their own* material and soul comfort.

As the number of separate living families increased, the number of children living apart from one or even both parents upraised. But if in the second half of the XIX century „orphans with living parents” did not know about the distorted state in which they were staying, did not expect that it is possible to live differently, then at the beginning of the XX century „new children” wanted from their near ones, above all, emotional closeness, wanted and even demanded love and care. As a result, such “orphanhood” was perceived much more painful than before, especially if there were full, friendly families nearby. Loneliness of children with living parents was first recognized as a social problem in the noble environment in Russia at the beginning of the XX century, which symbolized the transition to a new form of family organization.

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1. Paul Jensen, *History of the World*, New-York, University Publishing House, 2003, p. 243.
2. Richard Little, Barry Buzan, *Sistemele internaționale în istoria lumii* [International Systems In World History], Iași, Editura Polirom, 2009, p. 62-63.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
4. Stelian Tanase (coord.), *Cioran și Securitatea* [Cioran and Securitatea], Iași, Editura Polirom, 2009, p. 14.
5. Christine Sylvester, *Empathetic Cooperation: A Feminist Method for IR*, in "Millennium: Journal of International Studies", 1994, Vol. 23, no. 2, p. 315-334.
6. Richard Little, Barry Buzan, *Sistemele internaționale...*, pp. 148, 155, 239.
7. *Australia-NATO Joint Political Declaration*, in http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_94097.htm (Accessed on 12.11.2012).
8. А. И. Деникин, *Путь русского офицера* [The Way of a Russian Officer], Москва, Современник, 1991, с. 58.

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